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1. The Search for a Rational System 
of Accountability 
The Concept of Accountability 
Between 1972 and 1986 public enterprises in Tanzania represented 40 
per cent of the country's GDP, and at the end of 1986 they employed 
about 32 per cent of the total labour force (Bureau of Statistics 1972- 
1986). During the same period they absorbed an annual average of 75 per 
cent of government funds (Senkoro 1988). It is not surprising therefore 
that in the last two decades, as these enterprises became a significant fea- 
ture of the Tanzanian economy, the need to make them more efficient, 
beneficial and accountable gained urgency. 
However, the complex nature of the concept of accountability and the 
diversity of opinions among policy makers, advisers and researchers on 
the causes of poor performance of public enterprises in Tanzania makes 
this change problematic. In operational terms, accountability is a perfor- 
mance concept implying delegation of power or authority and assignment 
of performance responsibility. It also, in this sense, implies that a subor- 
dinate body or officer accepts such responsibility as well as the duty to 
exercise it within the limits of its attendant authority. Answerability and 
liability for misfeasance or non-performance naturally follow from this 
(Allen 1958, Sisk 1977). 
The second aspect of accountability, ultimate answerability, right of 
the person or body legally or conventionally entitled to confer such auth- 
ority, to take to task the person or body on whom the function or power 
has been conferred for any breach of such power, duty or function by sub- 
ordinates, whether or not they were lawfully exercising such power or 
authority. This imposes vicarious liability on superior officials for acts or 
omissions of their subordinates (Mwinyi 1987). Superior officials are also 
obliged to accept culpability and responsibility for authorized and un- 
authorized errors or failures (Mwinyi 1986, Mihyo 1988), indicating that 
delegating power does not necessarily relocate or mitigate accountability. 
Both types of accountability operate best in bureaucratic organiza- 
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tions, their underlying presumption being that the ultimately responsible 
person or body has unfettered decision-making powers within the applic- 
able rules and has absolute power to control the behaviour of his or her 
subordinates. Both ultimate and conferred accountability require a hier- 
archy of power and authority, which in turn implies a monocratic, bureau- 
cratic organization. Within this model, absolute power can be delegated, 
but absolute responsibility cannot. Other requisite conditions include the 
remaining Weberian attributes of bureaucratic organization, such as rule 
specificity, officialdom and specialization. 
As Sendaro (1986) points out, the two approaches have long existed in 
private enterprises where they have functioned as instruments for bure- 
aucratic control. In Tanzania, the two concepts have gained favour from 
time to time (Mwinyi 1986,1987, Hamad 1987). But there has also been a 
call for a third and broader view of accountability. Going beyond internal 
accountability and power, it calls for external and political accountability. 
External and political accountability distinguishes itself from the 
other two models firstly because it acts as a market response mechanism. 
Where political legitimacy is an essential qualification for continuation in 
power, any abuse of power or act of misfeasance erodes legitimacy. 
Hence, public officials who commit or allow, negligently or otherwise, any 
breach of duty or abuse of power, have a duty to relinquish authority, ir- 
respective of whether they had power to prevent the breach or abuse. 
Such a withdrawal restores the constituency's legitimacy to appoint an- 
other person or body to act in the same capacity. 
The second point of difference is that it includes a political responsi- 
bility to answer to the empowering authority for the exercise of power. 
The main issue here is not delegation of authority or power but its effect 
on the clientele or the public. Hence the duty to answer or explain does 
not necessarily arise from direct delegation of power by the questioning 
authority but from the need for openness in the exercise of public auth- 
ority or power. Such a concept goes far beyond the technical consider- 
ations of efficiency, to encompass the duty of accountability to civil so- 
ciety for acts and omissions of these bodies which constitute public 
administration. 
Public enterprises, as part and parcel of the system of public power, 
cannot be confined to the first two concepts of accountability. They are 
accountable not only to those above, but to those below (Khera 1964). 
They are duty-bound to explain the intentions, problems, achievements 
and failures of these enterprises. Such information is deemed to be a pub- 
lic right, accompanied by a moral responsibility to explain to the appoint- 
ing and electoral authority the way in which public responsibilities have 
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been discharged (Sokoine, 1983). Public enterprises in Tanzania are so 
much a part of the political structures of power and production that they 
must be accountable to the general public for their acts and omissions. 
Public Enterprise Studies in Tanzania 
Since their launch, public enterprises have been evaluated and de- 
bated. The main concern during the late 1960s and early 1970s was the ex- 
tent to which their structures and operations could counter Tanzania's co- 
lonial heritage: its orientation toward primary commodity export, the lack 
of sectoral linkages, its distorted income distribution and the absence of 
a capital goods sector (Rweyemanu 1970, 1971). The expansion of the 
public sector took place in the climate of social and economic optimism 
created by the country's socialist policy. Evaluation sought to discover 
whether quantitative changes were taking place which justified the shift 
from private sector to public sector-biased policy (Binhamer 1968, 1969; 
Loxley 1969,1972). 
Initial evaluations, however, concentrated on the market behaviour of 
these enterprises. Output became the major focus for both the critics and 
defenders of public enterprise. Although no clear output indicators were 
singled out, services, goods and financial contribution to development re- 
sources featured prominently (Moshi 1979, 1984). Even those who saw 
positive change concentrated on financial and physical output gains 
(Mwansasu and Mramba 1972; Mwapachu 1983). 
In the early 1970s researchers became preoccupied with physical or 
quantitative aspects of planning and decision-making. Studies produced 
in this period helped to isolate the various problems involved in the run- 
ning of the enterprises, for example: poor communication, lack of politi- 
cal orientation, absence of long-term planning, vague decision-making 
channels, lack of implementation strategies, and so on (Svendsen 1967; 
Loxley 1969; Packard 1973). They suggested quantitative and physical 
solutions ranging from decentralization to increased internal control 
(Helleiner 1967; Romnicianu 1971; Penrose 1972; Temu 1972). 
Researchers and policy makers during this period took for granted 
that the model of public enterprise applicable in Tanzania was the most 
appropriate and that the main problem was a general lack of experience. 
They also assumed that the poor performance of these enterprises arose 
from market factors, aggravated by organizational problems. They as- 
sumed that most problems were externally stimulated, either by multina- 
tionals or by fluctuations in prices on the international market, and that if 
prices and linkages stabilized, equilibrium would be restored. Finally, 
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they equated accountability with control. As a result, control agencies 
proliferated, making all sorts of decisions on investments, recruitment, 
marketing, distribution, etc. (Ghai 1977). The necessity of control was 
taken for granted (Msuya 1973, 1974), the assumption being that more 
controls meant greater accountability and greater likelihood of oper- 
ational efficiency. 
The studies of the 1980s did not make any significant departures. 
Most were process-oriented. Significant were the technology studies 
whose preoccupation was whether any transfer or acquisition of technol- 
ogy was taking place (Mlawa 1983; Komba 1984; Wangwe, et al., 1985). 
Most studies found that although policies for the build-up of local tech- 
nological capacity in the public sector existed, implementation, evalu- 
ation and follow-up procedures were weak. Other process studies con- 
centrated on participatory management as a strategy for development 
(Bavu, et al., 1980; Mapolu 1980; Mihyo 1980, 1982, 1983; Mihyo, et al., 
1983, 1986; Besha 1982, 1985). These were basically promotional studies 
aiming at popularizing participatory management. They advocated in- 
creased control of public enterprises through accountability to repre- 
sentative consultative bodies. 
Performance evaluation studies have contributed not only by analys- 
ing and exposing performance trends, but also by shaping policy. Sectoral 
performance studies in finance (Hyuha 1984; Rutayisire 1986), transport 
(Kasungu 1986; Kasungu and Ndulu 1986), agriculture (Lipumba 1983, 
1986), and industry (Ndulu 1983; Ndulu and Hyuha 1984; Wangwe 1982, 
1983; Wangwe and Skarstein 1986) all discussed the market failures of 
public enterprises and the need to reintroduce market controls. It was on 
the basis of this last group of studies that radical decisions were made first 
to shrink the public sector considerably and then to introduce competi- 
tion, sub-contracting, and if possible privatization as market control 
mechanisms for increasing the efficiency of the public sector. 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s each critic or defender of public en- 
terprise performance selected a single (or relatively few) threads of Tan- 
zania's socio-economic fabric, and with a towering indifference to other 
factors, issued a verdict on the whole public enterprise system or the na- 
tional economy. Furthermore, apart from the decision-making studies 
(which had no impact at all on policy), the general notion was that the 
disequilibrium in the public enterprise system and the national economy 
resulted from market distortions exogenous to the system of public 
ownership. Hence market failures such as under-capacity utilization, low 
rates of return, distributional bottlenecks, over-employment, and high 
debt rates were examined in isolation from non-market causes of market 
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failures, such as political manipulation of markets, political-control cycles 
in decision-making, marketing and the acquisition of technology, political 
intermediation of distribution and investment decisions; the socio-econ- 
omic importance of cycles of corruption and the resultant private accu- 
mulation by politicians and officials; and weak control and accountability 
structures, which as I will show later are inherent in the Morrisonian 
model of public enterprise. Finally, it was assumed, without much justifi- 
cation, that the prevailing model of public enterprise was the most appro- 
priate and that with it, accountability was attainable. 
This book will show that the public enterprise model, based on the 
Morrisonian concept of public enterprise accountability, favours non- 
market controls and is not conducive to adequate accountability to public 
bodies. The public enterprise model favours internal control and ac- 
countability over external control or accountability. In England, where it 
originated, the model has never allowed non-governmental institutions 
more control of public enterprises, and it is unlikely to produce better re- 
sults in Tanzania, where market controls are weaker and government in- 
stitutions fully control the political process. 
The book's eight chapters examine: traditional or historical barriers to 
market controls over public enterprises and operational barriers to such 
controls in the developmental context of Tanzania; the Morrisonian 
model as introduced in Tanzania and the way in which legislation and the 
power structure elevate non-market controls over public enterprises and 
the impact of this on their accountability to the public; the influence of the 
Tanzanian Parliament over government policy generally and public enter- 
prise policy in particular; the system of annual reports as a mechanism for 
external accountability; the role of the Parliamentary Committee on pub- 
lic enterprises and its contribution to the attainment of the accountability 
of these enterprises to the public; the impact of government controls on 
the performance of public enterprises; and the search for better and 
more appropriate mechanisms for the attainment of public enterprise ac- 
countability. The book focuses on short-term strategies which can im- 
prove the performance and accountability of these enterprises without 
waiting for major structural and organizational reforms. It also examines 
long-term structural and organizational changes that could lessen those 
burdens imposed on the public sector which perpetuate inefficiency and 
lack of accountability. 
2. Historical and Operational 
Barriers to Market Controls 
over the Conventional Public 
Enterprise Model 
Historical Barriers to Market Controls in the 
Morrisonian Model 
Before the end of World War I, most public enterprises were govern- 
ment departments, operated and staffed by civil servants. Without inde- 
pendent financial resources, they depended, like other departments, on 
funds from government budgets and on supplementary allocations. They 
lacked any independent corporate personalities, and could not be sued 
without government permission. Their ability to enter into contracts was 
very restricted and exercisable only through their controlling ministry. 
Generally nation-wide, such organizations were responsible for public 
utilities such as water and gas supply, environmental control, public 
health, transport facilities and education. 
In many countries the role of public enterprises changed after World 
War I. They became involved in the rehabilitation of the war-torn econ- 
omies and were deployed to invest massively in productive and extractive 
activities. Their new roles and obligations required more independence 
and autonomy, both in activities and in the recruitment of skilled person- 
nel. More autonomy implied less control from government and less scrut- 
iny by parliaments and their organs. Herbert Morrison, Transport Minis- 
ter in the UK from 1929 to 1932, suggested an autonomous, 
self-contained public corporation, operating with its own corporate per- 
sonality, perpetual succession, the right to sue and be sued, full control 
over its movable and immovable assets and accountable to Parliament 
only through the minister in charge. Most of the public corporations in 
the world have been based on this model, which is now called the Morri- 
sonian model. 
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Morrison sought to create a corporation that could attract senior and 
experienced experts who, assured of their autonomy and security of te- 
nure, were expected to run the corporation efficiently. The model as- 
sumes that managerial autonomy to provide room for creativity and inno- 
vation. It was also assumed to introduce some unspecified quantity of 
market discipline into the running of public enterprises while retaining 
accountability to Parliament. As will be shown below, the model was 
overly optimistic. It retained a structure too close to the government to 
allow any market discipline. It removed direct control by Parliament with- 
out introducing an alternative channel for accountability. This chapter ar- 
gues that the Morrisonian public corporation is accountable only to the 
minister in charge, and is effectively protected from both parliamentary 
and market controls. 
The market usually imposes several controls on enterprises. Competi- 
tion is usually the most effective because it compels enterprises of all 
kinds to struggle to capture a share of the market. Quality control, inno- 
vation, product differentiation, adequate and prompt service and other 
means to satisfy consumers always arise from the urge either to retain or 
to attain a fair share of the consumer market. Price mechanisms are also 
very important in shaping the producers' behaviour. Where an enterprise 
has a monopoly of the market, it is not forced by price fluctuations or 
price differentials to sell more or to produce more or better quality pro- 
ducts. The assumption is that management tends to be risk-conscious 
with a regard to profits, the value of stocks and their market share (Pes- 
tieau 1989:297, Cote 1989:433). Financial markets also may impose con- 
trols, including credit conditions and credit controls. Where credit is eas- 
ily obtainable and non-payment penalties shy away from the attachment 
of property or forced bankruptcy, performance in general and the use of 
credit in particular may not be determined by financial market pressures. 
For risk and liability-based controls to be effective, they should be uni- 
formly applicable. Further, consumers must be aware of their rights and 
the socio-political system should be capable of protecting these rights. 
This chapter argues that barriers inherent in the legal environment of the 
Morrisonian model of public enterprises prevent market forces from 
properly controlling public enterprises. 
The first and most fundamental barrier has made it difficult for the 
courts in many countries to exercise controls over conventional public en- 
terprises, including the enforcement of public and consumer rights. Pub- 
lic enterprises in England, where the Morrisonian model originated, 
began emerging in the sixteenth century, either for the purpose of develo- 
ping utilities or as city development corporations. In many cases they 
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were used to bring about structural transformation and to generate em- 
ployment. As instruments of change they have not only transformed the 
landscape, as in the case of the railways or other utilities development 
corporations, but have also restructured social relations as they set up 
new projects or relocated utilities, families, communities or resources. 
As developmentalist structures, they have been called upon to per- 
form functions which otherwise would be performed by the government, 
which in turn has justified their claim of a share in the functions, im- 
munities and privileges of the state. For example, city development cor- 
porations formed during and after the war have acted as local govern- 
ments or rehabilitation commissions to resettle people displaced by war. 
More ambiguous cases include corporations formed to run enterprises 
vital to security or to distribute commodities in short supply during crises 
or to provide utilities to disadvantaged groups or areas to which private 
enterprises are least attracted. As government proxies, they have been 
given very wide powers to interfere with the existing rights of the public. 
In order to justify this, the concept of ̀ common good' has been invoked. 
English law has used the concept of common or public good to justify 
the violation of individual or communal rights where such rights are 
deemed to be subordinate to the long-term benefits likely to flow to the 
broader community. The concept of public or general good has been 
used to protect public enterprises involved in the generation of electricity 
where their activities tended to inflict harm on the property of surround- 
ing farmers (Manchester Corporation v. Farnworth (1930)) and in most 
cases what amounted to `public good' was measured by the dictates of the 
dominant groups. For example, industrial group benefits weighed more 
heavily than the rights of agricultural groups. Public good ideology was 
used to legitimize the negation of public choice or individual rights. 
Collateral concepts to supplement such concepts include, among 
others, the idea of `inevitable, nuisance'. In England, this concept was 
used to protect electricity generating boards and gas boards from liability 
for injuries caused by their operations. The rationale behind these con- 
cepts, as explained in Dunne v. Northwestern Gas Board (1964), was that 
the failure of the market to provide adequate utilities created a duty on 
the part of the public to undertake measures for the public good and to 
tolerate nuisance arising from such measures. By the same logic, wher- 
ever public enterprises were created to compensate for market failure, 
market mechanisms were being automatically excluded. This duty to tol- 
erate nuisance existed irrespective of whether the rights infringed were 
individual or involved traditional community rights such as access to 
water sources (Geddis v. Proprietors of Bann Reservoir (1878); Liverpool 
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Corporation v. Chorley Waterworks (1852)) or whether the corporation 
performing the developmental function failed to provide alternatives or 
compensation (Wynn v. Shropshire Union Railways and Canal Co. (1850)) 
and even where public enterprises exposed the public to health hazards 
(Southampton and Itehin Floating Bridge and Roads v. Southampton 
Local Board of Health (1854)). 
English law has made few departures from the common good concept 
since its development in the early eighteenth century. It was still accepted 
in Dunne's case (1964), and an exception was allowed in British Railway 
Board v. Hen ngton (1972) only on grounds specific to this case, in which 
liability for failure to fence a live railway line was accepted because injury 
was to a juvenile trespasser and also because demographic changes which 
had taken place in England called for consideration of the possible temp- 
tation of children to trespass in search of wider playing areas. But this did 
not nullify the basis of the common good concept, which was that where 
market mechanisms had failed to bring about change they should not be 
allowed to constrain it. 
The second major obstacle to market controls over public enterprises 
in England is their statutory sources of power. The Morrisonian model of 
public enterprise, unlike common law, is based on statutory laws and not 
conventions, customs or case law. Courts are expected to interpret the 
powers, functions and liabilities of these enterprises from the statutes 
governing them. If a statute is silent about certain rights, the courts can- 
not provide for such rights without abrogating the principle of separation 
of powers. From the eighteenth century, courts have refused to provide 
remedy where the statutes are silent about it. In the cases of land aliena- 
tion without adequate compensation (R. v. Croke (1774)) or in cases 
where utility corporations were empowered to interfere with private land 
without the need for compensation (Leader v. Moxon (1773)) courts 
could only note lack of protection but could not fill in the statutory gaps. 
The statutes remain protective of the developmental role of public enter- 
prises, permitting them to commit wrongs without liability. This gives 
them an unfair advantage, because unlike private corporations they are 
not forced by market and public pressures to act diligently. Furthermore, 
the lack of liability represents a subsidy paid by the clientele victimized by 
their negligence. 
The role of the courts in enforcing market discipline is limited to in- 
terpretation. In practice, courts can intervene only where a statute 
defines a certain procedure to be followed and this procedure has been 
violated. Hence, where a statute allowed a public corporation to divert 
water but was silent on the means to be used in doing so or on the extent 
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to which this could be done, and water was diverted in such a way that 
local people were left without water, the court could provide no recourse 
(Liverpool Corporation v. Chorley Waterworks (1852)). Even in a case 
where the statutory powers had been exceeded in the diversion of water, 
the court found itself powerless to do more than declare that the statutory 
powers had been exceeded (Herron v. Rathmines, et al. (1892)). The ra- 
tionale for court hesitation is very clear. If courts arrogate the power to 
close gaps left in statutes, they would be performing a legislative function, 
thereby undermining both the concept of the separation of powers and 
that of the independence of the judiciary. But in Westminster tradition, 
laws governing public enterprises were drafted to give enterprises consid- 
erable discretionary power. More often than not, the statutes did not im- 
pose on these enterprises the duty to act diligently, carefully, or reason- 
ably (Eddington, et al. v. Swindon Corporation (1938); Wynn v. Shropshire 
Union Railways and Canal Co. (1850); Lee v. Milner (1837)). Whatever 
the underlying objectives, such permissive statutes tended to undermine 
to a large extent the ability of the courts to enforce controls such as lia- 
bility for negligence or the common law duties to act diligently and rea- 
sonably. 
The third factor which tends to limit control over public corporations 
is the concept of corporate personality. In England, and in many other 
countries, public enterprises tend to be legally independent corporate 
bodies. Irrespective of the role played in their administration by govern- 
ment officials, their property, liabilities and rights are not attributable to 
government. The doctrine of corporate personality provides market ad- 
vantages for both the corporations and the public. Because it helps distin- 
guish commercial from governmental functions of the state it allows non- 
governmental state activity to be classified as commercial, which in turn 
supports the subjection of public enterprises to market control. This prin- 
ciple dates from as early as the fifteenth century Anonymous Case IX 
(1484). Secondly, as was stated in Sutton's Hospital (1612), a corporate 
identity in a public enterprise detaches it from the personality of its ad- 
ministrators and ensures continuity of its objectives irrespective of 
change of personalities or even governments. An independent person- 
ality protects a corporation from the social or political attributes of its 
leaders (see Tipling v. Pexall, 1614, one of the foundation cases on the 
doctrine of corporate personality). Several factors however, limit the dy- 
namic role of corporate personality. 
The first is that in England and in other common law systems most 
statutes have tended to clothe these enterprises with statutory im- 
munities, some of which allow breach of contract without compensation 
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(Harold Stephens & Co. v. Post Office (1977)) as in the case of post offices. 
Some statutes limit the liability of public corporations by setting a ceiling 
on possible damages payable (Treifus and Co. v. Post Office (1957)). 
Others exempt public air transport from liability arising from negligent 
statements and careless handling of luggage (Collins v. British Airways 
Board (1982); British Airways Board v. Taylor (1976)). Exemption from 
liability has even been statutorily provided for where negligence has 
caused physical injury (Kandalla v. British European Airways Corporation 
(1980); Setvanaryanga v. University of West Indies (1983)). 
These privileges may tend to encourage negligent behaviour and de- 
prive the courts of the opportunity to regulate public and private enter- 
prises on equal footing. Thus, the former both escape the ordinary legal 
controls on contracts and liability for negligence, and they gain financial 
advantage from diminished or exempted liability. Where they perform 
functions normally discharged by the state or in which the state has an in- 
terest, they also become entitled to claim state immunities. Such entitle- 
ments may range from exemption from taxes to the right to withhold do- 
cuments required as evidence in litigation involving other people, as in 
Bunnah Oil Co. v. Bank of England (1980) and British Steel Corporation v. 
Grenada Television Ltd (1982). What these broad exemptions mean in 
practice is that while the doctrine of corporate personality gives a sem- 
blance of independence for administrative purposes, public corporations 
are insulated from judicial controls exercised on commercial and other 
private institutions. 
The fourth factor contributing to the failure of ordinary controls over 
public enterprises is the ambiguous nature of their obligations. Few pub- 
lic enterprise statutes in the Westminster tradition define the obligations 
or duties to the customers or clients of these enterprises. Although the 
importance of the public in the financing of public enterprise had been 
recognized even in court judgments such as Tamlin v. Hannaford in 1950, 
public enterprises have a history of exception from public control. In pri- 
vate enterprises shareholders exercise their control through the general 
meeting, at least in theory, and clients use either consumer organizations 
or courts to influence corporate behaviour. The shareholders and the 
consumers therefore combine to exert pressure on private enterprises to 
perform their obligations well. Public enterprises lack the mechanisms 
through which such pressure can be exerted. This is more so in the case 
of services or utilities that charge no direct fee or price for their services. 
While most public enterprise laws recognize their duty to act, there are 
no provisions for direct remedy where they act negligently or unsatisfac- 
torily. 
12 The Accountability of Public Enterprises in Tanzania 
Whether or not payment of consideration is involved, the institution of 
contract is a very useful mechanism for compelling performance. Most 
public service institutions perform their duties without contractual obli- 
gations. For some, their duty to act is tied not to an individual, but to the 
public at large. This removes the opportunity of using contract as a regu- 
latory mechanism. If such bodies fail to act or act negligently, causing loss, 
the immediate defence available to them is that they had no specific obli- 
gation to anyone and cannot be held particularly liable to any individual. 
The rationale for this is found within the broader perspective of the law 
itself. To be liable to anyone there must be a contracting process. Second- 
ly, an agreement must exist between the one performing and the one re- 
lying on the performance. Where duties are spelled out by statute, there 
is no direct contractual relationship. Hence, in Atkinson v. New Castle 
and Gateshead Waterworks Co. (1866-67)) a water corporation had a duty 
to pump water to the highest buildings in a city but failed to do so, with 
the consequence that a group of residents suffered loss by fire. Because 
there was no water, the fire could not be extinguished. This breach of duty 
to provide water was found by the court not to be actionable. 
The situation becomes more difficult when a public enterprise under- 
takes to perform a service in circumstances where it has power or a duty 
to do so, performs the service either recklessly or unsatisfactorily, and 
thereby inflicts loss on an individual or a group of individuals. The 
wronged individual will have limited recourse because, as was argued in 
East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board v. Kent (1941), theoretically the ser- 
vice is gratuitous. Non-market controls tend to address issues other than 
consumer or public satisfaction. Only the press, consumer organizations, 
and non-governmental action groups, if they are strong enough, can in- 
fluence public enterprise behaviour in such circumstances. 
The fifth factor is that of excessive discretion in dealing with the public 
and/or performing public duties. Public enterprises derive discretionary 
power from both their proximity to the state and their assumed develop- 
mental role. The relationship between discretion and control is clear: in 
most cases the wider the discretion, the narrower the control. Statutes 
have bestowed upon public enterprises wide discretionary power through 
either subjective clauses such as `if in the opinion of the board it is 
deemed necessary' or permissive clauses such as `as the board at its own 
discretion deems fit or necessary'. Most of these permissive clauses exist 
in many public enterprise statutes. Hence they do not have to be cited 
specifically. 
Capitalizing on such wide clauses, boards of public enterprises can 
alter investment patterns, switch priorities, change plans, schedules, rou- 
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tines, prices, fares, etc. Where they are empowered to perform a licensing 
function, such wide discretion may be used to escape barriers ordinarily 
imposed by common law on licensing authorities: for example, the duty to 
hear and determine applications or the duty to give notice of by-laws, 
rules, or cancellations. The danger of wide discretion was evident in the 
case of the National Enterprise Board, which used its discretionary 
powers to discriminate against some members of the public in allocating 
financial resources (Booth et at v. National Enterprise Board (1978)). In 
another case, the Civil Aviation Authority was able to cancel aviation 
licences of a group of operators without notice and without assigning rea- 
sons for its action (R. v. CivilAviation Authority exparte Northern Air Taxis 
(1976)). In normal circumstances this kind of discrimination would have 
been held to be contrary to principles of natural justice. But in both cases 
courts could not intervene and the only remedy given was a court decla- 
ration pointing out the undesirability of the decisions and the hardships 
suffered. 
All these fetters on traditional controls relate to performance. En- 
forcement processes are also very well shielded from the traditional con- 
trols. Since the duty to perform is a duty to no one individual, damage 
arising from this duty cannot be acted upon by an individual or group of 
individuals. As in the case of government, the common law tradition is 
that only the Attorney General can sue a public enterprise for a breach of 
public duty. The logic of this, explained in Attorney General v. Inde- 
pendent BroadcastingAuthority (1973), is that the Attorney General is the 
custodian of public interest and because the statutes are passed by in- 
stitutions of the State, their breach is also a wrong against the State (AG 
v. Pontypridd Waterworks (1908); Thorne v. BBC (1967)). However, the 
Attorney General is not legally bound to act when an individual or group 
seeks to enforce public rights against a public enterprise. The dilemma 
was explained by Lord Denning, M.R. inAG v. IBA (above) when he 
noted that Parliaments have clothed governments and their institutions 
with immense powers without providing for remedy in the case of breach 
of these powers. He expressed an opinion that the law ought to be 
changed to allow individuals to sue in their own name and right where 
their rights have been infringed upon, even in the absence of a direct con- 
tractual or fiduciary relationship. But English law remains unchanged in 
this respect. Although most public enterprise activities seem to be per- 
formed through individual contracts, public utilities, health and educa- 
tion are still based on no contractual obligations to individuals. New 
bodies charged with environmental protection, control of standards, or 
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performance of watchdog activities, also deal with the public in general 
and not with specific individuals. 
The last aspect of the historical barriers to market controls is the rela- 
tionship between public enterprises in England and their employees or 
the general public. From a random survey of decided cases, it seems that 
public enterprises have not only remained beyond the reach of the judi- 
cial controls, but have also failed to provide examples of good relations 
with the public or with their own employees. 
The public relations record of public enterprises in England is poor. 
Electricity generating boards engaged in nuclear energy projects have 
clashed bitterly with opponents, relying on forcible means to implement 
their projects (R. v. Chief Constable for Cornwall ex parte Central Elec- 
tricity Generating board (1981)). While it is difficult to foresee alternatives 
to negotiation, the public nature of these enterprises imposes upon them 
a moral obligation to consider public opinion. Similarly, in the handling of 
industrial disputes, some corporations have handled striking workers 
with excessive violence, for example, in the case of the coal miners or air 
traffic controllers (British Airports Authority v.Ashton (1983)). While one 
might assume that unfair labour practices, now disappearing in many de- 
veloped countries, would be absent in public enterprise, public enter- 
prises in England have been brought to court for attempts to divide 
unions (Post Office v. Ravyts et al. (1972); Post Office v. Crouch (1973)); 
discrimination against trade union leaders (Carlson v. Post Office (1981); 
discrimination against women (Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd 
(1983) and racial discrimination (Kingston v. British Railways Board 
(1982)). This is not to ignore the fact that public enterprises generally 
have helped to improve the working conditions of the majority of workers 
in England. 
The cases enumerated above may not be representative of public en- 
terprises in Britain, but the mere fact that some have engaged in such be- 
haviour clearly indicates that the current controls are inadequate. The 
English experience is important for Tanzania because Tanzania, like may 
other third world countries, has reproduced much of the Morrisonian 
model. The initial acts of Parliament establishing public enterprises were 
mainly copied from Britain. Most advisers were (and still are) either Brit- 
ish or British-trained. The Morrisonian model of public enterprise has 
been widely accepted as the standard model. But it is inherently insulated 
against judicial and market controls, and as we shall see in the next chap- 
ters, against public accountability. 
For the past decade, public enterprises have been severely attacked 
for poor performance. International donors have concluded that they are 
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no longer a dynamic option (World Bank 1989, 1990, 1991). Shielded as 
they were from the market forces and pressures that regulate other busi- 
ness organizations, one could well ask whether they ever were viable. 
Public Enterprises in Tanzania 
Tanzania copied the Morrisonian model of public enterprise not only 
because of its colonial history, but also because this model is almost 
universally accepted as the most rational model of public enterprise. 
Hence, most of the immunities and protective clauses found in British 
public enterprise legislation have been reproduced in Tlsanzania's legisla- 
tion. The legal culture within which public enterprises operate has been 
copied together with most of the concepts. These concepts and norms 
have aided the further erosion of traditional controls on market relations. 
In Tanzania, as in many other developing countries, the state is looked 
upon as an instrument of development. This, in turn, justifies wide and 
unfettered executive powers to intervene in the economy. In 1978, Pius 
Msuya, who was once Secretary-General of the ruling party, said that the 
nature of Tanzania's problems and the need for rapid development de- 
manded that certain officials of the government or the party be entrusted 
with great authority (Msuya 1978:29). He called for the vesting of admin- 
istrators with effective power which, he said, was essential to bring about 
desired transformation. An interventionist state in turn implies that 
potential intervening forces have to be weakened. The most effective in- 
stitution of intervention was the judiciary, and from 1965 onwards the 
judiciary was confined to litigation which neither challenged the powers 
of the state nor sought to elevate market controls over non-market con- 
trols (Nyerere 1966:311-2). 
The role of the state in public enterprises was made more obvious by 
the fact that the state relied upon these enterprises to operate where the 
market had failed. This also provided the ideological basis for the dis- 
missal of market controls as factors in the management of public enter- 
prises. Hence, right from the start, public enterprises as organs of policy 
were visible instruments of state power. In order to harness them to pol- 
itical needs and aspirations, they were given an ideological role, as harb- 
ingers of a new mode of production based on state intervention in the 
economy. In addition to being used to control information, broadcasting, 
education and culture, they became the primary testing grounds for new 
political and other programmes. 
In 1970, the ruling party in Tanzania decided to introduce participa- 
tory management through the formation of workers' councils and enter- 
prise management committees (Nyerere, 1970; Mapolu,1976). Public en- 
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terprises were used to test the feasibility of this new management policy. 
Its limited success in the public sector stymied attempts to extend it to the 
private sector in 1984, which were not readily supported within party and 
government circles. Public enterprises have also been used as the testing 
ground of a programme to develop a militia, beginning in 1973. The pub- 
lic sector was chosen because providing military training to workers is ex- 
pensive and enterprises were expected to bear both financial and labour 
costs. In 1979, when Tanzania went to war with Uganda, the people's mili- 
tia comprised a whole battalion of the army. All had been drawn from the 
public sector and their wages were paid by their employers, not by the 
military authorities. 
The people's militia has contributed to political stability in Tanzania 
by reducing the importance of the regular army, which to a large extent 
reduced the likelihood of a military coup. Hence the state has an interest 
in maintaining the militia and if public enterprises continue footing the 
cost of military training, these costs have to be accepted. Public enter- 
prises also run the party branch offices, paying the wages of party officials 
and auxiliary servants, and providing free services such as accommoda- 
tion, food and transport during national party congresses or annual festi- 
vals organized by the government. Such substantial costs tighten the 
bonds between government and the managers of these enterprises: the 
government seeks loyalty to its objective, while the enterprises use their 
contribution to justify deviating from normal commercial and economic 
practices. 
The third characteristic of the Tanzanian system, which has nothing to 
do with the Morrisonian model but is system-specific, is government de- 
pendence on public enterprises for revenues, services and credit. Be- 
tween 1969 and 1979 numerous public enterprises were formed in almost 
all sectors. They were given monopoly powers over distribution services; 
a trade confinement policy meant that most goods produced in the pri- 
vate sector had to be distributed by a specified public marketing enter- 
prise. This created a special dependence between all consumers and the 
public sector. Government, as a consumer, awarded itself priority, using 
its position as the controller of public enterprises to get the best services 
and the right of first treatment in the allocation of scarce or inadequate 
resources. Government has also relied upon the public sector as a source 
of credit and as the only reliable source of tax revenues. As it is easier for 
government to collect sales and other taxes on goods from public enter- 
prises than from private enterprises, goods produced in the public sector, 
for example clothes, building materials, cigarettes, beverages and station- 
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ery, have ironically been subjected to higher and more regular changes in 
tax rates. 
The public sector has also played a major role in offering credit to 
government. Through local purchase orders, government secures credit 
facilities for services from public enterprises which have no option but to 
accept them. In turn, public enterprise managers encourage the govern- 
ment to be indebted to their enterprises, in order to increase their lever- 
age when bargaining with the government or with parent ministries. In 
many cases, such debts remain outstanding for extensive periods. 
The structure of dependencies which emerged from the over-reliance 
of government on these enterprises required that government keep a 
close watch on their management. This non-market control further weak- 
ened the reliance of public enterprise managers on commercial princi- 
ples, which in turn encouraged the government to keep enterprise boards 
either very weak or resourced by government proteges. Furthermore, in 
order to keep market forces ineffective, political structures were given 
unusual pre-eminence at enterprise level, including the introduction in 
1975 of political commissioners as party watchdogs; internal participatory 
organs were elevated above conventional and professional management 
institutions, although, in practice, these organs remained purely advisory; 
and a multiple power structure emerged at enterprise level under which 
it was not clear whether managers or politicians had the ultimate auth- 
ority to manage. As Chapter Three shows, this further reduced the pro- 
pensity of these enterprises to be accountable. 
Politicians also became interested in the control of public enterprises. 
Most Members of Parliament suggested in their political campaigns that 
they were going to bring about economic change either by reducing short- 
ages in their constituencies or by increasing the efficiency of crop market- 
ing boards or by bringing new projects into their district. During their 
terms in Parliament, they were compelled to meet some of these expecta- 
tions. It became imperative that MPs secure for themselves places on the 
boards of public enterprises, so as to influence the distribution system in 
their favour. Until this practice was stopped by President Mwinyi at the 
end of 1985, some MPs were involved in as many as seven Boards of Di- 
rectors. Apart from supplementing their incomes through sitting allowan- 
ces, and relying on their board membership to gain access to credit and 
imprests, most of them used these boards to channel scarce resources to 
their constituencies. This, in turn, made it seem as if the increased role of 
MPs on boards increased the role of Parliament in running these enter- 
prises. The use of public enterprise boards as power bases for politicians 
further removed the possibility of enforcing market discipline. Hence, in 
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Tanzania an already overprotected model of public enterprises, de- 
veloped without the traditional checks and balances. 
The Erosion of Market Controls over Public Enterprises 
The public enterprise establishment laws passed between 1962 and 
1969 all contained clauses imposing a duty to operate on sound commer- 
cial principles, without discrimination and to operate at a profit compar- 
ing one year with another (Ghai 1977:227). Some of these principles, such 
as operational neutrality, were neither desirable nor practical, given the 
socio-political objectives of the enterprises and Tanzania's policy of so- 
cialism. At the same time, certain traditional market controls could have 
been very helpful to the enterprises even if, in the short-run, these would 
have undermined political and non-market controls. 
For example, the use of mortgages, debentures, charges and securities 
in any credit system easily allows one party access to the financial resour- 
ces of another. Should a debtor fail to repay, the creditor becomes en- 
titled to intervene to secure repayment. Debtors are thus aware of the 
dangers of misuse of credit or failure to use credit. Public enterprises 
have relied from inception on government grants, credit and subsidies. 
They rarely borrowed from financial markets, but even where compelled 
to do so, they borrowed from state banks and were not subjected to the 
usual restraints, which were for quite some time despised as selfish, 
profit-motivated and anti-socialist (Loxlcy 1969). Even when they bor- 
rowed from international donors, this was done through bilateral ar- 
rangements and the government remained the main party to, and guaran- 
tor of, such loans. Over time, most public enterprises became lax, as the 
knowledge that they were not vulnerable to legal action by creditors re- 
lieved them of the pressure to operate on sound economic principles, to 
retain a profit, and to meet their financial liabilities. 
Between 1969 and 1983, most legislation drafted to reorganize mar- 
keting boards or to amalgamate enterprises was silent on the duty to 
operate on sound commercial and economic principles. Provisions of this 
kind had come to be seen as irrelevant, because during the same period a 
number of laws requiring rigorous supervision of the public enterprises 
were set aside. Other laws, such as the Banking Ordinance, which re- 
quires all banking institutions to produce their operational accounts and 
display them to the public weekly, have never been implemented. The 
Companies Ordinance Cap 212 requires all registered companies to send 
the Registrar of Companies an account of their annual returns, profits, 
losses and capital structures. None of its provisions were implemented by 
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subsidiaries of public enterprises whether operating as joint ventures or 
as wholly-owned subsidiaries. The powers of the Registrar of Companies 
in this respect have been supplanted by non-legal parallel controls invol- 
ving informal returns to the Registrar of Treasury, parent ministries and 
the President's Office. But the sanctions for failure to make these returns 
also have remained informal. 
The second mechanism which could have helped to enforce market 
discipline in public enterprises is pricing. In Tanzania, neither producers 
nor consumers have had decisive influence on the pricing mechanisms. In 
1973, the Price Commission was formed to regulate prices. However 
laudable its objective, the commission was formed during a period of 
economic crisis and at the time when industrial output in Tanzania was 
dwindling. It became an institution for increasing prices in order to in- 
crease the profit margins of the producers and thereby provide them with 
an incentive to remain in operation while at the same time increasing the 
state tax revenues. At the same time, the bureaucracy involved in price 
adjustment was sluggish and complex. Information on price rises would 
leak before these were officially announced. Private retailers would then 
hoard such commodities and frequently sold their hoards at even higher 
prices. This hoarding, and the resulting higher prices on the parallel mar- 
kets, in turn set new price levels restarting the cycle. Because prices 
charged by public enterprises were set by the demands generated by both 
the government financial deficit (which created a malignant demand for 
new revenues), and the private sector (which after paying heavily in 
bribes for the scarce commodities could only break even by hiking up 
prices) they were always assured of comfortable returns. Hence it was not 
surprising that their revenues kept rising despite ever-decreasing levels of 
output. Earning more and producing less, they remained securely insu- 
lated from the pressures of the market. Hence, although the prices set 
were irrational and price controls inhibited innovation and encouraged 
the retention of bad managers and inefficient technologies, most enter- 
prises seemed to be performing well. 
The third mechanism was that of consumer protection. Consumers in- 
fluence the behaviour of producers either by refusing to buy defective 
goods or by enforcing their collective rights. However, the exercise of 
choice presupposes availability of choice and the enforcement of con- 
sumer rights presupposes the legal recognition of those rights, institu- 
tional support for their enforcement and public awareness of their exist- 
ence. Between 1970 and 1985, choice as a regulating factor was not 
generally available to consumers. However, consumer-oriented legisla- 
tion existed. By the 1920 Application of Laws Ordinance, the common 
20 The Accountability of Public Enterprises in Tanzania 
law of England and the Indian Consumer Laws were extended to Tanga- 
nyika. The Judicature Act 1%2, extended these laws to the present era. In 
addition, the Sale of Goods Ordinance, though very rarely invoked, has 
been in effect since 1930. A law against hoarding was passed in 1972 (Cap 
116: S. 194A) making the hoarding of saleable goods an offence. The 
Regulation of Prices Act of 1973 (Act 19 of 1973) created a machinery for 
price regulation and has supplemented existing product-specific legisla- 
tion such as the Textiles (Price Stability) Act of 1970 (Act 13 of 1970) and 
other general legislation such as the Duties and Taxes (Prevention of 
Price Increases) Act of 1970 (Act 14 of 1970 and the Manufactured Pro- 
ducts (Price Stability) Act of 1972 (Act 24 of 1972) both of which seek to 
outlaw unlawful price hikes by distributors. 
In addition to price protection laws, quality control legislation has 
also been passed. The Food Quality Act of 1978 (Act 10 of 1978) which 
created the National Food Control Commission is a good example, and 
several other drug and food brand-specific laws seek to control the 
quality of market commodities. The Weights and Measures Act of 1982 
(Act 20 of 1982) seeks to outlaw cheating by sellers. The Tanzania Bureau 
of Standards, also formed in 1973, was aimed at regulating the standards 
for industrial goods in order to protect the health of consumers. How- 
ever, between 1973 and 1985 the Price Commission was unable to protect 
either the stability of prices or the consumers. In actual fact from the 
operations of the commission it became clear that its mission was not to 
protect consumers but to adjust prices to ensure that production conti- 
nued. 
Other consumer mechanisms failed mainly as a result of the syste- 
matic violation of consumer protection laws by public enterprises. The 
Tanzania Breweries, for example, sold underfilled bottles of beer. A 
Member of Parliament had to carry an unopened half-empty bottle of 
beer to Parliament to demonstrate that the corporation was cheating. Be- 
tween 1970 and 1975, the State Trading Corporation was using dead or 
slow-moving stock to sell quick-going commodities and in all cases the 
cost ended up being pushed on to the consumers. In 1982, the Wazo Hill 
Tanzania Cement company was accused of selling bags of cement weigh- 
ing 40 kg at the 50 kg price. In 1976, the Minister of Health wrote that the 
drugs then sold by the National Pharmaceutical Company were `noxious' 
(Sterling 1976). In 1983, cassava distributed by the National Milling Cor- 
poration was condemned as being unfit for human consumption (Nditi 
1987:145). There are many other examples of this kind of breach of stand- 
ards by the public enterprises (Nditi 1987) and also of their flagrant 
criminal violation of consumer rights. 
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But, having abandoned protection against price rises in favour of 
price setting for purposes of raising revenues, the state began turning a 
blind eye to consumer complaints. Most of the Members of Parliament 
who could have raised this issue in Parliament were also sitting on several 
public enterprise boards. Those who did raise consumer issues, did so 
mainly for purposes of publicity and never made a follow-up (Hansard 
1975:222; June 1979:194; June 1980:250 and April 1981:36; Nditi 
1987:193). The Price Commission promised from time to time to take 
public enterprises which were hiking prices to court but this was never 
done. 
The courts, which could have played an important role, were also apa- 
thetic towards price hikes and other consumer problems. Perhaps justifi- 
ably, courts began relaxing their interpretation of laws and explaining 
hoarding and over-pricing as ills which could not be cured by court ac- 
tion. Hence, while in the lower courts harsh sentences were imposed for 
consumer law violations, the High Court adopted a liberal attitude and 
kept on reducing the sentences (Juma George v. R. (1970); Ester Mwan- 
jabala v. R. (1978)). In a way, the courts were justified in their approach, 
because the main violators were never prosecuted; they wriggled through 
the system either because they could bribe or because they were part of 
the national power structure. In any case, public enterprises were never 
charged, and both the courts and the public knew that, as part of the state 
system, public enterprises enjoyed special protection. 
The absence of effective pressure groups has also contributed to the 
ineffectiveness of consumer law. Public awareness of consumer rights 
exists only when private and public voluntary organizations popularize 
consumer law and remedies and provide support services for the enforce- 
ment of consumer rights and remedies. In 1965 Tanzania adopted a party- 
state corporatist power structure under which lawful political activity can 
only be organized through the ruling party and its government. All politi- 
cal and social movements with the potential for organizing and mobilizing 
the people were incorporated into the party structure as mass organiza- 
tions - workers, youth, agricultural producers, women and parents. The 
state can also intervene in the various activities of religious bodies. This 
leaves no space for independent pressure groups to develop. Given the 
link between the political system and the economy, any group which seeks 
to regulate the quality of services or products from the public sector by 
legal or other non-governmental mechanisms can only be understood as 
attempting to embarrass the government or disgrace its policies. 
These and other factors have combined to entrench the ideology of 
developmentalism, under which instruments of economic change have 
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been given wide powers to interfere with public rights without being sub- 
jected to non-governmental controls. These problems of public enter- 
prise performance are not revealed in the usual statistics; some are inher- 
ent in the Morrisonian model; others are peculiar to Tanzania. Together, 
the power structure of the Morrisonian model and the needs of the Tan- 
zanian state have undermined the function of market mechanisms in con- 
trolling public enterprises. 
3. Non-Market Controls, Power and 
Accountability 
Non-Market Controls in the Morrisonian Model 
A Morrisonian public corporation possesses an independent corpor- 
ate personality, operates at a distance from government with a semblance 
of autonomy, and is accountable only to Parliament. Accountability is 
limited to matters on which government exerts influence. Scholars have 
embraced the model with enthusiasm. Hanson (1955) praised it as the 
most systematic attempt to define the structure of public enterprise in 
contemporary society. Hanson identifies three advantages in the model: 
it recognizes the inevitability of state participation in economic enter- 
prises; it addresses the limitations governments face in performing intri- 
cate, entrepreneurial functions; and it seeks to bring about a `balance be- 
tween the flexibility and autonomy enjoyed by private commercial 
enterprises and [ ... ] responsibility to the public' (Hanson 1955: 20). 
Garner has referred to Morrisonian public corporation as a `pathway to- 
wards a new form of government management' (Garner 1970: 3). These 
two professors have contributed much towards popularizing the Morriso- 
nian model of public enterprise, as has Seidman, who referred to it as a 
catalytic agent for governmental budget, accounting and auditing reforms 
(Seidman 1955: 48). 
Politicians also have expressed some satisfaction with this model. For 
example, in the US, President Franklin D. Roosevelt saw Morrisonian 
corporations as clothed with the power of government while possessing 
the flexibility and initiative of private enterprise (1955: 20). 
Public corporations represent a positive departure from government- 
department type enterprises, which are organically integrated in govern- 
mental administrative and financial structures. One of the model's main 
attractions is its potential autonomy from the administrative activities of 
the government. Morrisonian public corporations became very popular 
during the period of strong demands for more decentralized government. 
Ironically, opponents of the current public enterprise system argue that 
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decentralization will increase efficiency, so that decentralization has 
become the rationale for both the rise and the demise of the public cor- 
poration. 
After the First World War, decentralization was essential to the reha- 
bilitation of war-tom economies. The activities of government extended 
far beyond traditional frontiers; reconstruction and the organization of 
colonial markets to propel the recovery of the metropolitan economies 
required human and financial resources which could not be found exclu- 
sively within the government itself. Governments had to borrow from pri- 
vate finance markets to fund some of their non-traditional undertakings, 
and to win the confidence of creditors they needed to move away from the 
governmental corporation and towards a more autonomous corporate 
form bearing some resemblance to that found in private enterprise. 
The demands of post-war reconstruction thus supported the decen- 
tralization argument. Subsidiary corporations were seen as a way to en- 
sure that colonial markets were effectively and economically exploited 
(Willoughby 1917: 501). But the use of the public corporation for coloniz- 
ing purposes is not the crux of this discussion. Rather it is important to 
note that in the periods just preceding and following the war, public opi- 
nion opposed excessive government involvement in administrative and 
commercial activities. Note that Willoughby also advocated the use of 
such colonial subsidiaries as experimental agencies, foreshadowing the 
devolution of powers in metropolitan countries. 
Politicians in the first decades of the twentieth century also favoured 
decentralization, for totally different reasons. After the First World War, 
many groups, for example women and minorities, were enfranchised. 
This added to the already complicated spectrum of what were considered 
to be pressure groups in many countries. Hence the decentralization of 
government generally and its various institutions in particular had the ad- 
vantage of dispersing the focal points of pressure groups. As channels for 
public investment, public enterprises deflected and diffused the heat of 
pressure group politics away from Parliament. As Herbert Morrison said 
in 1933, in order to function without the fear of being watched, public en- 
terprises needed to operate at a distance from government with what he 
referred to as `a large degree of independence [ . , . ] on matters of cur- 
rent administration'. He argued that this would confine ministerial inter- 
vention to matters of policy and restrain government officials from at- 
tempting to get involved in day-to-day management. In the same vein, he 
argued that ministers then would be neither required nor expected to 
answer questions on non-policy issues in Parliament (Morrison 1933; 
Robson 1952:25). 
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The fear of public scrutiny was not confined to politicians. In Britain 
at this time, public managers made substantial contributions to the 
model; they wanted autonomy, if not from government, at least from pub- 
lic institutions. Sir Geoffrey Heyworth, while chairing the British National 
Coal Board, expressed this desire clearly, remarking that too-close super- 
vision lessened decisiveness and productivity (SCNI 1953: 689). The 
decentralization argument was thus much more motivated by the desire 
to limit the public and Parliamentary accountability of these enterprises 
than any wish to attain a functional distance from the government. 
Most of the attributes of the Morrisonian model show evidence of this 
desire, for instance: public ownership without substantial private equity 
participation, the performance of commercial activities, the selection of 
management officials on the basis of skills, the treatment of their em- 
ployees as private employees and not as part of the public service, oper- 
ational autonomy for their boards of directors and, most importantly, 
their indirect accountability to Parliament (Arora 1969: 36). This pattern 
of accountability and the power and control structures it implies are dis- 
tinctive features of the Morrison model. It is also responsible for the 
strength of government participation in public enterprise management 
and for the removal of judicial, market and public controls. So, while in 
theory these enterprises are removed from the ambit of government ac- 
tivity, in actual practice they have retained their proximity to government 
and have thereby been insulated from market forces and public scrutiny. 
So far, public enterprise research and discussion has confined itself to 
trends in efficiency, institutional forms, financial structures and decision- 
making processes. The implications of the whole public enterprise model 
as part of the state power structure have remained unresearched. It has 
been assumed that these enterprises really are autonomous and that it is 
their autonomy which causes their problems (Moshi, 1982; Kaijage, 
1986). Poor performance has been attributed to goal displacement and/or 
communication bottlenecks. Such explanations have been advanced even 
in developed countries, where technological advances defy such conclu- 
sions. The policy failures of public enterprises have, in some cases, been 
explained in terms of psychological problems such as suspicion and dis- 
trust between policy makers and enterprise functionaries, or ill-feelings 
between Members of Parliament as controllers and managers as experts 
(Levy 1969: 125). Other studies of the anxiety expressed by MPs about the 
operation of these enterprises or their attempts to raise public enterprise 
management issues in Parliament were understood in terms of political 
conspiracies to `embarrass' or `harass' ministers (Robson 1952: 314). 
While some of these ideas implicitly accept that public enterprises have 
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been and will continue to be an arena for power struggles between the ex- 
ecutive and representative bodies, they do not explain why such struggles 
arise. 
The accountability structure of the Morrisonian corporation creates 
the necessary conditions for such struggles. Firstly, the principle of oper- 
ational autonomy, which in theory separates politics from commerce, is 
more often than not used to bar certain kinds of politics - namely, par- 
liamentary politics. The enterprises cannot be questioned directly, only 
through the government. But because these enterprises perform com- 
mercial functions of a highly specialized nature, which government can- 
not undertake given the limitations of its human resources, the govern- 
ment is expected to leave them to operate without undue interference. 
Public enterprises claim the right to operational autonomy and a degree 
of freedom, boldness and enterprise that will allow them to do business, 
in the words of Robson, `without [the] caution and circumspection which 
is considered typical of government departments' (Robson 1970: 16). 
However, government continues to exercise various controls over the 
operational activities of public enterprises. The concept of operational 
autonomy has reduced the degree of parliamentary control over day-to- 
day activities. Public enterprise managers and civil servants also tend to 
support the related concept of managerial freedom, which argues against 
the need for parliamentary scrutiny of non-policy activities or issues, and 
widens the area of public finance within which they can operate unques- 
tioned by representative bodies. 
In 1929, the Postmaster General of England said that if Ministers were 
expected to answer all the minute questions elected officials might ask 
about the operations of public enterprises, they would find no time for 
other important activities (Robson 1970: 16). However, true operational 
autonomy does not exist. As Sloman has argued, politicians use the con- 
cept of managerial freedom only to attract dynamic managers and to limit 
the areas over which they can be questioned in Parliament (Sloman 1978: 
6). In most cases these expert managers realize too late that the promised 
freedom was illusionary. 
The Morrisonian model is operationally and philosophically opposed 
to the direct accountability of these enterprises to Parliament. But, while 
it argues that these enterprises must operate at arm's length from govern- 
ment, it still insists that they should be accountable through it - probably 
to control the influence of pressure groups. Pigou (1926) argued that 
elected organs such as municipal and national representative bodies 
should not control industry and commerce, which otherwise would be 
susceptible to what he called the `narrow political interests of electionee- 
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ring'. The dangers of pressure group influence in the management of 
public enterprise were also discussed by Hanson, who dismissed the 
French tripartite management structure as `a constant tug-of-war be- 
tween different groups' (Hanson 1955: 21). 
The advantages of indirect accountability for both public enterprise 
management and government are more financial than administrative. In 
1962, van Dorn praised the Morrisonian model as the most viable form of 
organization because its financial procedures are removed from the 
possible delays of the normal parliamentary appropriation powers and 
procedures. He also noted that indirect accountability to Parliament fa- 
cilitates short-term borrowing without the necessity to seek legislative 
sanction (see Arora 1969: 16). Dimock also praised this ability to make 
financial decisions without the constraints of parliamentary processes, 
seeing this freedom as conducive to managerial efficiency and initiative 
(see Arora 1969: 16). This perceived advantage was the basis of indirect 
accountability - through the executive - to Parliament. 
Indirect accountability requires self-contained finances. This implies 
that once funds have been transferred from government to a public enter- 
prise, they become divorced from the national budget, even if the govern- 
ment retains control over the financial operations of these enterprises. 
The public loses its right to demand an account of such funds in the con- 
text of government accounts. The concept of self-contained finances fol- 
lows from the concept of the independent corporate personality and from 
the assumption that this personality can be used by these corporations for 
purposes of independent borrowing (Morrison 1933: 125). The inde- 
pendence of finances is meant to create confidence among lenders that 
their money is not destined for government coffers. The link between len- 
ders' confidence and the need for independent corporate identities is 
clear from the experiences of the 1920s. The Tanzanian state could not 
adequately fund its public investment projects, and sought most of its 
funds from private financial markets. For a while, this succeeded, but the 
combination of non-market, bureaucratic controls, the abysmal perfor- 
mance of such enterprises, and constant political interference in their ac- 
tivities destroyed lenders' confidence. 
The Morrisonian model in essence claims to emulate private sector 
enterprise. In order to attract both skilled human resources and credi- 
tors, public corporations are projected as private enterprises with public 
funding. The Morrisonian model was justified in terms of its contrast with 
the departmental-type corporation which preceded it, the argument 
being that reduced government control would increase efficiency (Rob- 
son 1952: 21). It was seen as a dynamic innovation which would show that 
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in democratic society, enterprise, even public enterprise, could best oper- 
ate on the basis on non-governmental intervention (Hanson 1962: 50). 
But the public/private analogy was as mistaken as it was unfortunate. Fir- 
stly, the managerial autonomy of the Morrisonian corporation was more 
assumed than real; secondly, the objectives of the model were to increase 
control without accountability, not to diminish it. By 1949, some academ- 
ics were already describing the model as an unsuccessful attempt to hide 
the hand of government (Friedman 1949: 233) and the doctrine of inde- 
pendent corporate personality as an operational shield allowing govern- 
ment to manage enterprises outside traditional controls (Friedman 1948- 
49: 7; 1950-51: 275). By 1969, even traditional defenders of the model, 
such as Robson, were admitting that it failed to reduce government invol- 
vement in the activities of public enterprises. Robson actually complained 
about what he categorized as excessive government intervention in the 
management of public enterprises irrespective of statutory provisions 
(Robson 1970: 79). 
There are two ways in which this development can be explained. One 
might argue that the model can be seen as a calculated conspiracy to in- 
crease executive control and diminish public enterprise accountability to 
Parliament. Alternatively, the incidence of increased government control 
and diminished accountability can be seen as an unfortunate develop- 
ment in an otherwise well-intentioned model. Evidence for conspiracy 
would include the fact that the architects of the model, including Morri- 
son, were highly-placed government or public enterprise officials. It 
would be unusual for such officials to recommend structures which would 
diminish their own influence. This is further compounded by the concept 
of informality in the management of these enterprises. Morrison wanted 
informal ministerial guidelines and experienced, committed managers 
whose professionalism would oblige them to consult their Ministers be- 
fore making decisions on `ticklish} issues (Morrison 1933: 141). Accord- 
ing to Morrison, this informal consultation would be for purposes of sol- 
iciting ministerial views, not for seeking direction or instructions 
(Morrison 1933: 173). Other authors interpret it as a carte blanche for 
ministerial intervention without responsibility or the fear of pressure 
group politics (Kelf-Cohen 1969:31). 
But the model cannot be viewed simply as a conspiracy to provide 
power without responsibility. Ironically, while Morrison was equating 
these enterprises with their counterparts in the private sector he was still 
advocating that they operate on the same basis of informality as did gov- 
ernment departments. The Westminster tradition of government relies 
very much on customs, convention and discretion, and Morrison did not 
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feel the need to alter this; the model created for public enterprise carried 
over this aspect of the model of government business essentially unal- 
tered. Possibly, this reveals a certain over-optimism. Public enterprises, 
exempt from market controls, were susceptible only to non-market, bure- 
aucratic controls, most of which are governmental. It may have been naive 
to expect government officials both to relinquish a sizeable proportion of 
public finances and to resist the temptation to exercise indirect power 
and influence. Legislative frameworks in the British tradition tend to 
elevate bureaucratic controls over those available to representative in- 
stitutions. This tradition has been preserved in Tanzania. 
The Legislative Institutionalization of Non-Market 
Controls over Public Enterprises 
By non-market I mean political and administrative institutions and in- 
struments relied upon to regulate the behaviour of public enterprises. 
Most of these have never been codified, although to be used consistently 
and effectively they have to find some degree of legal support, either by 
being directly sanctioned or by not being prohibited. 
Particular characteristics of Tanzanian law tend to elevate administra- 
tive power and discretion over legislative and related power. These laws 
in turn sanction the predominance of political and administrative con- 
trols over alternative types of controls. This bias can be seen, first of all, in 
the ambiguity of the law governing public enterprises. For example, Tan- 
zania Legal Corporation Establishment Order (GN 32 of 1971) defines a 
parastatal organization as a statutory corporation established by Parlia- 
ment or the President, and/or as any corporate body in which either the 
central or any local government holds 50 per cent or more of the total 
equity and any/or other institution in which a subsidiary of any such enter- 
prise holds 50 per cent or more of the total equity holding. This, in effect, 
creates multiple categories of public enterprises - mainly 100 per cent 
central or local government-owned corporations; subsidiary companies 
of such corporations which are 100 per cent owned by such corporations; 
joint-ventures in which wholly-owned corporations own 50 per cent or 
more of the share capital, and associated companies in which the subsi- 
diaries of the central and local government corporations hold 50 per cent 
or more of the share capital. Such a definition would include associated 
companies involved in joint ventures with multinationals such as AGIP, 
Shell, BP and mining companies which have no direct links with wholly- 
owned government corporations but are jointly owned by partially-owned 
public enterprises. Although operationally the government is always 
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aware of its limitations in the latter category of corporations, their classi- 
fication as parastatal organizations creates room for selective and unpre- 
dictable government intervention. 
The legislated sources of power for the formation of public enter- 
prises are also ambiguous. Traditionally, this power belonged to Parlia- 
ment, and the earliest corporations (1962-68) were formed by statute. 
The Public Corporations Act (No. 17) passed in 1969 empowered the 
President to form corporations at his own discretion, and without con- 
sulting Parliament. Defenders of this Act argue that it suits the develop- 
ment needs of the country by allowing the government to act swiftly when 
needs arise, and not only when Parliament is in session (James and Ligu- 
nya 1976: 39). Others have justified it as a cost-saver, because otherwise 
Parliament would need to convene to discuss single pieces (or small 
groups) of legislation, at considerable cost to the state (Mkizungo 1975; 
Hansard 1969: 331), although such an argument ignores the fact that the 
National Assembly has never been convened to discuss a single act. 
The 1969 Act substantially alters the power structure of the state in re- 
lation to the formation, regulation, control and accountability of public 
enterprises. In practice, Parliament has abdicated the function of sanc- 
tioning new structures of the state and, by allowing the executive to deter- 
mine its new structures, fettered its own power to question the executive 
expenditures and decisions. Once a corporation has been formed, Parlia- 
ment faces a fait accompli, usually left no option but to bless expenditure 
through supplementary appropriations. Secondly, because the corpora- 
tions formed under this Act require new financial and other resources, 
Parliament has indirectly and perhaps inadvertently surrendered some of 
its crucial budgetary powers. A ministry seeking such supplementary ap- 
propriations can wait until the formal budget session has passed, and then 
launch a new corporation. In fact, no such corporation has been launched 
during a regular budget session. This has created a parallel budgeting 
structure completely beyond Parliamentary reach. Parliament has also 
given carte blanche to government to establish enterprises with structures 
suitable for easy intervention and control. Parliament has not reserved for 
itself the power to scrutinize these structures; it has also allowed the 
President to sub-delegate the power of forming enterprises to the Minis- 
ters (section 11). 
The Act provides no guidelines on stages to be followed, policy objec- 
tives to be borne in mind, vetting procedures, evaluation of performance 
or other matters vital to the exercise of this delegated (or sub-delegated) 
power. This clearly puts the fate of those corporations in the hands of the 
executive. Worse, in addition to surrendering Parliament's role in the for- 
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mation of public enterprises, the Act gives such enterprises a corporate 
personality, powers to contract independently and rights of perpetual 
succession. Some public enterprises were quick to exploit their position, 
engaging in illegal transactions, making non-existent purchases, paying 
non-existent persons, acquiring defective equipment, and so on (Mihyo 
1989). Because their managers technically were not government em- 
ployees, and because theoretically they were not government depart- 
ments, the government (though in effective control over their activities) 
could not be made answerable for their behaviour. Although these prob- 
lems may have no direct link with the mode of incorporation, the account- 
ability structures established at the time of incorporation surely encour- 
age such corporate behaviour. 
The previously-described principle of informality found expression in 
the 1969 Act, which provided more powers than guidelines. The executive 
can form any corporation with any structure under the Act, and can also 
form as many corporations as it thinks necessary. If, in exercising its dis- 
cretion, it makes an error, it can only be blamed for the quality of its 
judgement, not for any breach of law. 
In exercising this discretion, the government formed many corpora- 
tions, some of which were performing closely-related functions. For 
example, livestock corporations proliferated - one for marketing live- 
stock, one for transporting them, another for developing them, a fourth to 
engage in livestock research, a fifth dealing with meat, and yet another to 
deal with their skins. Nearly all dealt with the same, limited number of 
cattle. A poultry feed company existed independently. Some of these cor- 
porations were formed to attract foreign aid or to use project-oriented 
aid that happened to be available. When such projects exhausted their 
project funds, they became dependent on a continuing, limited supply of 
government funds. Most were disbanded at the height of the economic 
crisis in the early 1980s, although a few, particularly in the area of scien- 
tific research, still exist, performing overlapping functions or sharing a 
limited market. 
The lack of clear standards and guidelines not only justifies the use of 
discretion, but also makes control difficult. Where standards are not ex- 
ternally applied, an entity can be judged only by internally-provided - 
and highly relative - standards. The question becomes what a reason- 
able person would have done under the circumstances - not what an or- 
dinary and reasonable person would have done. Where political struc- 
tures can be manipulated easily for personal or group gain, such 
discretion undermines certain controls and elevates others. 
This confusion has led to the formation of corporations, such as the 
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Tanzania Wood Industry Corporation, without clearly defined financial 
structures, an omission which allowed assets to be transferred from other 
enterprises without formal instruments. Similarly, corporations were 
formed without a Board of Directors or with very weak Boards. All 
banks, for example, (the Bank of Tanzania, the National Bank of Com- 
merce, the Tanzania Investment Bank and the Cooperative and Rural De- 
velopment Bank) were established by statutes which do not define the 
criteria for selecting their Board members. As a result, their Boards are 
chaired by their own top executives. In some cases, the managers of the 
enterprises are all ex officio Board members and thus are empowered to 
exercise control over themselves. Unlike private sector directors and 
managers, public enterprise managers are employees, not shareholders, 
and such circular lines of authority, ungrounded by market constraints, 
are potentially disastrous. 
Some Boards of Directors include ministerial officials from parent 
ministries, who are expected to exercise control over the management but 
occupy low positions on the boards. For example, the principal secretary 
of the Treasury sits on the Board of the Bank of Tanzania, but the Board 
is chaired by the Governor of the bank. Similarly, before 1985, when most 
MPs were asked to relinquish their positions on public enterprise Boards, 
they sat as ordinary members, while managers were either secretaries or 
chairs of their own Boards. 
In effect, the absence of guidelines in the 1969 Act and similar statutes 
is strengthening (and widening the scope for) administrative controls. 
Such discretion also gives the executive the option to select the structures 
or forms best suited to its interests. Most importantly, it allows ample 
room for multiple power structures to develop in the public enterprise 
system, and makes the evaluation of the performance of individual public 
enterprises more difficult. 
Administrative controls are also strengthened by the bureaucratic 
manner in which powers have to be exercised. Some public enterprises 
are controlled by government Ministers, or by a Board of Directors, with 
absolute power and no requirement for consultation: the management is 
expected to respond without question. In the same vein, enterprises em- 
powered to act `in the public interest', for example by setting prices or 
standards, or by issuing licenses, have complete discretion; the public has 
no formal right to be consulted. Absolute discretion is by nature a barrier 
to more democratic or public forms of control, by indemnifying enter- 
prises against the consequences of their actions. For example, an enter- 
prise empowered to enter upon any land and alter the landscape, water, 
gas or electricity supply or other supplies (for example, the Tanzanian 
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Railways Corporation) has no duty imposed upon it to act reasonably 
(section 17 of Act 11 of 1979); corporations (such as all Tanzanian crop 
marketing boards) are empowered to set prices or licence fees without 
consulting farmers, producer cooperatives or purchasers. It would be 
very difficult to hold any of them liable or responsible for abuse of power. 
Another vacuum in the law which can be readily filled by administra- 
tive discretion is the communication channel between various actors. The 
Public Corporation Act 1969, for example, empowers the President to 
form public corporations, but does not spell out the processes to be fol- 
lowed. The President decides which group to consult and whose advice to 
follow. When the government decided to build a new capital in 1973, it 
consulted the ruling party, TANU, possibly feeling the need for party 
backing of such a major policy decision. In 1975, when the cooperative 
movement was abolished and the National Milling Corporation (see Ap- 
pendix 6) was reorganized to take over its activities, the government 
asked Parliament to sanction the reorganization. But in 1969, when the 
government decentralized the National Development Corporation to 
form several, smaller, holding corporations, the Party and Parliament 
were not consulted, despite the magnitude of the investment. Perhaps this 
was due to the fact that the demand for decentralization came more from 
joint venture interests involving multinationals than from government. 
Clearly, though, the law gives administrations broad leeway to decide 
which bodies to consult, when and for what purpose. 
Communication channels related to appointments are also ambigu- 
ous, since a dual system exists. Usually the President is empowered to ap- 
point the chairperson of the Board, while the relevant Minister appoints 
Board members. Generally, the Board has the power to appoint mana- 
gers. However, the President is never required to consult the Minister on 
appointments, and vice versa. This anomaly has tended to obscure hierar- 
chical relationships. Very powerful chairpersons or general managers 
may presume that they are on an equal footing with their Ministers (who 
may also be presidential appointees). In some cases, very powerful Board 
members have felt themselves closer to the Ministers than to their chair- 
persons. This has in some cases encouraged conflicting allegiances which, 
more often than not, lead to `Boards within Boards', to Boards that refuse 
to be answerable to their parent Ministers, or to Boards that are used by 
the Ministers to block the decisions of powerful chairpersons. The power 
to make uncoordinated appointments thus interferes in the basic hier- 
archy of decision-making, and such divided loyalties prevent Boards from 
performing their roles properly (Mengi 1983; El Namaky 1985). 
Wide ministerial powers also strengthen bureaucratic controls in 
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other ways. In addition to their powers to appoint Board members and 
(indirectly or directly) managers, Ministers can issue broad policy gui- 
delines. In general, this is one of the most sparsely worded and most per- 
missive provisions in public enterprise statutes, granting powers of a very 
general nature. While preserving the myth of government non-interven- 
tion which forms the basis of the Morrisonian model, it also limits par- 
liamentary control over ministerial power, allows Ministers to intervene 
selectively through informal channels without leaving a trail of documen- 
tation that would allow the Minister's actions to be assessed, and creates 
legal uncertainty about ministerial powers which can permit erratic or in- 
consistent decision-making, especially in response to top-down press- 
ures. Ministers thus can opt to be softly paternalistic during times of suc- 
cess and prosperity and harsh and ruthless during corporate crises. 
Uncertainty about possible ministerial behaviour becomes itself a regu- 
lating element, creating apprehension and fear among enterprise execu- 
tives. Such discretion also allows Ministers to screen the behaviour of the 
corporations and to take responsibility only for those acts which suit them 
politically, disowning others on the basis of political expediency. Finally, 
wide discretionary powers allow Ministers to exercise wanton control 
over corporations. Empowered to make unreasonable requests, they can 
use any failure to perform as grounds to reorganize, to dismiss or appoint 
staff, or to obtain a better bargaining leverage over management. 
Related to this is the lack of evaluation criteria and procedures. Al- 
though a number of administrative control organs, such as the National 
Productivity Council, the Tanzania Bureau of Standards, the Standing 
Committee on Parastatal Organizations and Tanzania Audit Corporation 
(which control productivity, standards, employment policies and ac- 
counts respectively) exist, most operate with difficulty. They lack the 
necessary skills and other resources to carry out their functions, but they 
also lack powers to summon, castigate, impose penalties or prosecute vi- 
olations of their regulations. Most are purely advisors, either to Ministers 
or to the President, able neither to take action through ordinary adminis- 
trative processes nor to determine the pace of such actions as the Minis- 
ters or the President may take. 
Lacking enforcement mechanisms and evaluation criteria, most con- 
trol agencies concentrate on being seen to be having an impact on the en- 
terprises and rarely bother about the long-term effect of their controls. 
The Standing Committee, for example, derives satisfaction from issuing 
directives on wage structures and organizational hierarchies but rarely in- 
vestigates the effects of these wage structures on productivity. As in India 
(see Nath 1986), in Tanzania most control organs are more concerned 
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with the quantity of their controls than with their quality. Again, the ab- 
sence of evaluation criteria and of enforcement procedures or mechan- 
isms is inherent in the Morrisonian model, which relies excessively on ad- 
ministrative discretion and informal channels of communication. The 
resultant lack of full accountability gives government an upper hand, be- 
cause unless required by law, no government will voluntarily allow itself 
to be questioned on its use of its powers. 
Factors in the Predominance of Non-Market Controls 
The degree of mutual dependence in personal and institutional rela- 
tions is determined more by forces within the actors than by their oper- 
ational context. Contexts provide only the media for interdependence or 
dependence. Law, as part of such a context, thus facilitates, but cannot 
create relations. In any public enterprise system, forces within enterprises 
either encourage or suppress dependence relations between the enter- 
prises and the government. By definition, any significant force limits the 
influence of its contravening forces. Thus, assuming that domination is 
normally unacceptable and that dominated parties have an inherent urge 
to resist domination, continued domination (namely, the fact that public 
enterprises have failed to resist bureaucratic, non-market controls) indi- 
cates either coercive or dependent intra-organizational relationships be- 
tween the enterprises and government. 
According to Max Weber, organizational change is usually motivated 
by efficiencies to be gained (Weber 1968: 45) and by the same argument, 
organizations will accept the status quo unless they can gain by shifting 
away from it. The task environment approach posits that the acceptance 
of domination is less a matter of choice than the effect of the environment 
on the organizational autonomy of an institution (Emery and Trist 1965: 
31; Terrebery 1968: 590). The resistance approach holds that the depend- 
ence of one organization is influenced by the capability of the dominant 
organization to compel obedience without much resistance (Emmerson 
1962: 21), although this approach has been nullified by studies which 
show that there could be domination in which the subordinate party ac- 
cepts domination as legitimate and does not seek to resist (Jacobs 1974) 
or where the subordinate party is completely unconscious of the fact of 
domination or control and thus does not attempt to resist it (Bannester 
1969: 374). The problem with such theories of intra-organizational de- 
pendence is that they tend to consider only relations between equal or- 
ganizations or organizations capable of influencing each other. 
For the study of government and its domination of subordinate organ- 
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izations, factors unique to this environment must be considered. The first 
is legitimacy. The legal framework described in this chapter has sup- 
ported both de jure and de facto dependence of enterprises on govern- 
ment. Powers of appointment, securely cushioned by wide interventionist 
powers which can be invoked at any time, are sufficient to compel obe- 
dience even in the absence of a clear statutory mandate and to the exclu- 
sion of other notions such as `common sense' or `sense of justice'. 
The second basis of intra-organizational dependency is the dominant 
organization's ability to control the ways in which the dependent organiz- 
ation can meet crucial and problematic needs (Thompson 1967). For 
public enterprises, one of the crucial needs or dependencies is finance. 
Public enterprises in Tanzania cannot borrow from outside the govern- 
ment without governmental intermediation and approval. Because finan- 
ces are crucial, the organ which controls funding will be the dominant 
organ. If borrowing on the open financial markets was allowed, the pat- 
tern of control would be substantially different. 
Other crucial needs include human resources or labour market infor- 
mation, technology market information, capital and productive forces ac- 
quisition channels, etc., and in so far as the government remains the 
dominant or monopolistic supplier of these needs, it does not require the 
use of force to impose its will. This is as true at the individual as at the or- 
ganizational level. In all cases, the dependency is determined by the 
mechanisms of demand and supply and the level of control is directly pro- 
portional to the level of monopoly over needs crucial to the dominated 
party (Perrow 1961: 854; Landberger 1961: 299; Jacobs 1974: 53). 
Thirdly, the lack of growth and innovation in an organization will also 
reinforce its dependence on traditional suppliers of crucial needs. In Tan- 
zania's public enterprises, technological innovation has been both slow 
and very elementary. Although technological innovation is not exclusively 
a function of market forces, public enterprises have been slower than pri- 
vate enterprises in technological innovations. In private enterprises, such 
innovations have contributed substantially to reducing production costs 
(Kanyilili 1983; Collande 1980; Komba 1984,1988) and in developing the 
bargaining power of private enterprises - to such an extent that some 
governments have become dependent on them for export earnings. Most 
of the current policies of liberalization stem from the ability of the private 
sector to deliver goods and services where public enterprises have failed. 
Technological innovation and self-reliance have figured heavily in the suc- 
cess of the private sector. 
Fourthly, needs can be over-specialized. Organizations with very 
diversified needs and the power to modify them, and with unlimited ac- 
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cess to other possible suppliers of these needs, tend to enjoy more auton- 
omy than those with limited suppliers. The fewer the suppliers of their 
needs, the greater their dependence on those suppliers that are available. 
Most public enterprises in developing countries have specialized func- 
tions and socio-political objectives. They can only perform their pres- 
cribed functions, and their needs are correspondingly specialized. They 
cannot, for example, meet financial needs on the open market, even 
though borrowing from such sources might be cheaper. They must sell to 
or serve a specified clientele, and thus have specialized needs which are 
very sensitive to changes in the environment. When needs change, legis- 
lated restrictions on substituting or diversifying services or clients put the 
existence of an over-specialized enterprise in jeopardy. A can for govern- 
ment support is the next logical step. Hence, once cut off from the in- 
fluence of market forces and pushed into activities which are not necess- 
arily very lucrative, such public enterprises tend toward over-reliance on 
the government for subsidies, debt cancellations, subventions, grants, 
price setting mechanisms and other forms of protection. 
Other factors that have encouraged enterprises to remain comfort- 
able with domination by government, as discussed in the previous chap- 
ters, relate to the extent to which government and its officials meet certain 
of their social, political and economic needs from this sector. Ironically, 
the dependence relations in this context essentially obey the laws of de- 
mand and supply, but at the same time undermine the effect of market 
control mechanisms on the activities of public enterprises. 
4. Parliament as an Alternative 
Control Mechanism 
The Significance of Parliament 
As a control mechanism, Parliament differs substantially from mar- 
kets and bureaucracies. Parliament is a body of representatives assem- 
bled to perform legislative functions on behalf of the public. Market con- 
trols are direct interventions by parties actually involved in, among 
others, litigation, contract, credit control and price mechanisms; admin- 
istrative controls affect management, supervision, evaluation, and plan- 
ning. Both market and administrative controls either arise from or are de- 
ployed within the processes of production, commerce and trade, while 
parliamentary inputs are intermittent and cannot replace the dominant 
control mechanisms. 
In most countries, Parliaments occupy the ground between the market 
and bureaucracy. Their position, and their presumed representative 
function, make them an important institution to which public enterprises 
can become accountable and through which accountability can be at- 
tained. Depending on the existing power and social relations structure, 
they have a high potential of defining the spheres of influence for both the 
market and the administration. 
Several researchers have commended the role of Parliament in mak- 
ing public enterprises accountable. In the case of India, whose parliamen- 
tary system has a long and relatively stable history, government policies 
on public enterprises have been positively influenced and adequately 
controlled by Parliament (Rao 1982: 217). Even critics of the Indian Par- 
liament's effectiveness in controlling public enterprise have accepted its 
potential, blaming related difficulties on a lack of time and resources 
(Mallya 1971) or on rigid parliamentary procedures which reduce the im- 
portance of questions and debates on public enterprise (Narain 1979: 9; 
Mallya 1971: 144-6). Other studies, for example by Somasundram in the 
case of Sri Lanka, have shown that once Parliament is part of the existing 
power structure or involved in the struggle for influence over policy, it is 
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likely to overstretch its control function and become in the words of So- 
masundram a'watch-god' rather than a`watch-dog' (Somasundram 1984: 
49). 
Very few Parliaments have reached a stage where they can be cate- 
gorized as 'watch-gods'. Many in the Third World are weakened by the 
structural articulation in their national power structures, in which they 
feature as subordinate, advisory bodies. Some are prevented by statutory 
or constitutional restraints from playing a prominent role in policy formu- 
lation and evaluation. Others are dominated by government bureau- 
cracies despite their constitutional powers and rights. Factors perpetuat- 
ing intra- organizational dependence between government and 
Parliament tend to be similar from country to country. Apart from the 
fact that Third World governments tend to emphasize executive power, 
with the executive controlling the distribution processes over which many 
members of the National Assembly depend for legitimacy, governments 
also control several other needs crucial to individual members and to the 
National Assembly as a group. Such dependencies include transport, in- 
come, political influence, information and the administrative process. 
The next few sections discuss the ways in which these dependencies 
interact with other factors to limit the Tanzanian National Assembly's 
ability to control or influence policy: its one party system. A number of or- 
ganizational and procedural barriers to parliamentary effectiveness also 
exist; these will be covered in Chapter Five in the context of a discussion 
of the role of questions and debates in regulating the activities of public 
enterprises. 
Parliament in a One-Party System 
Over the last three decades the phenomenon of one-party political 
systems has become a dominant feature in most African countries. Irre- 
spective of ideology, resource base or colonial history, most African 
countries are either de jure or de facto one-party states. Even in the out- 
standing exceptions, such as Botswana and The Gambia, where more 
than one political party exists, the dominant parties have virtually re- 
mained the same. The role of the new parties that have emerged in Zam- 
bia and Zimbabwe remains to be seen. I am not going to attempt to ac- 
count for this situation here. What is important to understand is that in 
most cases the dominant parties manage to mobilize large numbers of 
supporters through religious, ethnic or ideological affiliations. The social 
structures of African countries are composed of a poor majority, whether 
urban or rural poor, the intelligentsia, a commercial class, and a few 
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wealthy industrialists. The intelligentsia and the commercial class are 
very diverse and non-cohesive, while the Elite, in general, have been able 
to use populist and nationalist ideology to establish its legitimacy. Other 
factors in the distribution of power include the survival of the pre-colonial 
and colonial legacy of centralized leadership; the dominance at family 
and community levels of closed systems in which power is highly cen- 
tralized; cultural constraints against opposing or challenging leadership 
in traditional political systems and the nationalist ideology inculcated by 
the ruling parties, which employs nationalism to oppose foreign models 
or ideologies that might threaten existing power relations. 
Tanzania was among the first African countries to legislate, institu- 
tionalize and practice one-party politics. Under the Tanzanian system, 
between 1965 and 1992, the ruling party was constitutionally the only pol- 
itical institution which can lawfully mobilize the population for political 
purposes. The government operated under the direction of the party, and 
the National Assembly, apart from being a sub-unit of the Party Congress, 
obtained its membership from among adherents to the party ideology 
vetted by the party and approved to perform a legislative role. Such a pol- 
itical structure has a number of implications for the relationship between 
the party, government and Parliament. The most obvious is that no matter 
what claims may be made, a system based on one-party dominance de- 
parts from the traditional Western parliamentary model and is more 
geared towards the centralization of political power and functions. Sec- 
ondly, because members of the National Assembly are selected from 
within and by the same party, parliamentary processes are more likely to 
be based on cooperation and complementarity than on friction and con- 
flict. This is in contrast to multi-party Parliaments, where representatives 
are drawn from opposing groups with fewer common interests and fewer 
motives for cooperation (King 1976:13). 
Thirdly, in one-party systems, Parliaments presumably are not the 
focal centre of politics. In multi-party systems, the parties wage the best 
of their battles in Parliament and individual members show their party 
loyalty in Parliament during debates and confrontations. Constituency 
politics are used to gain popular support for both the programmes of the 
party and the popularity of the contestants. In a one-party system, the 
constituency is the most heated focal centre of political activity. At the 
constituency level, the party is portrayed as capable of having two people 
interpreting the same policy in two different directions. Hence it is at this 
level that most contestants seek to legitimize themselves as the most ap- 
propriate spokespersons of the ruling party. They seek to show that they 
understand party policy better and are the best positioned to implement 
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it in Parliament. Therefore they struggle at this level to win support from 
both the party and the electorate. Once in the National Assembly, they 
can remain quiet implementers of party policy, and this is what most of 
them do. 
Several constitutional and contextual factors seem to support these 
assumptions. Firstly, according to the very commonly used concept of 
party supremacy, all political activities and organs, constitutionally and in 
practice, were subordinated to the party (section 3, 1977 Constitution). 
To implement this concept, the party oversees all economic, social and 
political activities, strictly supervising political activities, although not en- 
gaging in their actual management (Kaduma 1977; Msuya 1977). Under 
this system, organized and tacit opposition was unlawful, and the party re- 
tained the right to remove any member of the National Assembly seen to 
be opposed to party policy at any time. Such removals from office are not 
unheard of (Smith 1978; Mwakyembe and Rusemwa 1983). 
Further, the party expected the Tanzanian Parliament to help govern- 
ment to implement party policies but not to play a leading role in the for- 
mulation or evaluation of policy. As one former party executive secretary 
put it, Parliament was expected to supervise the government on behalf of 
the party and advise the former on how best to implement the policies of 
the latter (Mwakawago 1979: 199). To make this possible, Parliament was 
organically linked with the party by section 54 of the 1977 Constitution, 
which makes it a sub-committee of the Party Annual Congress. Under 
this provision, members of the National Assembly were both integrated 
into the party structure and collectively and individually bound to abide 
by party resolutions and policies. 
This does not in any way mean that members of the National Assem- 
bly were all necessarily party cadres and went into the Assembly as a uni- 
fied bloc. The party itself very much represented a spectrum of ideologies 
and class interests, and party policy at any given time may have depended 
greatly on the views of the three top party leaders, namely the party chair- 
person, the vice-chair, and the Secretary General. For this reason, policy 
could and did shift from one extreme to another within the same party, 
under the same leadership, and while implementing the same policies of 
socialism and self-reliance. For example, in 1967 leaders possessing pri- 
vate property such as houses or large farms were said to be a disgrace to 
the party, and between 1969 and 1975 some were purged for violating so- 
cialist ethics. Between 1982 and 1989, the policy changed and party 
leaders made it clear that leaders who did not engage in agricultural acti- 
vities were a bad example to the people. 
There also have been extreme shifts in agricultural landholding policy, 
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which has ranged from emphasis on villagization and small-holder agri- 
culture to the redistribution of land to private farmers and invitations to 
big companies to undertake agricultural activities. Crop marketing 
policies have shifted from the 1975 dissolution of cooperatives as essen- 
tially capitalist, to their restoration in 1982. There are many other exam- 
ples of policy shifts which show that party policies are difficult to predict. 
They all indicate that the predominant party was a coalition including 
many conflicting interest groups, and that the dominance of a particular 
brand of ideology or policy option depended on whether there were suf- 
ficient conditions to support it within and outside the party and on 
whether national and international economic conditions could sustain it. 
This affected the composition of the National Assembly, because the 
committees of the party which vetted and selected parliamentary candi- 
dates were also composed of representatives of various group interests. 
Thus the representatives who reached the National Assembly were not 
necessarily motivated by similar goals or supported by similar interests. 
Similarly, if the party policy is difficult to ascertain, and its interpretation 
differs from group to group or even person to person, public perception 
of party policy is unlikely to be uniform. This in turn contributes to re- 
moving the possibility that those who come to the National Assembly 
share a common understanding of party policy or have common goals. 
Thus, while in practice the party controlled the selection and electoral 
process, it was unlikely to exercise effective control over policy unless its 
policies were clear. But the lack of clarity allows some room for ma- 
noeuvre to both the government and to any other organized group moti- 
vated to exert its own influence. For example, a strong and well-organized 
executive arm of the state stood between the party and the National As- 
sembly and was well represented and articulated in both institutions. The 
executive contributed substantially to the top leadership of the party and 
most ministers are members of both the National Assembly and the top 
organs of the party. Being in control of the party machinery, the govern- 
ment was well positioned to exercise control over the National Assembly. 
Hence, although in theory Parliament was expected to `call government 
to book' (Mwakawago 1979: 200), it could not do so without risking bring- 
ing the party to book and thereby antagonizing the party. Such difficulties 
are inherent in one-party democracy but do not in and of themselves 
necessarily make Parliament a weak control mechanism. There are other 
factors arising from Tanzanian parliamentary structures, facilities and 
procedures which combine with the implications of one-party democracy 
to make Parliament a weak alternative to administrative controls. 
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Organic Factors Weakening Parliament 
The dynamics of Tanzania's Parliament have been surveyed by several 
researchers who focused on Parliament and its role in the political pro- 
cess. Five significant impressions emerge from these studies. The first is 
that the people of Tanzania have had great faith in their parliamentary 
and electoral systems and view any attendant problems as unfortunate 
and temporary (Cliffe 1967; University of Dar es Salaam 1972). Secondly, 
election symbols, mainly `the house and the hoe', are very significant; they 
tend to be seen as symbolic of economic classes, with the hoe seen as rep- 
resenting the poor and the house the rich (Kabudi and Mlimuka 1983). 
Thirdly, in most constituencies, ethnic origins and regional or tribal affil- 
iation still influence the choice of representatives (Mwakyembe, et al. 
1983). Fourthly, commercial groups contribute substantially to the mobi- 
lizing of financial resources for candidates, to enable them to influence 
the electorate. This in turn seems to encourage corruption during the 
campaigns and collusion between commercial groups and members of 
the National Assembly in the allocation of resources (Kabudi et al. 1982). 
Finally, most researchers agree that the majority of the population tends 
not to rely on parliamentary processes to solve problems, preferring the 
party and the government's faster and more powerful methods. Hence 
the crucial processes in which the people play a significant role are all 
pre-election activities. This may explain why most of the studies between 
1%5 and 1985 have been very much concerned with the electoral process. 
It seems that post-election parliamentary performance has been assumed 
to be unimportant. 
If the post-election performance of Parliament is insignificant, this 
would contradict the enthusiasm that attends the electoral process. But if, 
as these studies claim, the people attach importance to the parliamentary 
system, then logically they would want to see Parliament perform better, 
and they would believe that it can. This is what makes performance evalu- 
ation very important. A few, limited studies have been carried out in this 
direction. For example, Tordoff has studied some of the weaknesses of 
Tanzania's National Assembly, first concerning himself with contextual 
variables that tend to impinge on the capability of the National Assembly 
to attain the necessary effectiveness in policy formulation. Starting from 
the general assumption that Parliament was weak, he blamed the low 
level of parliamentary influence over policy on time constraints. He 
worked out the statistical spread of the average mean time spent on ses- 
sions and debates and concluded that sessions took about an average of 
three days, with about four bills debated per session (Tordoff 1965). The 
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implication is that if the National Assembly spent more time in sessions, 
and more time on each bill, it would have more opportunity to influence 
policy and legislation. 
Nine years later, Mwansasu again used the time frame approach to as- 
sess parliamentary effectiveness. He calculated that between 1960 and 
1965 the average mean time spent on sessions was 4.8 days, with 2.3 bills 
considered per session. The period covered was the same as that exam- 
ined by Tordoff, and the conclusions were similar. He then calculated the 
average mean time spent on sessions for the period 1965 to 1973, during 
which the average length of sessions had increased to five days and that 
the bills covered had fallen in average to 1.4 per session. He then happily 
asserted that Parliament had become more effective between 1965 and 
1973 (Mwansasu 1974:234). 
While Mwansasu and Tordoff used the same data base to come to dif- 
ferent statistical results, it is interesting that they reached similar conclu- 
sions. Tordoff's 1965 study argued for a link between quantity and quality. 
Mwansasu relied on statistical evidence of quantitative change to argue 
that qualitative changes had occurred. However, Tordoff later reported 
that, statistics notwithstanding, quality was still constrained, indicating 
the influence of other factors (Tordoff 1977). Tordoff's 1977 study, a com- 
parison of the Zambian and Tanzanian Parliaments, caused him to con- 
clude that, time constraints aside, the power structures in the two coun- 
tries were deliberately biased against the National Assembly playing a 
dominant role in controlling the activities of government (Tordoff 1977: 
235). But, if time does not determine the inability of the National Assem- 
bly to influence policy effectively, other factors must; for example, the ar- 
ticulation of Parliament in the power structure of Tanzania, the proce- 
dural and substantive insubordination of the National Assembly to the 
presidency, the policy affiliation to the party structure, the significant rep- 
resentation of government in the structure of Parliament, the operational 
dependence of members of the National Assembly on the regional ad- 
ministration at district level and on the central government at national 
level, and, finally, the fact that members of the National Assembly lack 
any specific leadership role in the grassroots levels of Tanzania's multi- 
layered power structure. 
By articulation I mean the operational division of power between the 
executive and the National Assembly. Issa Shiv i has argued that in Tanza- 
nia, the National Assembly is subordinate to government as long as gov- 
ernment can dissolve it, the National Assembly does not participate in the 
selection of the cabinet and there are no constitutional provisions for a 
vote of no confidence for Parliament (Shivji 1984:3). Constitutionally this 
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argument is correct, because while under the 1977 Constitution the Presi- 
dent can dissolve the National Assembly, there is no provision empower- 
ing the National Assembly to bring down a government. The power to dis- 
solve the National Assembly can be exercised where the President refuses 
to give assent to a bill of Parliament after a third reading and the Assem- 
bly refuses to change its position, or where the President differs with the 
National Assembly substantially on issues of policy. 
On several occasions the Tanzanian President has either secured the 
removal of opponents of government policy from the National Assembly 
or threatened to dissolve the National Assembly if members of the As- 
sembly did not change their positions. In 1969, members of the National 
Assembly who opposed trading relations with China were removed from 
the Assembly by recommendation of government to the party, which at 
that time was chaired by the President. The argument was that those op- 
posing trade with China were using Parliament as a platform for a 
broader opposition (Mwakyembe and Rusemwa 1983). In 1973, a ma- 
jority of members of the National Assembly rejected the Income Tax Bill 
after its second reading. Under this bill the government sought to intro- 
duce a graduated tax system, which would have greatly increased the 
taxes of higher civil servants. The President, addressing the Assembly be- 
fore the third reading of the bill, delivered an ultimatum: either the bill 
was to be accepted, or the members would be returned to the electorate. 
The bill was passed unanimously (Mwakyembe and Rusemwa 1983: 75- 
80). Similarly on 9 May 1981 the Assembly rejected, on purely economic 
grounds, a bill seeking to establish the National Urban Water Authority. 
The Prime Minister, in his summary of the government position before 
the third reading of the bill, warned MPs against making sweeping state- 
ments or taking blind action. He allowed them two days to reconsider 
their position and in a similar fashion, the bill was passed unanimously 
after the third reading. 
These two instances show how the threat to dissolve the National As- 
sembly can effectively curb parliamentary opposition to government pol- 
icy. It is clear that MPs did not assume that, should the National Assem- 
bly be dissolved, they would be assured of an opportunity to stand again 
nor to explain their opposition to the bill to the electorate. Otherwise, it 
would be reasonable for them to stand firm and allow the National As- 
sembly be dissolved. Instead, knowing that the party Chairperson or 
Vice-Chairperson who dissolves the National Assembly in their capacity 
as President will later preside over the selection of candidates in the re- 
sulting elections, they could be almost certain that very few of them would 
be allowed to stand again. It is such circumstances, arising from the im- 
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balance of power between the executive and the legislature, which make 
Parliament a weak instrument of popular participation in policy formula- 
tion. One of the recommendations of the Constitutional Committee of 
1984 was that in case the National Assembly would be dissolved, all in- 
cumbents should have an automatic right to stand. This was rejected and 
was omitted from the 1984 constitutional amendment, probably because 
it substantially offers an opportunity to the public to give a vote of no con- 
fidence in the government, should it feel the Assembly to be justified in its 
position. 
The subordination of the Assembly to other policy-making bodies has 
already been discussed in the context of the party-Parliament relation- 
ship. In this section Parliament is examined in terms of its two compo- 
nents - the Assembly and the President. Under the constitution of Tan- 
zania, the President is a constituent organ of the Parliament and the 
Assembly is the final legislative authority. In the legislative process, a bill 
does not become law unless it has obtained a presidential assent. By with- 
holding assent, the President may block the passing of a bill into law; the 
Assembly may block a government bill by refusing to pass it. The Presi- 
dent also is entitled to dissolve Parliament. Therefore while in theory the 
Assembly can block a government bill, and while in theory the President 
can refuse to give his assent to a bill, in practice there are usually no pri- 
vate member bills. Therefore the likelihood that the President will refuse 
to assent to a bill are minimal, while the likelihood that an Assembly that 
opposes the government on a bill will be dissolved is rather higher. Again 
this entails a situation of relative imbalance of power and reduces the 
ability of the Assembly to come out openly against government policies or 
bills. 
When the position of the Assembly is viewed in terms of the relation- 
ship between the party and the government, the Assembly or Parliament 
as such becomes an insignificant policy body. Under the 1977 Constitu- 
tion (section 54), Parliament was a subcommittee of the Annual Congress 
of the ruling party (CCM). In theory, this subordinated both wings of Par- 
liament to party policy institutions. In practice, since the Chairperson and 
Vice-Chair of the party were also top officials in government and the Sec- 
retary-General and several members of the party central committee were 
also cabinet members, government was not only adequately represented 
in the top party hierarchy but in fact controlled the party. Hence the Na- 
tional Assembly was drawn into the party structure where, by participat- 
ing in the formulation of party policy collectively with other members of 
the party congress, it becomes bound by it. Such affiliation makes the pol- 
icy-making function of Parliament derivative and residual; as long as 
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party policies inevitably reflect government policy preferences, Parlia- 
ment as such has no direct impact on party policies. As a party subcom- 
mittee, Parliament per se had no place in the party hierarchy: its leader 
was not a member of the party Central Committee, it had no repre- 
sentation on the party's National Executive Committee, it had no duty to 
report to the party, and at the Annual Congress it was not expected to 
present a performance report on its own activities or on the activities of 
government. 
Thus, the Tanzanian government and the party dominated parliamen- 
tary politics, but parliamentary politics rarely affected party or govern- 
ment politics. Tanzania is not alone in this regard (for example, during the 
Allende regime Chile was in a very similar situation) and various scholars 
have analysed the dynamics of such relationships. Wiilde and Venezuela 
(1976: 136) have argued that in order for Parliament to influence party 
and government politics, the bureaucracies of the latter should be neither 
integrated nor very strong; otherwise, they see Parliament becoming a 
political power broker between constituents and the government. Ac- 
cording to Hopkins (1976: 133) if Parliament cannot assert itself over 
other state political organs, it can be easily relegated to the role of legit- 
imizing party or government policies among the electorate. In Tanzania, 
the political affiliation reduced Parliament to this secondary (or tertiary) 
role: and party and government officials expected Parliament to help 
them to explain their policies to the masses, but not to have any significant 
influence over them (Mwakawago 1979: 199). The crucial question is 
whether or not the people, and their representative institutions, are ex- 
pected to determine the parameters of primary and fundamental policy: 
democracy for the people versus democracy by the people (Pinkele 1976: 
134; Morrel 1976: 135). 
The Tanzanian Parliament was further weakened by the extent to 
which government is represented in the National Assembly. Neither the 
1965 nor the 1977 Constitution recognize the need for a front bench or a 
party whip in Parliament. Theoretically, in a one-party Parliament, such 
institutions would be irrelevant; their existence would question the va- 
lidity of the presumption of lack of opposition in a one-party democracy. 
In practice, however, there is recognition that Members of Parliament, 
however supportive they might be of the party manifesto, are not necess- 
arily likely to agree with all party or government policies at all times. 
Given the multiple interests represented in the party, there is always the 
possibility of parliamentary freedoms being exercised in ways not necess- 
arily conducive to the predominance of the policy interests of government 
and the party. To reduce the extent to which this may undermine party 
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and government hegemony, the Constitution has guaranteed government 
representation in Parliament. 
So, in addition to the need for presidential assent and the presidential 
power to dissolve Parliament (Section 63 of the Constitution) the Con- 
stitution grants the President power to nominate fifteen members of the 
Assembly, of whom at least five must be from Zanzibar and at least five 
from the mainland. In addition, twenty-three regional administrators 
come to Parliament as ex officio members with the status of cabinet min- 
isters. Their numbers are boosted by at least twenty-five cabinet members 
who are nominated from among members of Parliament who - unless 
they are presenting reports or estimates, in which case they are under 
scrutiny - enjoy the same anonymity as other Members of Parliament. 
Thus a minimum of 65 members of the Assembly directly represent gov- 
ernment interests. Another thirty-five Members of Parliament who enter 
through indirect elections are drawn from the party's mass organizations: 
women's, parents' and youth groups, and the country's single trade union. 
They are nominated by the party and subjected to a parliamentary vote, 
so in essence they also represent party interests. These two groups ac- 
count for one hundred of the Parliament's 181 representative, or 55 per 
cent. While no close study of group performance in Tanzania's Parliament 
exists, it would be reasonable to hypothesize that this group constitutes a 
de facto front bench of the party and the government and that to the ex- 
tent that it is capable of acting in an organized way, it can ensure that gov- 
ernment interests are not obstructed by Parliament. 
The Prime Minister's role as leader of government business in the 
house also strengthens government against the Assembly. While the 
Prime Minister's role in itself is not a disadvantage to the elected mem- 
bers of the Assembly, there is no independent leadership in the Assembly 
to counterbalance it. In most systems, the legislature has a leader, and the 
Prime Minister leads government business. In Tanzania, the Prime Minis- 
ter leads both, and thus is entitled to set limits on debates and to sum- 
marize the views of the Assembly at the ends of debates. The non-govern- 
mental members of the house have no opportunity to summarize their 
views when they disagree with the line of thinking pursued by govern- 
ment. 
The last major weakness of the Parliament is its operational depend- 
ence - both Parliament and its individual members are very much de- 
pendent on government for services and legitimacy. At district or regional 
levels, Members of Parliament have no independent resources and are 
not officially represented in the regional administrative structure. This 
subjects Members of Parliament to administrative and financial control 
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by the regional administration. In the district and regional planning struc- 
tures Members of Parliament feature as representatives of the people, but 
have no leadership roles to play. The regional and district planning com- 
mittees are chaired by the regional and area commissioners respectively, 
and the regional and district development directors provide the secreta- 
riat for the two committees. Members of Parliament have very weak link- 
ages at grassroots level. They are forced to attempt as much as possible to 
accommodate the wishes of their local administrators, without whom they 
will be denied necessary local services and a share of the development 
funds for their constituencies. 
Meanwhile, the office of the Speaker of the National Assembly is also 
part of the central government. The Speaker is regarded as a senior civil 
servant. The auxiliaries of the Speaker of the Assembly are civil servants 
and operate under the control of the central establishment. They are 
therefore dependent on the government for promotion and can be verti- 
cally or horizontally transferred to other departments. They provide sec- 
retarial and informational services to Parliament. However, as part of the 
civil service, these officials can provide only the information or services 
allowed by the government; they therefore represent a significant re- 
source for government control over data and resources available to Mem- 
bers of Parliament. As Tanzania tries to work out a new constitutional 
structure it has to ensure that redemocratization is based on a strong par- 
liament and an executive which is accountable to it. 
Organizational Weaknesses of Parliament 
Most legislatures are treated as sub-units of the state machinery, al- 
though some are considered to be independent organizations. There are 
no hard and fast rules which can be used to judge their organizational at- 
tributes. In characterizing the United States Congress as an organization, 
for example, Cooper considers its capability to affect the power structure 
of both government and the dominant political parties from which it is 
drawn (Cooper 1974-75:307). Size and evidence of growth or transforma- 
tion, division of power and work and the nature of role specialization 
have also been used to test whether or not a legislative body is an inde- 
pendent and dynamic organization (Davidson and Olzek 1976: 37). In 
most cases, however, Parliaments which have shown evidence of inde- 
pendence from the government structure and the capacity to develop 
their legislative function through well-worked out strategies on how to in- 
fluence law and policy have been categorized as organizations rather than 
as sub-units (Cooper 1974-75: 310). 
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Parliaments do not operate in a social or political vacuum. Born of 
political and social structures, they carry the genes and bear the marks of 
their social and political contexts. The extent of their influence is directly 
related to their socio-economic and political context, which either will or 
will not accord them recognition and acceptance as vital organs of policy. 
Where recognition is not immediately forthcoming, it can be gradually at- 
tained if Parliament is capable of asserting itself over rival policy-making 
institutions. However, for this to occur Members of Parliament must 
become aware of their legitimate role as the most proximate repre- 
sentatives of the majority of the population and therefore of their legitim- 
ate right to formulate the broad policies of the nation. The legitimation of 
their policy-making role also requires that Members of Parliament be 
aware of their need for operational channels through which positions to 
be taken can be discussed prior to parliamentary debate and information 
can be exchanged on matters of importance to MPs. Such linkages would 
very much help members to define and develop common national objec- 
tives, work out their common output goals and develop the operational 
cohesion which would be necessary for minority positions within Parlia- 
ment to have an impact on government policy. 
There are four main organizational constraints which hamper the 
Tanzanian Parliament's ability to develop the organizational base its 
members would need in order to develop such linkages and to achieve 
operational autonomy. The first is that their representational role is 
shared by several other demand-handling channels, some of which are 
better equipped and can out-perform the legislature. Secondly, Members 
of Parliament lack open and free access to information both from their 
constituencies and at the national levels. They also lack sufficient sources 
of independent information on government activities. Thirdly, they have 
no direct control over the system which disseminates information about 
their own activities, and finally, their lack of a formal role at the local level 
makes them very susceptible to pressure group demands at constituency 
level. 
The demand handling structure in Tanzania consists of a three-tier 
system of demand handing channels without horizontal links. The party is 
well-organized from the ten-cell or ten household level, and controls 
most of the political activities of the district. The local representative to 
Parliament is nominated through a screening process organized under 
the auspices of the party, but the MP is not then incorporated in the party 
hierarchy. The party branches continue to handle most of the demands 
and complaints of the people and to play a significant organizational role 
among the population. The control vested in the party by the Constitution 
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over political processes in general and the electoral process in particular, 
limits the ability of individual members of Parliament to exercise discre- 
tion in handling the demands of his or her constituency. 
Government is the second demand tier extending from constituency 
to national levels. Like the party, the government is organized from a ten- 
cell base to the ward level, with wards grouped to constitute a district. Its 
administrative system parallels that of the party, with which it is constitu- 
tionally and operationally very well interlinked. 
Parliament does not constitute a separate demand tier, since it has no 
formal, visible, executive role reaching to the constituency level. Thus, 
Members of Parliament are in some respects sandwiched between two 
powerful organs of the state. Although, according to Mezey (1976: 125) 
such a structure may have the advantage of reducing the actual number of 
demands finally reaching the MP, it also makes it relatively easy to draw 
parliamentary representatives into a struggle to forge a representational 
role and may contribute to making MPs more concerned with district and 
regional issues, at the expense of broader issues of national development 
such as long-term planning, public investment or the control of govern- 
ment policy. 
A third, informal demand-tier consisting of religious bodies, also 
plays an important role in handling and channelling constituency de- 
mands to policy-makers. On family matters, land issues, and employment 
policy, and on social issues such as training opportunities, schools and the 
distribution of health facilities, individual heads of religious bodies are re- 
lied upon in many constituencies to reach and influence the top policy- 
makers in government. 
This third tier also draws a sizeable portion of constituency demands 
away from Members of Parliament. While MPs are allowed by the Con- 
stitution to be the main channel for constituency demands, local govern- 
ment officials still encourage constituents to bring demands to them di- 
rectly. The party has not reached a stage where it can communicate 
clearly that the Member of Parliament who operates under its licence is 
the sole person entrusted with the duty of channelling demands to the 
government. It has not delegated these representative functions to Parlia- 
ment and its members. Instead, it is the party and the government at local 
level which are endowed with the power to take immediate and effective 
action on constituency demands, whether or not their response is necess- 
arily the most appropriate. 
This serves to disempower Members of Parliament, who must rely on 
the much more lengthy parliamentary process. When either the govern- 
ment or the party (or both) decides to act on a local demand, this fore- 
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stalls the possibility of the MP raising the issue without risking possible 
antagonism; if the issue does reach parliamentary level, it comes in the 
form of an appeal or an accusation against local administrators, who are 
adequately represented in the Assembly. More often than not this leads 
to conflicts between members and regional administrators in Parliament. 
The problem of pressure group influence arises because members of 
Parliament have a very weak representational role at grassroots level; 
their search for constituency to represent drives them into the hands of 
well-organized groups - for example, commercial or industrial groups 
- whose interests are not very well articulated at government or party 
level. MPs quickly discover that such groups are the least favoured by 
both the party and the government. Private entrepreneurs do not have 
priority in either the licensing or the commodity distribution system. To 
gain access they mobilize MPs, who, because they are sitting on various 
marketing boards, find that it is mainly the interests and demands of such 
groups that they can effectively handle. They therefore devote consider- 
able energy to seeking to influence licencing, distribution and land alloca- 
tion decisions, and so on, in favour of investors. This further alienates 
MPs from their constituencies and creates opportunities for corruption. 
When up for re-election, such MPs, unable to create sufficient oppor- 
tunities to work with their constituency's issues, inevitably find it necess- 
ary to rely on commercial groups to mobilize the resources necessary for 
their re-election campaigns. As demonstrated by petitions in the 1975 and 
1980 elections, the alliance between politicians and commercial interest 
groups has led to vicious circles of corruption and illegal election prac- 
tices (Kabudi and Mlimuka 1983). Furthermore, these self-reinforcing re- 
lationships and their attendant cycles of corruption naturally tend to con- 
tinue after the elections, as MPs - further diverted from national issues 
- resume their attention to what Mohaptra has called the `expediting' 
demands of their sponsoring classes or groups. 
Self-help developmentalist groups, which are also not well placed in 
government and party structures, seek similar forms of support from in- 
dividual Members of Parliament. Such groups mainly organize within eth- 
nic or tribal populations to mobilize resources for educational and other 
development projects. Between 1975 and 1989 their activity intensified in 
response to the government's failure to meet needs of planned or ex- 
pected development projects. Voluntary public organizations mush- 
roomed to fill the gap, and in the process have provided MPs a new base. 
Self-help groups have a number of advantages in terms of mobilizing 
people for collective self-reliance at district level. Their main disadvant- 
age is that they rally people by accenting divisions based on localities, eth- 
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nicity, and in some cases divisions based on pre-colonial and colonial 
chiefdoms which were disbanded immediately after independence. A dis- 
cussion of the relative importance of the long-term effects of reverting to 
such divisions and the consciousness this produces would be peripheral 
to my main point, which is that such groups are further diverting MPs 
from national goals. Because the government and the party are neither 
opposed to, nor actively involved in such groups, they provide MPs with 
one of the few fora within which they are seen to play a mobilizing, devel- 
opmental role. 
The problem of diversion from national to local politics is therefore 
primarily a product of the lack of a political base for MPs, however wide 
a social base they may enjoy among the people. Studies in other countries, 
both developed and developing nations, have shown that Members of 
Parliament can be easily diverted from national issues by local demand 
pulls. These may include sectoral demands where a member has certain 
sectoral preferences or biases, or demands derived from allegiances to in- 
formal organizations or organized pressure groups such as unions and 
commercial or producers' organizations (Driberg 1969: 87; Sutchcliff 
1970:87). 
The third problem which prevents Parliament from operating as an 
organization rather than as a sub-group is the way in which knowledge or 
information available to its members is limited. As Kashyap has argued, 
the continued vitality and relevance of Parliament very much depends on 
the ability of its members to perform new roles and develop new expecta- 
tions and this calls for adequate training and information about new roles 
and challenges (Kashyap 1976: 163). In Tanzania, as in many other de- 
veloping countries, Members of Parliament may lack knowledge about 
government and parliamentary procedure. Irrespective of educational 
background, most MPs lack fundamental knowledge about rules of Par- 
liament and the options available for them to increase their input and ef- 
fectiveness (Kashyap 1970: 81; Campbell 1971: 108). To cure this defi- 
ciency some parliamentary systems have provisions for orientation 
seminars, which are supplemented by library services and regular infor- 
mation bulletins and newsletters. Papua New Guinea, which is smaller 
and more constrained in terms of resources than Tanzania, has attempted 
to provide such services and India has maintained such a system for de- 
cades (Shakder 1971: 105). Countries with more resources have at- 
tempted to create a link between individual Members of Parliament and 
researchers based in policy research institutions and to avail MPs of ad- 
vanced methods of extracting their own information and reaching their 
own decisions (Lloyd 1971: 256). 
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While providing technical assistance or equipment does not in any 
way ensure that the quality of performance will improve, it must be recog- 
nised that training is a factor in the improvement of policy input and out- 
put. In the case of government, staff colleges exist to train government of- 
ficials on matters of government and parliamentary procedures. An equal 
opportunity must be extended to Parliament, regardless of the role in 
which the legislature is cast. Ian Lloyd has argued that the dominance of 
the executive over the legislature can be reduced if the struggle for par- 
liamentary autonomy includes as its objective independent control of in- 
formation by Parliament. But such control can only arise if the MPs indi- 
vidually and collectively know where and how to obtain information, can 
decipher the technical jargon used in tax and budgetary data, can carry 
out independent data analysis and strengthen their capability to devise 
workable development strategies and models (Lloyd 1971: 258). 
In order to operate effectively within the stringent rules of parliamen- 
tary procedure, MPs have to be equipped with accurate and coherent in- 
formation, obtained preferably from non-governmental sources, and 
must know exactly when, where and how to deploy it. Since MPs are 
elected officials and are not necessarily specially trained in government, 
the organizational structures of Parliament must be geared more towards 
increasing the ability of MPs to scan, select, analyse, utilize and retrieve 
needed information without relying solely on what is provided by govern- 
ment machinery. Cross-country comparisons show that this ability to ob- 
tain and control information independently increases the capacity of Par- 
liaments to affect or control government activities and to ensure 
compliance with agreed laws and policies (David 1969: 8). In some coun- 
tries, such as Papua New Guinea, the legislative function has been streng- 
thened by the provision to MPs of legal advisory services to aid the inter- 
pretation of government bills submitted to Parliament (Ley 1972: 303). 
In Tanzania, MPs lack both the skills and the information necessary to 
enable them to analyse government bills and policy documents. The li- 
brary of Parliament is poorly equipped, and even parliamentary reports 
are not well stocked. Government publications are not organized for 
ready availability or for systematic use during parliamentary sessions. 
MPs are very much dependent on newspaper reports and other collateral 
sources of information which are not based on sound data. It would, of 
course, be quite difficult for a country like Tanzania to provide its MPs 
with advanced technical equipment for information processing. Aside 
from the considerable expense, it is likely that not all MPs would be able 
to use such equipment. But a well-stocked and up-to-date library for its 
national legislature is something even a poor country must be able to af- 
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ford. Similarly, orientation seminars on government and parliamentary 
procedures would not be a particular drain on national resources. In any 
case, as was noted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union at its symposium in 
January 1973, if a country can afford a legislature, it ought to afford the 
necessary legislative reference services (Barker 1973: 100). 
The last and perhaps related constraint on the legislature is their lack 
of control over the reporting on their activities. Very few researchers have 
understood this as a substantial problem, because they have considered it 
narrowly in terms of labour availability. Using the case of Malta, for 
example, Mifsud has shown how lack of control over reporting of par- 
liamentary proceedings could easily be a problem if those relied upon to 
report go on strike (Mifsud 1970: 333). Because reporters of parliamen- 
tary activities are government employees in most countries, including 
Tanzania, they have a limited right to strike. 
The real problem, however, is that in most countries the civil service 
directs and controls the reporting process, with insufficient control by the 
legislature. In Tanzania, the office of the Clerk of National Assembly 
(who is a civil servant) controls the information outflow from parliamen- 
tary proceedings. Parliament in Tanzania, as in many other systems, has 
no editorial committee to verify the accuracy of the reporting. 
The disadvantages likely to arise from such a situation were discussed 
at the meeting of the clerks of the Commonwealth Caribbean Parliaments 
in 1968 in the broader framework of the links between Parliaments and 
civil service structures. At this conference, the clerks discussed the struc- 
tural contradictions in their present role. Specifically, as long as the clerks 
of national assemblies are civil servants, they are legally servants of the ex- 
ecutive and depend on the executive, rather than the legislature, for pro- 
motion or transfer to other government departments; this implies divided 
loyalties. For them, the structure implies that if the clerks of national as- 
semblies are to act as servants of Parliament, the clerks need to be self- 
contained and independent of the civil service. Support for removing the 
clerks from government control was argued on the basis of three main 
points: 
- The possibility of horizontal transfer within the civil service creates 
a situation which forces clerks to be subservient to the executive and 
allows the latter to determine the civil servants' behaviour towards 
Members of Parliament. 
- Because the clerks are governed by civil service promotion proce- 
dures, promotions can be used to guarantee their loyalty to govern- 
ment, as opposed to Parliament. 
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- While the clerks are meant to support Parliament, they are not 
trained as career Parliamentary aides; they require specialized 
training, both for themselves and their auxiliaries, and would benefit 
from professional association with clerks in other countries 
(Stratchman 1969: 66-67). 
The concerns expressed by the Caribbean clerks in 1968 are equally 
relevant in Tanzania today. In Tanzania, the Clerk of the Assembly is a 
presidential appointee and a senior member of the civil service. The 
terms and conditions of service for this position are governed by civil ser- 
vice regulations, which means the Clerk can be disciplined only through 
civil service procedures. Parliament has no power or say over the appoint- 
ment, tenure, termination or transfer of the Clerk of the Assembly (Sec- 
tion 88 Act 15 of 1984). In an executive-oriented system like that of Tan- 
zania, the executive's control of the personnel serving Parliament is 
conducive to situations where these personnel fail to recognize the im- 
portance of the MPs in their employment and work only to please those 
wielding powers over them. Although there are examples of strong Parlia- 
ments able to assert control over the Clerk - as has been claimed in the 
case of Jamaica (Hart 1969: 67), in a situation where parliamentary power 
vis-d-vis that of the executive is constrained, the latter may use its control 
over parliamentary services to increase its bargaining leverage with Par- 
liament. 
In summary, relying on Parliament as an alternative to non-market 
controls over public enterprises would require a number of fundamental 
changes aimed at freeing Parliament from the civil service and elevating it 
above the executive. Any genuine efforts towards restructuring Tanza- 
nia's political system will require that the government relinquish its power 
to supervise the economy to Parliament and to market forces. Such a de- 
volution may require empowering Parliament to prevent the government 
from encroaching on the positive aspects of market controls. As long as 
the Parliament's role is to `bless' rather than to shape policy, (see Barker 
1973: 102), the requisite balance of power between market and non-mar- 
ket mechanisms will be impossible to achieve. As the next chapter will 
demonstrate, parliamentary procedures have reduced the impact of an 
already constrained Parliament. Parliamentary questions and debates will 
also be examined in terms of the extent to which MPs have attempted to 
influence public enterprise policy despite the existence of overwhelming 
constraints. 
5. Parliamentary Questions and 
Debates on Public Enterprises: 
Their Contribution and Limitations 
The Importance of Questions and Debates 
Considerable optimism has been expressed about the usefulness of 
parliamentary questions and debates in the control of public enterprise. 
In assessing the effect of legislative questioning on public enterprises in 
the Indian Parliament, for example, Ramanadhan has asserted that they 
have helped members to raise grievances concerning public enterprise 
management and that, when properly used, such questions tend to have a 
significant moral influence on public enterprise managers (Ramanadhan 
1984: 14). Narain used the number of parliamentary questions asked on a 
single enterprise as one simple, quantitative measure of public enterprise 
performance (Narain 1980: 23). Stretched too far, such a measurement 
could yield misleading results because some corporations may perform 
well economically and still be targets of rigorous parliamentary questions 
and debates. For example, their economic success may derive from some 
breach of their social obligations or abuse of their monopoly position or 
even from failing to meet their obligations to the public. Other re- 
searchers view `too much' questioning as a violation of the main attributes 
of the Morrisonian corporation and as a way of reducing them to the level 
of public departments (Robson 1952: 314-6). 
While parliamentary questions are an established mechanism for ex- 
tracting implicit and explicit government policy statements, some authors 
have expressed doubts as regards their viability as a mechanism for mak- 
ing public enterprises accountable. Even in Britain, where the Morriso- 
nian corporation originated, most such questions are usually dodged by 
ministers (for a detailed study, see Drake 1970: 41). Daintith (1970: 68) 
blames the failure of the question mechanism on the traditionally blurred 
nature of ministerial powers as regards their role in public enterprise 
management. In the case of the Indian Parliament, which has been put 
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forward by Ramanadhan (1984) and Narain (1980) as a success story, 
Mallya (a long-time official of the Lower House in India) has categorized 
parliamentary questions as merely `spot checks on performance' which 
neither increase parliamentary control of public enterprise nor make 
them more accountable to the public (Mallya 1971: 131-2). 
The utility of parliamentary questions is limited by the general factors 
discussed in Chapter Four, which affect parliamentary input in all areas. 
In addition, specific factors tend to constrain parliamentary questions 
and debates. These are mainly rules about the admissibility of questions, 
the psychological outlook of the Members of Parliament and their ability 
to use the debates and questions to assert their influence on policy. 
Procedural Barriers to Effective Questioning 
Most parliamentary rules of procedure have been inherited from the 
colonial Legislative Council; some have been copied from the British and 
Indian Parliaments. Those rules based on a multi-party system may not 
reflect the spirit of a one-party system, with its inherent presumptions of 
unity and uniformity of approach. Admissible questions must be brief, ge- 
nuine, and within the respondent's area of responsibility; they may not be 
made a pretext for debate, refer to persons or officials not present, nor 
relate to official secrets. 
The first rule that affects the utility of questions is thus Rule 35, which 
governs admissibility. For a question put to a minister to be admissible, it 
must be related to public affairs with which such a minister is officially 
connected and which are directly relevant to the proceedings in the house 
or to some matter of administration for which the minister is responsible. 
Secondly, the question should be genuinely interrogative, seeking infor- 
mation or pressing for action. Thirdly, questions should not be made a 
pretext for debate. 
Rule 37(1) of the standing orders bars leading questions. It requires 
that for a question to be admissible it should not be framed in such a man- 
ner as to suggest its own answer or convey a particular point of view. Sub- 
sections (2) and (3) of the same rule further require that questions should 
not contain arguments, inferences, opinions, implications or controver- 
sial, ironical or offensive expressions or epithets. Breach of these regula- 
tions exonerates Parliament from liability for misrepresentations and 
places the liability on the maker of the statement. This in actual fact cre- 
ates a technical limit on the maker of the statement because despite par- 
liamentary privileges an MP can be charged with libel if a question is so 
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phrased. Parliamentary privileges indemnify members against the public, 
but the rule does not apply to the members among themselves. 
A third set of rules excludes questions which refer directly or by 
necessary inference to other persons or officials related to the minister 
officially or personally, who at the time of the question are not officially 
present in Parliament (Rule 37(10)). The same rule requires that no ques- 
tion asked should relate to any matters which are by their nature officially 
secret. In order for a minister to be asked a question about a person not 
officially present in the house, the minister has to be notified in advance 
and the speaker has to give prior notice of the intention to ask such a 
question. If the procedure is violated the minister has a right not to 
answer and the question cannot be recorded (Rule 39(11)). 
The fourth set of rules relevant to the admissibility of questions seeks 
to limit the length of questions. Rule 37(1) requires that a question should 
not be framed in such a way that it amounts to a speech. The Speaker of 
the House determines what amounts to a speech. In order to comply with 
this rule, questions must be very brief. 
All these rules contribute substantially in reducing the importance of 
the question mechanism in influencing policy. Similar rules apply in all 
former British colonies; studies exist of Kenya (Parliamentarian 1969: 
243-8), Uganda (Ochuro 1970: 149) and Sierra Leone (Davies 1976: 67-8) 
to mention a few. In effect, the former colonies have transplanted rules 
governing the admission of evidence in criminal and civil procedure to 
the parliamentary process, and although findings in East Africa tend to 
show that ministers are usually ready to answer questions which do not 
comply with the rules, they free ministers from answering certain ques- 
tions if they think it is politically expedient not to do so. Within the Mor- 
risonian model of public enterprise they also help to strengthen the myth 
that ministers are not involved in the day-to-day operations of enter- 
prises. In systems like that of Tanzania, where administrative discretion is 
relied upon more than rules, they provide the government additional lee- 
way in responding to Parliament and in disclosing information. 
In the Westminster tradition, parliamentary processes are calculated 
to prevent members of the opposition from taking undue advantage over 
the party in power by imputing the weaknesses of autonomous govern- 
ment agencies to government itself (Jennings 1961: 103; Michaelides 
1979: 69; Newman 1978: 64), the general sense being that where the scope 
of questions is unlimited, they can be used as indicators of statutory and 
extra-statutory relationships between ministers and government agencies 
(Giddings 1975: 391). In one-party and non-party systems, the argument 
of undue advantage has no legal or logical basis. Furthermore, where le- 
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vels of literacy are limited and there is a general lack of administrative 
skills and supportive advisory services, adherence to such rules can only 
be understood in terms of general disregard for Parliament's potential 
contributions to policy or in terms of the government's administrative un- 
preparedness for influence from Parliament. Supplementing this short- 
coming is the lack of legal protection for parliamentary privileges. This is 
discussed in the next section. 
Parliamentary Privileges and Access to Government 
Documents 
As noted in the rules of procedure, Rule 37 makes inadmissible any 
question requiring disclosure of information which is by its nature offi- 
cially secret. The National Security Act of 1970 makes it an offence for 
any public servant to disclose any information which may be prejudicial to 
national security interests. In this Act there is no distinction between pub- 
lic information and official secrets. The determination of what is likely to 
endanger national security interests depends on the subjective opinion of 
the official being required to disclose the information. Parliament is not 
exempted from this statutory limitation on the disclosure of information 
to the public. 
Tanzania is not the only country in which laws preventing disclosure of 
information to the public define `public' to include national legislatures. 
In the United States, for example, Congressional Committees fail from 
time to time to gain access to information held by federal agencies. In 
some cases, federal (and even non-federal) agencies have successfully 
used court injunctions to bar Congress from obtaining information on 
their activities, on the grounds of protecting national security interests 
(Rosenthal and Grossman 1977-78: 75-118). Courts have expressed their 
dissatisfaction with such rules but have failed to intervene because Con- 
gress, whichis the law-maker, has itself failed to change the rules. In the 
US, laws exist to define the limits to which government or its agencies can 
block access to information. In Tanzania, the National Security Act is the 
only relevant piece of legislation, and as long as this Act leaves so much 
room for administrative subjectivity, government will choose the informa- 
tion it finds suitable for disclosure to the public through Parliament. 
Another area deserving attention is the personal security of MPs, who 
are inadequately protected from legal action for statements they make in 
the legislature concerning government officials or fellow MPs. Section 
100(1) of the present Constitution contains a clause which states that the 
freedom of speech for the Members of Parliament shall not be ques- 
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tioned by any institution. Section 100(2) states that MPs shall not be liable 
for civil action arising from what they say in the National Assembly. These 
are the main provisions which govern parliamentary privileges. Section 
101 empowers Parliament to pass any other law defining its privileges, but 
such a law is yet to be passed. In the meantime, MPs are not indemnified 
against arrest or prosecution for speech or activities outside the Assem- 
bly, and there are no rules governing the rights of MPs or parliamentary 
committees in the performance of their legislative function. Such rights 
would include, for example, the right of access to public documents with- 
out undue delay, and the right of the Speaker to summon any public of- 
ficer to appear and make presentations or give testimony before Parlia- 
ment itself or its committees. 
There are currently no provisions in any law that protect the proceed- 
ings of any committee of Parliament from government or private inter- 
ference. Even the right of an MP not to be arrested within the Assembly 
or its precincts is assumed from common law tradition rather than pro- 
tected under the Constitution. History reminds us that sovereigns such as 
Charles I, Napoleon I and Idi Amin managed, in the absence of legal con- 
straints, to arrest legislators within the confines of the Assembly (Thorne 
1974: 163-5). Of course, laws cannot prevent a dictator from assaulting 
Parliament, but they can prevent a government from exercising what in 
the absence of a state of emergency would amount to an abuse of its 
power over MPs. 
One cause of the failure of the parliamentary committee on public en- 
terprise, to be examined in Chapter Six, is that enterprise officials refused 
to appear before the committee. Such committees, and Parliament gener- 
ally, are powerless to compel governmental and enterprise officials to ap- 
pear before them, a pattern very much of a piece with the general con- 
straints on the ability of Parliament to summon public officials and 
compel their testimony. 
The Tanzanian Parliament lacks the power to impose penalties on 
those who exhibit contempt of its proceedings. Although in some coun- 
tries only courts possess such power, the idea being that Parliament 
should not perform judicial functions (Pettifer 1969: 288-97), in other 
countries it has been deemed proper that Parliament adjudicates, 
through its own bar, disputes arising between its members and those in- 
volving breach of privilege by outsiders (Pelletier 1973: 143-52; Par- 
liamentarian 1973: 132-4). The Tanzanian Parliament can summon public 
officials to appear before its committees, but cannot impose penalties for 
non-cooperation or contempt or breach of parliamentary privileges. 
Finally, if Members of Parliament are to feel secure in their perfor- 
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mance of parliamentary duties, they must be legally protected from the 
fear of removal from Parliament during their term. The practice of re- 
moving members before Parliament is dissolved if they appear to oppose 
government policy puts them in an untenable position: they must be very 
careful about what they say and how they say it. It would be in the general 
interest of democracy and national development to pass and enact a law 
assuring MPs that while they continue to perform their representative 
role, they can be disqualified only by the electorate. 
Administrative Short-Cuts and the Legislative Process 
The government uses several effective administrative short-cuts to 
avoid Parliament's lengthy procedures and the attendant uncertainties. 
Such short-cuts are normally invoked on potentially controversial issues 
or when neglect or failure to act in time has eroded the time available for 
action and consultation. The main short-cut for potentially controversial 
issues is the use of the party forum. In 1971 the government decided to 
build a new capital city in Dodoma and to move from Dar es Salaam. 
Given Dodoma's climate and the resources that might be required by the 
project, it was clear that Parliament would oppose the move. In order to 
forestall controversy, the government presented the proposal to the 
party. The party, eager to operate in a new city based in one of the most 
disadvantaged regions, blessed the proposal and gave the government the 
go-ahead. In the implementation of the party decision the government 
passed a presidential decree forming the Capital Development Auth- 
ority. Parliament never had the opportunity to discuss the decision to 
move. Similar short-cuts have been taken on issues which were con- 
sidered to be highly political, such as the 1969 villagization programme, 
which was blessed by the party and implemented by presidential directive 
(No.1 of 1969); the introduction of participatory management in all pub- 
lic enterprises in 1970, also blessed by the party was introduced by 
presidential directive (No. 1 of 1970); and the abolition of agricultural 
producer cooperatives in 1975, which not only destabilized the marketing 
system but also overburdened the existing marketing boards by giving 
them extra responsibility without extra resources. These directives all cre- 
ated new enterprises or new production relations or involved the deploy- 
ment of immense financial resources, and Parliament, which is supposed 
to hold the national purse, was not consulted. 
The second administrative short-cut is the use of presidential power 
under the Public Corporation Act 1969 (Act 17 of 1969) to form new cor- 
porations without consulting Parliament. This generally occurs after Par- 
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liament's budget sessions. As noted in Chapter Three, the right to decide 
whether a corporation will be defined and formed by Acts of Parliament 
or by presidential decree rests with the President. Between 1970 and 
1979, 60 per cent of the corporations formed were created by presidential 
orders. Most of these were to engage in agriculture and research and de- 
velopment activities. Several seem to have been initiated by their parent 
ministries in order to utilize international aid available for agriculture and 
research. Some, especially in the area of research, while formed to utilize 
project funds, became dependent on (virtually unavailable) government 
funding when the international projects ended. Of the few public enter- 
prises formed by presidential decree in this period that catered for mar- 
keting demands, most were based on temporary trends. Most of the latter 
marketed agricultural products. A temporary boom in the prices of hides 
and skins, for example, led to the formation of the Skin and Hide Market- 
ing Corporation in 1969. Similarly a party decision in 1970 that govern- 
ment should encourage the destocking of cattle-grazing areas to reduce 
soil erosion and improve the incomes of the livestock farmers led to the 
formation of the Tanzania Livestock Marketing Corporation, alongside 
an already existing Livestock Development Corporation. When the price 
of hides fell on the world market and the cattle population stabilized in 
cattle-grazing areas, these enterprises became liabilities. 
Some corporations formed by presidential decree were motivated by 
political control objectives. Ministries have at times apparently estab- 
lished enterprises in order to generate jobs - as safety valves, for the re- 
cruitment of faithful auxiliaries in management or as a dumping ground 
for uncooperative associates. Another motive may have been to expand 
financial powers and, given the financial autonomy of public enterprises, 
to increase discretionary powers in financial decision-making. Most of 
the enterprises that could be viewed in this way have been formed in the 
areas of training, where institutes enjoy some contractual and other 
powers. 
The third administrative short-cut is the use of certificates of urgency 
in Parliament to take parliamentary bills through the legislative process 
quickly. In 1969 the Election Bill, the African Chiefs Bill, the Education 
Bill and the Metric System Bill were passed through Parliament very 
quickly because of this mechanism. The Election Bill carried with it many 
changes. It altered the national and local electoral constituencies and re- 
pealed other Acts, such as the Presidential Election Act of 1962 and the 
Local Government Election Act of 1962. It also altered the system for 
supervising elections by reducing the role of the speaker of Parliament 
and increasing that of the Clerk of the National Assembly. The bill passed 
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barely six months prior to the 1970 elections. The African Chiefs Bill 
abolished the traditional structure of leadership and made illegal any 
claims to traditional authority. A sizeable group of MPs were tribal chiefs 
and a debate would have given them opportunity to air their views. The 
Education Bill established the concept of national education and put sev- 
eral limitations on the rights of private groups to run educational institu- 
tions. All these changes affected the development processes in the whole 
country and altered the power structure of most communities. To avoid 
the controversies which open debate would have revealed, the bills were 
pushed through the Assembly using certificates of urgency. 
A certificate of urgency was used for the first time in relation to public 
enterprises in 1971, when the Pyrethrum Board Bill was passed. The bill 
repealed the Ppyrethrum Ordinance of 1932 and took back the right to 
market pyrethrum from the existing Pyrethrum Board, which was seen as 
dominated by private capitalist farmers, and vested it in the cooperative 
movement. The Board was reorganized and nationalized. Parliament was 
not given the opportunity to discuss the bill, perhaps because government 
felt that private large-scale farmers had too much parliamentary support. 
The government ignored the fact that pyrethrum farming was the exclu- 
sive domain of wealthy farmers, who controlled the knowledge about 
farming techniques and marketing channels. The markets were very well 
protected and organized on kinship and other lines. The new board 
formed after 1971 lacked the necessary links with the producers or their 
markets. pyrethrum production sharply declined and at the end of 1979, 
after only eight years, the new board had an overdraft of 1.3 billion shill- 
ings. 
Certificates of urgency also were used to pass the Tanganyika Coffee 
Curing Company Acquisition Act 1971, in the ex post reorganization of 
the National Milling Corporation in 1975, and in 1977, when regional 
transport companies were being formed (see Appendix 5). In the case of 
the coffee curing company shares, the aim was to acquire control over the 
marketing of processed coffee abroad. In the case of the national milling 
corporation, a certificate of urgency was used to forestall parliamentary 
opposition, because most MPs were opposed to the abolition of the co- 
operative movement which preceded the reorganization of the corpora- 
tion, and because the unstated fear behind the reorganization was that 
the old cooperative movement was being used as a parallel base for pol- 
iticians apart from the ruling party. The transport corporations were 
formed without debate because similar corporations formed in 1969 as 
regional transport cooperatives had failed and while this was still too 
fresh in the minds of MPs for them to accept such a venture, government- 
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based politicians wanted regional transport companies for administrative 
and political ends such as the transfer of crops on credit, access to inac- 
cessible areas, and the offering of services on commercially unviable 
routes. 
Certificates of urgency and other administrative short-cuts or detours 
have been used effectively by government-based politicians to short-cir- 
cuit parliamentary processes without violating constitutional principles. 
Together with procedural barriers and the lack of parliamentary privi- 
leges, such strategies have contributed to the organizational and organic 
weaknesses of Parliament, reducing its strength as an alternative mechan- 
ism for counter-balancing non-market controls backed and dominated by 
government and its agencies. 
These organic, organizational and procedural barriers to parliamen- 
tary efficacy are all system-specific and little affected by the personal or 
collective capabilities of Members of Parliament. Instead, they contribute 
to shaping the behaviour of the individual members, limiting their capac- 
ity to develop and articulate a conscious position that would enable them 
to use their power to revise the country's democratic structures. 
The Subjective Consciousness of MPs 
In this section, the `subjective consciousness' of MPs exclusively refers 
to their individual and collective perception of their role in policy formu- 
lation. The previous chapter mapped out the factors at constituency, re- 
gional and national levels which combine to destroy the individual and 
collective self-confidence of MPs: both the factors that create their 
powerlessness and those that tend to reinforce it. For the last quarter- 
century, political opposition in Tanzania has both been unlawful and, 
when organized, punished. The majority of Tanzania's leaders were 
trained either within the colonial system, which was authoritarian and op- 
pressive, or during the post-independence period, when opposition was 
also actively discouraged. Most political leaders have learned to respect 
hierarchy and authority, and Members of Parliament are no exception. In 
the performance of their representative function, they have been and re- 
main aware of their limitations. They have developed an approach which 
leaves no doubt that they accept the authority of the government over 
them, and in dealing with it they have tried as much as possible to avoid 
confrontation. 
Attempts to avoid confrontation have led Parliament into a facilitating 
role in discussing government policy or bills. This has been demonstrated 
on several occasions. In 1970, the University of Dar es Salaam Bill was 
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tabled in Parliament. It sought to establish the first university in Tanzania. 
Its very strongly-worded preamble stated the need to establish a univer- 
sity that would serve the people of Tanzania and accelerate socialist de- 
velopment. Its provisions, however, reproduced the structures of univer- 
sities in capitalist countries, with faculties and faculty boards which would 
absolutely and exclusively determine curricula, with a senate and a 
university council dominated by academics and bureaucrats as the top 
policy-making organs. How these institutions would receive the necessary 
input to enable them to serve the masses was unclear. The debate simply 
took for granted that socialist objectives and the proposed structures 
were compatible. MPs called for the immediate formation of faculties of 
engineering and agriculture to accelerate socialism and socialist educa- 
tion, which the majority seem to have assumed would flow naturally from 
the passing of the bill. There are numerous similar examples. 
On 25 January 1971, the Minister for Industries announced in Parlia- 
ment that the government had decided to nationalize 100 per cent of the 
Bata Shoes Company. He said this would enhance socialism in Tanzania. 
Members applauded him and no questions were asked. However, at that 
time shoemaking technical skills were unavailable domestically; 
shoemaking technology was the domain of foreigners. Nationalizing the 
industry necessitated research into the mechanisms that would be used to 
acquire those skills. But no MP wanted to be seen to be attempting to 
stand in the way of government. Bora Shoe Company, which was formed 
from this nationalization, never acquired the necessary technology. Its 
serious operational problems became apparent in 1975, and by the end of 
1985 it was virtually bankrupt. 
Similarly, on 25 October 1977, the government tabled the Tanzania 
Post and' Uecommunications Bill, which responded to the collapse of the 
East African (Economic) Community in 1975 by converting the then Tan- 
zanian branch of the East African Posts and Telecommunications into a 
fully-fledged corporation. This measure came at a time when Tanzania 
was beginning to feel the impact of the oil crisis and the global economic 
depression. However, the administrative structures which were recom- 
mended for the corporation did not reflect the prevailing economic situ- 
ation. Similarly the job and salary structure of the East African corpora- 
tion was difficult for the new corporation to sustain, given the resource 
constraints facing Tanzania at that time. While introducing the bill, the 
Minister for Transport and Communications called upon MPs to advise 
the government on how to run this and other corporations about to be 
formed, such as Air Tanzania, Tanzanian Railways Corporation and Tan- 
zania Harbours Authority. The members endorsed the bill without raising 
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any substantial issues. The transport bills mentioned earlier were handled 
in the same manner. 
When government comes to the Assembly for advice, the contours of 
uncritical acceptance of policy recommendations can be drawn very 
sharply. For example, on 18 July 1975 the President of Tanzania ad- 
dressed the Assembly on self-reliance, explaining poor economic perfor- 
mance as primarily caused by bad weather, inflation, a fall in the prices of 
agricultural produce on the international market and the rise in prices of 
imports. He also explained how these difficulties were reducing the capa- 
bility of the nation to become self-reliant. After his speech, he invited 
MPs to contribute ideas on how to organize the economy and enhance 
self-reliance (The Parliamentarian 1975: 262). During the same year, the 
government by unilateral decision had abolished the old marketing struc- 
ture based on traditional cooperatives. This had caused obvious hard- 
ships to the population and there was an obvious threat that the reorgan- 
ization would cause a food crisis. Members neither raised questions nor 
tried to offer advice on policy. Instead, one after another, they arose to 
congratulate the President on his speech and the government on its 
policies. They knew that Parliament was going to be dissolved and fresh 
elections held in that year, and it is more than likely that no one wished to 
antagonize the President by questioning or contradicting his analysis or 
policies, since this could carry with it some probability of jeopardizing re- 
nomination. 
Failure to debate policy has not been confined to sessions including 
presidential speeches and directives. Even ministers do not receive many 
contributions on their policies from members. In 1974 for example, the 
Minister of Finance stated in Parliament that the government was going 
to set up eleven development funds, totalling 210 million Tanzanian shill- 
ings, to help public enterprises engaged in production and training. 
Members asked nothing about the source of these funds, nor the manner 
in which they would be transferred, for example as loans subventions or 
subsidies (The Parliamentarian 1974: 287). In fact, as I will document later 
in this book, these funds have constituted the main escape route from 
parliamentary budget procedures. On some occasions, parliamentary 
failure to comment was due to lack of information. On others, informa- 
tion was available, but the contribution of the members was calculated to 
ingratiate them to the ministers or to enhance a minister's popularity. On 
18 January 1977 for example, a member asked the Minister of Transport 
and Works whether the government had a plan to build a drydock on 
Lake Victoria. The member knew such a dock had been acquired by the 
government from Belgium, as had been promised in the budget speech 
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the previous year, but asked the question in order to give an opportunity 
to the Minister to show that his ministry was successfully implementing its 
projects and also that he was caring for regions outside his constituency. 
Similar examples abound in Tanzania's past parliamentary debates, which 
tend to show that more often than not members conceive their role as 
supplementary to that of government in the formulation of policy on key 
issues. 
What the general trends show is that the consciousness of most of 
MPs remains at a very elementary and fragmented level; most of the ques- 
tions raised in Parliament between 1970 and 1980, for example, reflect in- 
dividual rather than group goals. The central cause for this apparently re- 
lates to the lack of an organizational framework within which members 
can act as a group without fear of reprisals against them as individuals. 
The lack of a group consciousness is also reflected in the way in which 
most have tended to concentrate on constituency issues, attaching less 
importance to national affairs. 
Constituency Consciousness of National Goals 
When faced with constituency demands and given the competition 
created by other constituency demand channels discussed earlier, Mem- 
bers of Parliament have shown an inability to make effective demands on 
government or to suggest concrete ways to solve constituency problems. 
In some cases, parliamentary questions have aimed only at exposing the 
plight of the masses, without any demand for a governmental commit- 
ment to provide solutions. Given the evidence, it would be plausible to 
suggest that MPs raised such issues in order to let their constituents know 
that they were aware of their problems. It also appears that many MPs as- 
sumed that once concerns were raised, government would inevitably find 
ways to solve them. For example, on 25 January 1972 an MP asked 
whether the Minister of Communications was aware that the post office 
in Shinyanga town was congested. The minister answered in the affirm- 
ative and used the opportunity to tell the member that it was not only the 
post office in Shinyanga which was congested. The member did not sug- 
gest what should be done or demand to know what the minister's plans 
were for alleviating the problems in Shinyanga or elsewhere. 
A similar question was asked on 17 June 1974 by an MP who wanted 
to know when a factory was going to be built in his constituency. The 
question did not specify what type of factory was suitable for the consti- 
tuency, nor why his constituency deserved priority. The minister 
answered merely that there were no such plans (The Parliamentarian 
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1974: 186). Such a question reflected only the MP's anxiety to show his 
constituents that he was trying to obtain a factory for them. It could not 
have led to any positive action because it never amounted to a proposal. 
At most it showed some element of individualism or geographical paro- 
chialism. Similarly, in 1974 the Minister of Agriculture suggested that a 
pyrethrum extracting factory would be built at John's Comer in Iringa re- 
gion. Another MP from the same region demanded that it be built in his 
own constituency at Makambaku and alleged John's Corner was being 
chosen because it was located in the Minister's constituency (Hansard 
1974: 344). While this was true, the MP offered no evidence that Makam- 
baku would have been a more feasible location than John's Corner. 
In concentrating on their constituencies, most members make no at- 
tempt to develop logical, economic arguments for their claims or de- 
mands. Generally, they simply concentrate on the bargaining process, at- 
tempting to direct a trickle of benefits towards their constituencies 
irrespective of the economic considerations involved. Generally, as said 
earlier, members know the answers to the questions they raise in the As- 
sembly, and raise concerns primarily for purposes of publicity in their 
constituencies. For example, on 17 June 1974 a member asked if textiles 
were being equally distributed to all regions. Everyone in the country 
knew the answer, but the Minister, in the absence of any evidence to the 
contrary, answered in the affirmative (The Parliamentarian 1974: 286-7). 
Earlier in 1972 another member, who had promised his constituency a 
market for its millet, asked the Minister of Agriculture if the milling cor- 
poration was going to construct 'a factory to process millet meal. 
Everyone knew the market for such a staple was severely limited. The 
Minister answered in the affirmative because, not having been required 
to be specific about the time, he could not rule out the possibility (The 
Parliamentarian 1972: 242). 
Table 5.1, at the end of this chapter, lists thirty-eight questions MPs 
raised in the Assembly on public enterprises. This represents the sum of 
all parliamentary questions on public enterprises. They have been num- 
bered and the concerns raised in each are summarized, as are the answers 
given, and comments on their potential to influence policy. As a group, 
they reflect a set of problems characterizing the major handicaps of the 
MPs: 
(a) Most questions lack a sense of direction and clarity of objective. 
While most sought to provoke the government to comment on cer- 
tain policy issues, they do not seem to have aimed at eliciting policy 
commitments. Questions 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 22, 26, 28, 29 and 32 
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(31.57 per cent of the questions asked) have no clear objective and a 
very low potential for influencing policy. 
(b) Few questions were preceded by inquiry or research; they lacked 
background information. They were raised on important public en- 
terprise policy issues such as pricing policy, interest rates, project 
implementation, production capacity utilization, etc., but were un- 
substantiated by background data. Hence they were inherently inca- 
pable of influencing changes in public enterprise policy. Such ques- 
tions (numbers 1, 13, 15, 23 and 36) together amount to 15.78 per 
cent of the total questions on public enterprises. 
(c) Some of these questions reflect a degree of ignorance of the law and 
of government policy and activities. Questions 3 and 20, for 
example, were meant to extract information on the possible com- 
mencement of operation of certain public bus routes, although it 
was common knowledge that these routes were already in operation. 
In a way, this question betrays both the lack of contact between 
some members and their constituencies and a lack of basic knowl- 
edge about the service structures in their districts. Another question 
in this category is question 7, which sought information on whether 
a commission established to study the National Development Cor- 
poration and the State Trading Corporation had submitted its re- 
port. This report had not only been submitted, but was available in 
all major libraries and each MP had received a copy. Similarly, ques- 
tion 33, which asks why multiple directorships are allowed in public 
enterprises, reflected ignorance of the fact that the Prime Minister 
had issued a directive outlawing the practice, and that the govern- 
ment had issued a notice to this effect. 
(d)Some Members of Parliament are unaware of existing rules, con- 
tained in either government orders or Acts of Parliament, which 
apply to public enterprises. Question 21, on why the British-Ameri- 
can Tobacco Company or BAT (which was not a public enterprise) 
was not under the Tobacco Authority `as required by law' was not 
only erroneous in fact because BAT was not public, but also misrep- 
resented the law governing the Tobacco Authority, which did not re- 
quire BAT's adherence to it. Similarly, question 34 about why the 
Usafiri Dar es Salaam was not serving other regions outside Dar es 
Salaam, reflected unawareness that the articles of this company con- 
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fine its services to the city. (For a summary of the value of goods that 
was handled by the Tobacco Authority, see Appendix 5.) 
(e) Few MPs know the procedure governing questions; they therefore 
expect ministers to answer any question asked, with all the hoped- 
for details. Question 8, for example, asked which ̀ equipment' locally 
available in the country was being imported by MWATEX. The 
member wanted to use the question to criticize the import of ̀ inputs' 
other than equipment. The minister answered that none of the 
equipment being imported was domestically available, which was 
true. A similar problem arises in the question meant to criticize the 
requirement of security for loans and the resultant discrimination in 
loan allocation (Question 31). The member simply asked when and 
if the rules were going to be changed, without showing why they 
should be changed. He was told they were not going to be changed. 
(f) Finally, most questions were framed too indirectly, possibly reflect- 
ing a lack of confidence. Because they sought to communicate by 
implication, it was possible for ministers to frame answers in such a 
way that little was revealed. Directness and sharpness are lacking 
because MPs lack background information and hard evidence, be- 
cause they have no secure way to oppose government policy openly, 
and because these two factors give credence to the idea that ulti- 
mate power and the legitimate right to make or change policy lay 
with the government. 
At times, however, Parliament has succeeded in giving government 
some food for thought; in limited ways, individual parliamentarians have 
managed to influence policy. 
Private Member Motions and Parliamentary Influence 
The most effective mechanism which has so far been used in Tanza- 
nia's Parliament is that of private member motions. On several occasions 
these have been deployed with unexpected efficacy. In July 1968, for 
example, the government announced a plan to pay a gratuity to ministers 
and administrative civil servants. One Member of Parliament tabled a pri- 
vate motion opposing this, and was immediately seconded by sixty-seven 
other members. The plan was immediately withdrawn, and five years later 
the same Parliament passed an Act providing for pension to senior civil 
servants and political leaders. 
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The government withdrew its proposal in 1968 at least in part because 
Parliament had more bargaining strength. In 1967 the party, through the 
government, had nationalized houses belonging to many local leaders, 
thereby depriving them of their traditional source of long-term security. It 
would have been by any standard dishonest for the same party and gov- 
ernment to provide for their own social security at taxpayer expense. Sec- 
ondly, the same government had passed the famous leadership code, pro- 
hibiting all public employees earning TShs. 1060 and above from 
engaging in any activities aimed at generating supplementary income. 
The effect of the code was to destroy the basis of social security for most 
public employees. Government officials were therefore in no position to 
put forward a policy which provided them exceptional protection after 
retirement. 
The third factor apart from the timing of the motion was that the 
member who tabled it used the official ideology to oppose the govern- 
ment plan. The official ideology was based on populist appeals to the 
cause of the masses. The member argued that it would defeat the goal of 
socialism and frustrate the masses if top leaders reward themselves with 
substantial amounts of money, scooped from public coffers as compensa- 
tion for a leadership role which they had always claimed was based on 
commitment and sacrifice. Logically, the success of this motion showed 
that while most members were eager not to challenge the government, 
they were ready to assert the supremacy of Parliament and wished to elicit 
government recognition. It also showed that for Parliament to act as a 
united body, there has to be leadership within it. Hence, once one of the 
members risks playing a leading role, members will use the opportunity to 
express their views more freely. 
Between 1970 and 1985, only two private member motions were re- 
lated to public enterprises. The first, tabled on 31 July 1972, proposed the 
formation of a select committee to inquire into the cause of food short- 
ages. The member tabling the motion argued that most foodstuffs were 
neither being marketed by producers nor purchased by public enter- 
prises, but were being smuggled out of the country. He argued that those 
involved in the smuggling were outright saboteurs of government policy. 
The motion was carried and a select committee formed, but since no one 
expected the committee to end the shortages, it foundered without rec- 
ommending any new policies. The motion was carried without govern- 
ment opposition because the member tabling it clearly was not question- 
ing the food marketing policy and employed the official explanation for 
the shortages, namely that they were being perpetuated by enemies of 
government policy. 
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The second motion of relevance to public enterprise policy, tabled in 
July 1981, was provoked by revelations in the press that several tons of 
sugar had been destroyed through negligence and poor storage and that 
several more tons had disappeared on their way from Dar es Salaam to a 
certain distribution centre. While these reports were still fresh in the 
minds of the people, the government raised the price of sugar by almost 
25 per cent. The government argued that this rise was necessary because 
of increases in the overhead costs of the Sugar Development Corpora- 
tion. Members of Parliament took advantage of the press reports to ques- 
tion the government on its pricing policy. The motion proposed forming 
a select committee to investigate the government's claim that the rise was 
prompted by increased overhead costs. 
When the motion was tabled in Parliament it was unanimously sec- 
onded by all sections of the house. Tivo national (indirectly elected) mem- 
bers condemned the Ministry of Agriculture for making consumers sub- 
sidize the inefficiency of its corporations. Another member went on to 
testify that during the shortage, the Sugar Development Corporation had 
been surcharged US$ 100,000 for delay in collecting imported sugar from 
the port facilities. The same member stated that about 252 tons of sugar 
had disappeared while in the hands of the corporation's officials and that 
the ministry had taken no action. The minister in charge of the corpora- 
tion, confronted with this information, offered an arrogantly-worded ex- 
planation which isolated him from his fellow front-benchers, one of 
whom had strongly supported the motion during the discussion. A select 
committee was formed and the minister was fired within a few months, 
but the price of sugar was reduced by only a few cents. Government op- 
position to a price roll-back - which would have affected government 
revenue and its capacity to meet some of its goals - was the prime cause 
of the committee's difficulties. 
One of the many reasons why the motion had some impact on policy 
was the fact that the issue united government officials, national members 
and constituency members. Secondly, government could not protect itself 
easily against overwhelming evidence of negligence, corruption and in- 
competence in the handling of sugar (see Appendix 1). Thirdly, the mem- 
bers who contributed to the debate possessed irrefutable evidence based 
on researched information. But, most importantly, there was leadership. 
Although they can be no more than an occasional feature of parliamen- 
tary activity, private members' motions seem potentially the most effec- 
tive parliamentary mechanism for policy control. They break the barriers 
of procedure and provide members with an opportunity to develop com- 
mon goals. 
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In short, parliamentary questions and debates have not been very ef- 
fective mechanisms for controlling policy. They are too susceptible to the 
Parliament's legalistic procedures, and tend to serve narrowly-conceived 
constituency issues rather than the development of parliamentary con- 
sciousness. If the Morrisonian model, which advocates accountability 
through such mechanisms is to succeed, parliamentary procedures must 
be adjusted to promote such consciousness. 
Table 5.1: Summary of Questions Asked and Answers Given on Public 
Enterprises Between 1970-79 
No. Session Q. No. & Summary Of Question Summary 
and Hansard Of Answer 
Year Page 
1. March Q.121 at Was it true TANITA 
1970 page 690 was run by Italian 
managers with busi- 
ness in Mozambique 
and South Africa? 
Comments 
Management is Member had 
Italian, but no data to back 
unconnected his allegation. 
with South 
Africa. 
2. June Q. 164 at What benefits do Benefits do The issue of 
1970 page 724 peasants get from not only arise price rises could 
SFC-reduced prices from price not be properly 
on hoes, matches reduction; tackled by such 




3. April Q. 59 at When will NTC 1 April 1970, MP was 
1971 page 235 commence operations? one year ago. unaware. 
4. April Q. 279 at How much has NDCA TShs. 
1971 page 235 given in loans? 119,905,514. 
5. April Q. 311 at What has been the 
1971 page 256 cost of running the 
Coffee Board? 
6. January Q. 29 at Which NDC 
1972 page 12 subsidiaries have local 
managers? 
The question 
could have been 
to whom, not 
only how much. 
TShs. Without a break- 
34,866,880 down of costs, 
between 1968 this provides 






had not been 
answered in 
previous session. 
7. January Q. 41 at Were NDC and STC Yes. Process This was com- 
1972 page 88 being decentralized? continuing. mon knowledge. 
8. January Q. 42 at Was MWATEX No, it was not. Member had 
1972 page 88 importing equipment `inputs' rather 
that could be locally than equipment 
obtained? in mind. 
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No. Session Q. No. & Summary Of Question Summary 
and Hansard Of Answer 
Year Page 
Comments 
9. April Q. 4 at Were public textile 
1972 page 5 firms producing more 
`vitenge' than `khanga' 
fabrics? 
10. April Q.12 at How many villages 
1972 page 3 received TRDB loans? 
11. April Q. 383 at How was Tobacco 
1972 page 385 Processing Co. 
operating? 
12. April Q. 782 at When would NATEX 
1972 page 682 open branches in the 
regions? 
13. June- Q. 50 at How was government 
July page 867 going to protect Devel- 
1972 opment Corporations 
from being squeezed 
out of livestock busi- 
ness by private traders? 
14. June- Q. 332 at What steps were being 
July page 1217 taken to train pilots 
1972 and establish a local 
airline after Kenya had 
begun training their 
own pilots? 
15. June- Q. 351 at When would the 
July page 1259 Mbeya Cement factory 
1972 be constructed? 
16. June- Q. 415 at Why was the 
July page 1362 construction of East 
1972 African Community 
Headquarters delayed? 
17. June- Q. 340 at How many state farms 
July page 1375 were self-sufficient? 
1972 
18. Feb. Q. 5 at Why should NBC 
1973 page 15 accounts remain tied 
to branches? 
19. Feb. Q. 6 at Can Post Office 
1973 page 18 maximum withdrawal 
sum be raised from 
TShs. 200? 
























Lack of funds. 
Only 10 per 
cent of total 












No issue raised 
by the question. 
No issue raised. 





out of the meat 
business. 
In 1975 Kenya 
broke away from 
EAA. Govern- 
ment should not 













Changed in 1980 
on initiative of 
the bank. 
Raised in 1978 
to TShs. 400 
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No. Session Q. No. & Summary Of Question Summary Comments 
and Hansard Of Answer 
Year Page 
20. Feb. Q. 32 at Can NTC buses help NTC has 
1973 page 12 Teeteeco in the South regular service 
Regions? in the South. 
21. Feb. Q. 145 at Why is BAT, contrary It is not 
1973 page 143 to law, not under the required by 
Tobacco Authority? the law to 
be under it. 
22. June Q. 12 at How many heads of Figures 
1973 page 10 cattle are bought by supplied. 
Tanganyika Packers at 
what price annually? 
23. June Q. 3 at What were causes of Faulty 
1973 page 13 power cuts at MWA- generators. 
TEX? 
24. June Q. 31 at Why does UFI No capacity to 
1973 page 37 manufacture do so. 
insufficient bolts 
for its ploughs? 
25. June Q. 29 at Why are tobacco pro- Not quite true. 
1973 page 34 cessing centres away 
from tobacco growers? 
26. June Q. 45 at What are the 4,017 cartons 
1973 page 56 production levels of monthly. 
Tanzania Distilleries 
Ltd 
27. Sept. Q. 180 at Why should interest They serve 
1973 page 628 rates of state banks different 
differ? objectives. 
28. Sept. Q. 196 at How manyworkers Figures 
1973 page 722 in textile enterprises? supplied. 
What are the 
production figures? 
29. Sept. Q. 200 at What is the production Figures given. 
1973 page 724 capacity of beer in the 
industry? 
30. Nov. Q.14 at When will STAMICO No plan. 
1973 page 28 allow individuals to 
survey for minerals? 
Member, not a 
regular bus rider, 







question or its 
contribution 
unclear. 
Member had no 




why this problem 
continues. Not 
answered. 




to raise issue of 
corruption in 
distribution. 
Issue was that 
they differ even 
when objective. 
does not. 
Objective was to 
compare the two. 
Member did not 
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No. Session Q. No. & Summary Of Question Summary 
and Hansard Of Answer 
Year Page 
31. March Q. 13 at TUB loans, given 
1974 page 10 on the basis of title, 
exclude small 
landholders in 
Musoma; loans go 
to 'big shots'; 
when will regulations 
change? 
32. June Q. 7 at Why was NDC 
1974 page 3 suffering a lot of 
losses? 
33. June Q. 41 at Why are people 




34. March Q. 21 at When would UDA 
1975 page 34 begin serving in the 
regions? 
35. June Q. 431 at When would the 
1976 page 2005 Housing Bank open 
branches in the 
districts? 
36. June Q. 142 at Why were public banks 
1978 page 627 giving bigger loans to 
individuals than 
parastatals? 
37. June Q. 297 at How many shops 
1978 page 1073 had BORA opened 
in villages? 
38. June Q. 1 at (a) Why does CDA 
1979 page 108 employ foreign firms 
when local firms can 
do the work? 
(b) Houses built by 
CDA at a cost of 
TShs. 6 million leak. 
What measures had 




No plans Member gave 
to change no evidence of 
regulations. his allegations, 
and lost the 
argument. 
Shortages, Member did 
rises in prices not have his own 
in inputs, bad conception of the 
machines. problem. 
Government Member 
has already displayed gross 
made this ignorance of 
unlawful. government 
directives. 
It is meant to Member 
serve Dar es ignorant of the 
Salaam only. articles of UDA. 
Plans Problem was not 
underway. branches,but 
loans going to 
villages at all. 
Not true. Member had no 
89 per cent of supporting data. 
state banks 
had gone to 
public 
enterprises. 
None. It would Member knew 
be difficult. no such shops 
existed in villages. 
Not true. Not adequately 
answered, but 
because CDA 
was a sensitive 
The cost was issue, Member 
not TShs. 6 did not pursue 
million. issue further. 
6. Annual Reports and Financial 
Disclosure to Parliament 
Periodic Mechanisms of Accountability 
Questions, debates and motions are the continuous mechanisms 
through which governments are to be made accountable for their conduct 
and that of their agencies during sessions of Parliament. Annual reports 
are periodic mechanisms. The Morrisonian model of public enterprises 
puts considerable faith in continuous and periodic mechanisms which can 
provide information to Parliament on the activities of enterprises. Cor- 
porations are expected to prepare annual reports describing their acti- 
vities and showing the extent to which they have attained their statutory 
objectives, and to table these through the ministries. Private companies 
also produce annual reports, which they present to both the Registrar of 
Companies (Cap 212: 109-112) and to their annual meetings. Coopera- 
tives do the same; their annual reports to the Registrar of Cooperatives 
provide detailed accounts of their activities and transactions (Coopera- 
tive Societies Act 1982: 67-71). 
The weakest of the three types is the public enterprise annual report. 
However, the main differences among the types stem from variations in 
the legal provisions governing accountability for public, private and co- 
operative institutions. Companies and cooperatives are required by their 
by-laws to disclose information on most financial and many non-financial 
matters. They therefore tend to provide a great deal of detail on a wide 
range of issues. Public enterprises are usually required only to present 
statements of financial accounts. Cooperatives and companies submit 
their annual reports to institutions which are empowered to take direct 
action against them. Public enterprises, on the other hand, reach Parlia- 
ment indirectly, through the government, and Parliament has only a 
limited ability to react to the contents of the reports. 
This chapter will discuss other factors which diminish the effective- 
ness of the annual reports as a disclosure mechanism, such as the legal as- 
pects of financial disclosure through periodic reports, the procedural 
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limitations of disclosures to the parliamentary committee on parastatal 
organizations, and factors which discourage public enterprises from pro- 
viding a full accounting of their activities to Parliament. 
The Law Governing Financial Disclosure 
The disclosure of finances, operations and activities generally is one 
of the most important mechanisms for attaining accountability in a com- 
mercial or service organization. In private sector companies, disclosure 
goes beyond financial operations. The Companies Ordinance (Cap 212 
sections 109-111) requires annual returns to be made to the Registrar of 
Companies, stating, among other things, changes in membership, sub- 
scription for capital, actual levels of investment, increase or reduction of 
capital, transfer and transmission of shares and information relating to 
credit and securities. The company's Board of Directors must report at 
the annual meeting on the activities of the company and, in addition to the 
information it supplies to the government through annual returns, the 
Board must report on capital investments, the rates of return on equity 
and other investments, the value-added on investments, the state of loans 
and liabilities, liquidity, and in general develop a true picture of the com- 
pany's operations. 
These statutory requirements play a central role in providing govern- 
ment and the shareholders with appropriate criteria for measuring per- 
formance. While every enterprise, whether private or public, is affected 
by the performance of other enterprises, other sectors, and the economy 
in general, once one allows for this, the indicators provided in response to 
statutory requirements are a reasonable basis to assess private enterprise 
performance. 
Of course, the objective of disclosures by managers of enterprises 
generally is to meet legal requirements, so the more detailed the statutory 
requirements, the more detailed the reporting will be. Public enterprises 
are not subjected to the same strict procedures of financial account- 
ability. In most countries, public enterprises do not have general meet- 
ings, and their boards are not compelled to compile reports which would 
only be presented internally. In addition, unlike companies, they do not 
send annual returns to any specialized, centralized agency charged with 
monitoring their performance and able to make cross-sectoral or cross- 
enterprise comparisons of financial or other performance criteria. 
General meetings and annual reporting are very important to sharehol- 
ders and the public, because they open enterprises to scrutiny. Public en- 
terprises in many countries only report to their ministries, which are not 
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necessarily involved in performance evaluation. This relaxes the demand 
for rigorous reports. While there generally are statutes requiring annual 
reports, the laws governing these for public enterprises are not as de- 
manding as those applying to the private sector. Rather than demanding 
accountability through the disclosure of financial and non-financial acti- 
vities, they concentrate solely on accounts. 
In Tanzania there are two main sources of laws governing the public 
enterprise accounts on which financial disclosure is based. The primary 
source is the various statutes which define the duties and obligations of 
these enterprises and require them to prepare and submit annual finan- 
cial statements to the government. The second is the section of the'Ianza- 
nia Audit Corporation Act of 1968 which governs audits and accounts. As 
instruments of financial disclosure, neither the 1968 Act nor the enabling 
statutes focus on the internal managerial and growth processes of the en- 
terprises. They focus on outputs, for example accounts as projected in the 
balance sheet, rather than inputs. Hence, reporting on the processes that 
shape these outputs, such as organizational aspects, growth factors and 
various social and economic objectives, does not feature in these laws. 
Apart from an accounting of profits and losses, the law requires no ac- 
count of capital structure, liquidity, rate of return on investments, invest- 
ment criteria, control structures, and so on - exactly that information 
which shareholders in private enterprises use to understand the overall 
behaviour of their enterprises. 
These laws thus fail to provide the necessary framework within which 
the public can adequately pressure management to disclose its activities 
in a systematic and detailed manner. As there are no uniform rules about 
what should be explained beyond the balance sheet, most enterprises 
confine their explanations to an annotation of the balance sheet - mere 
descriptions of the sums and figures in the accounts that offer little insight 
into whether objectives have been attained. Similarly, the lack of any 
statutory penalty for failure to submit accounts for auditing within three 
months of the close of the financial year, (Act 2 of 1981), means that most 
public enterprises are slow to submit accounts for auditing; most of the 
accounts submitted for audit relate to operations four to five years in the 
past, and therefore do not reflect a current or accurate picture of the ac- 
counts (Senkoro 1988: 12). 
The 1973 act establishing the National Board of Accountants and 
Auditors (NBAA) requires accounting personnel in all public and private 
corporations to be holders of qualifications approved by the NBAA. The 
NBAA has defined the qualifications for all accounting posts and stipu- 
lated the ethics of accounting and auditing, but no law imposes a penalty 
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on corporations or corporation executives who employ unqualified ac- 
countants. Fifteen years after NBAAs formation, and despite its training 
of many accountants and auditors, numerous corporations continue to 
employ unqualified personnel; some have failed to abide by NBAAs code 
of professional ethics, for example by making internal auditing processes 
subject to the control of the accounting departments, and some have ex- 
cessive turnover of personnel in their accounting departments. These fac- 
tors have kept the quality of accounts and the level of accountability very 
low (Senkoro 1988: 13-15). 
Accounting methods have also been affected by the law's emphasis on 
financial statements. Most enterprises prefer to use cash accounting 
methods, which concentrate on revenues and expenditure and rarely 
bother to focus on appropriation details. This is the usual governmental 
method of accounting and is well-suited to non-commercial enterprises. 
On the other hand, the accounting method best suited to commercial or- 
ganizations, accrual accounting, goes beyond revenue and expenditure 
and is well-suited to financial disclosure about patterns of investments, 
rates of return on investments and equity, profitability, liquidity, solvency, 
value added on capital and numerous other indicators of economic per- 
formance. The accrual accounting method is unpopular because it tends 
to demand reporting on details of the inner aspects of operations which 
are not required of public enterprises under existing laws. 
Another important factor arising from the laws governing accounts is 
that, unlike private sector enterprises, where accounts of subsidiaries 
must appear separately from those of holding corporations, public enter- 
prises are subject to no such requirement. This has not only encouraged 
the partial reporting of the accounts of subsidiaries, but has promoted the 
decentralization of public enterprises, since less accountability is re- 
quired of subsidiary corporations or decentralized operational units. 
These are now a very common feature of the organizational structure of 
many enterprises. Small workshops, maintenance units, dispensaries, 
training wings, and similar operational units are technically referred to as 
independent accounting units, and therefore can be used to generate 
revenues or to receive substantial sums from the parent enterprise which 
then need not appear in the main accounts. In Dar es Salaam, a random 
survey of a dozen or so corporations showed that each had at least three 
such units. Most were used to transfer resources to provide free services 
or perquisites to individual employees and some, especially those in- 
volved in catering and medical services, tend to exaggerate costs, since 
the items purchased are not price controlled. 
The Tanzania Audit Corporation Act of 1968 established the Tanzania 
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Audit Corporation (TAC), empowering it to audit the accounts of public 
and other enterprises. TAC is required by law, in the case of public enter- 
prises, to produce annually two types of reports to enterprises on their ac- 
counts: a short form audit report in which the TAC gives its opinion on 
the financial statements submitted to it by the corporations, including the 
extent to which they have complied with statutory requirements; and a 
management audit report, which deals with deficiencies in internal ac- 
counting and financial management and control. Copies of these reports 
are sent to the parent ministry and the treasury. In addition, the TAC re- 
ports semi-annually to its own board, outlining its planned activities and 
listing clients whose accounts are in arrears, clients who have received 
clean or qualified or adverse opinion audit reports, client losses and 
profits, and listing any causes for concern that have been uncovered by its 
auditing function. At the end of the year, the two semi-annual reports are 
combined to create an annual report which the TAC submits to Parlia- 
ment through the Minister of Finance. 
Although the 1968 Act calls upon the TAC to be very efficient in com- 
piling reports to the corporations, its own board and Parliament, it does 
not empower the TAC to compel corporations to act with the same effi- 
ciency. This weakens the effectiveness of the TAC as a regulatory body. 
The law also fails to provide penalties for failing to register with the TAC, 
and while no corporation has challenged the TAC's legitimacy as sole 
auditor of its accounts, some have behaved as though registering with the 
TAC is optional. The number of public enterprises registered with the 
TAC as clients has fluctuated from year to year; prior to the 1980s it 
served fewer than 70 per cent of the country's public enterprises (Senko- 
ro 1988: 20). Corporations which failed to present their accounts for audit 
over a long period of time ultimately found it safer to avoid auditing al- 
together. Between 1968 and 1988 a hard core of about 20 per cent of pub- 
lic enterprises (mainly small agricultural enterprises, district develop- 
ment corporations and joint venture companies with foreign equity 
holding) simply did not submit their accounts to the TAC. Realizing that 
a significant number of enterprises were not being audited and ultimately 
were failing to submit annual reports, on 13 April 1978 Parliament de- 
cided to form the Parastatal Organizations Committee to examine the ac- 
counts of parastatals on its behalf (see below). 
The TAC has no statutory link with the boards of directors of their 
client enterprises. In the private sector, auditors are appointed by the 
general meeting and sit in board meetings to offer guidance on invest- 
ment and other decisions. This gives them an opportunity to understand 
the basis of management decisions without being incorporated in the ma- 
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chinery of administration. The management seeks clarification on techni- 
cal matters from auditors present at board meetings. When auditing ac- 
counts, the auditors perform a review function rather than a control func- 
tion. The TAC, on the other hand, learns about the activities of 
enterprises from the financial statements and from separate meetings 
with corporate officials. Having had no contact with the enterprise prior 
to the audit, the auditor generally plays the role of a controller rather than 
a reviewer, and some of the faults the auditor uncovers turn out to be of a 
type that could have been minimized through continuous interaction be- 
tween enterprises and auditors. 
The laws governing the TAC also fail to spell out the privileges of the 
auditors during the auditing processes, although the Companies Ordin- 
ance (Section 134A) does this for private enterprises. In order for the 
TAC to perform its external auditing function adequately, it must be able 
to compel public enterprises to allow auditors access to all bookkeeping 
and other relevant documents and the right to examine and inspect build- 
ings and projects. It is ironic that these privileges are very well protected 
in the case of private sector enterprise auditors, where defaults are heav- 
ily penalized. In practice, the TAC gives negative or qualified opinions 
when it has not had access to all relevant materials or documents. In the 
whole period between 1968 and 1988, clean accounts certificates have 
been given only to an average of 35 per cent of all public enterprises per 
year (TACAnnual Reports 1969 - 1988). It is always assumed that those 
receiving qualified or adverse opinions will be disciplined by their boards 
or ministers. But because both the boards and the ministries tend to fig- 
ure in the enterprise's management problem, such reactions have not 
been forthcoming. 
The line between the duties of the TAC as auditors and as agents of 
the public which funds the enterprises is also unclear. If parallels from the 
private sector can be drawn, a private sector auditor owes the company a 
duty to act carefully and diligently. As has been observed elsewhere, the 
auditor is not a detective or spy, and has no right or duty to approach the 
enterprise with caution or suspicion. The auditor is entitled to assume, 
even in openly corrupt society, that the persons managing the affairs of 
the enterprise are honest and committed to its goals and objectives and 
that they have tried to act in the best interest of the enterprise. Only when 
locating something which raises grounds for caution or suspicion does the 
auditor become bound by a duty to make every inquiry necessary to over- 
come anxiety or suspicion. If an auditor refuses to make inquiries in such 
circumstances and as a result causes the company to suffer loss, the audi- 
tor becomes liable to compensate the company for such loss. The judge- 
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ments handed down in Kingston Mill Co. (1896), London and General 
Bank (1895), and In Re Allen Craig and Co. (1937), all old, English, 
authorities, provide sound guidance on the role of auditors in the private 
sector. Although principles of private law governing the performance of 
professional contracts can be enforced in cases involving public enter- 
prises, they need statutory backing to be made more effective. However, 
the relationship between the TAC and its clientele resembles both that of 
a controlling agency of government vis-d-vis enterprises and that of two 
contracting parties. Notwithstanding the auditing fees paid, if the audi- 
tors are not involved on the board as technical advisers, anything con- 
tained in the auditors' reports will be geared towards strengthening the 
controlling function of the state and thus cannot be made a basis for legal 
action if it leads to financial or other loss. The 1968 TAC Act imposes no 
duty of care or liability on auditors. 
Finally, while the laws governing accounts give the TAC the power to 
examine and report on the accounts of the enterprises, they are charac- 
terized by the informality inherent in the Morrisonian model. Assuming 
the best of intentions, the law provides no sanctions in the case of breach. 
The TAC has no judicial recourse when clients fail to submit accounts to 
it, nor when managements refuse to take action on their short form audit 
reports or management audit reports, nor when cited mistakes are re- 
peated in subsequent accounts. The TAC is not even empowered to de- 
clare default or impose fines for delay. In short, there are no sanctions 
and no enforcement mechanisms. Systems which depend more on admin- 
istrative than on legal sanctions usually assume that ministers, eager to 
see their enterprises run well, will remove inefficient elements. But, min- 
istries may have no clear commitment to audits and the existence of clean 
accounts, in which case there is no guarantee that they will act in this 
manner, nor that they will impose sanctions for defaults or omissions. 
Between 1969 and 1976, annual reports, as a mechanism for financial 
disclosure, were not producing the desired results. In 1976, the TAC 
pointed out most of the problems enumerated here, emphasizing the lack 
of a statutory limit on the period within which accounts can be laid before 
the National Assembly, the lack of a systematic way in which such reports 
could be handled by the National Assembly, and the fact that the status of 
companies in which government held over fifty per cent of the shares but 
which were registered under the Companies Ordinance, was not clear 
(TAC Annual Report 1976). 
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Disclosure to the Parastatal Organizations Committee 
(POC) 
The National Assembly resolved to create the Parastatals Organiza- 
tions Committee under Section 47(2) of the 1977 Constitution. POC was 
formed as a special committee to make detailed examinations of the ac- 
counts of parastatal organizations. Its formation reflected Parliament's 
eagerness to have a better understanding of the financial operations of 
these enterprises and the failure of the existing system, in which annual 
reports were expected to be tabled before the Assembly. The mere act of 
forming a special committee promised enhanced accountability, since the 
committee, if properly chosen, would be composed of experts experi- 
enced in public enterprise management, evaluation or research. Such a 
committee could use its experience and expertise to guide public enter- 
prise policy development in Parliament. Secondly, properly equipped 
with information, technology and the necessary powers, such a committee 
could become the nucleus of public enterprise performance assessment, 
cooperating easily with specialized regulatory agencies and obtaining the 
background information Parliament would need to make sound and ap- 
propriate decisions on public investments. 
Such a committee could also use audits and other, related reports to 
assess the liquidity, solvency and viability of public enterprises and to in- 
vestigate potential improvements outside the politically charged ques- 
tions and answers of Parliament. This would enable enterprises in 
general, and ailing ones in particular, to have an input into policies meant 
to rectify the situation. 
These and other possible advantages, however, would be attainable 
only if the government and its agencies support the committee's right to 
obtain the necessary information and its ability to make a positive con- 
tribution. As David Stoddart has noted, such committees tend to be effec- 
tive where they have easy access to information without government ob- 
struction or intermediation and where they are able to use this 
information to deliver their message to government without any explicit 
or implicit limitations (7he Parliamentarian 1981: 87). Similarly, for any 
such committee to remain dynamic and influential, it should be con- 
stituted in such a manner as to be answerable to and controlled by the As- 
sembly without being institutionalized, bureaucratized or routinized. 
More often than not such committees quickly develop formalized, spe- 
cialized bureaucratic hierarchies; members attach excessive importance 
to their role as a special committee, and the committee can become rit- 
ualistic and inaccessible. The general tendency to develop norms and 
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conventions then makes committee members more like civil servants than 
members of Parliament or the public. They become what Arthur Con- 
stain has referred to as `oral civil servants' (The Parliamentarian 1981: 
86). 
Another possible threat to the efficacy of such a committee arises 
from the possible danger of incorporation. In most bureaucratic systems, 
democratic organs risk being lulled into alliances in which they end up as 
junior partners. In most multi-party and one-party systems, parliamentary 
committees are selected to represent party or factional interests. They 
therefore generally are coalition bodies, a factor crucial to their function- 
ing. The struggle to operate as non-partisan coalitions may require the 
pretence of neutrality, which in turn dulls the perceptual and analytical 
capacity of the committee as a whole. As a result, they become less sharp, 
less effective, and less influential on policy (King 1976: 20). The unwilling- 
ness or inability to recognize explicitly factional interests within can make 
a committee inadvertent supporters of the dominant party or faction, and 
thus easy targets for government incorporation. Governments try to use 
committees as `shock absorbers', testing parliamentary responses to pol- 
icy, screening policy options and testing policy choices which are later 
presented to Parliament. Other forms of incorporation include using par- 
liamentary committees as recruiting grounds for government frontbench- 
ers. In non-opposition party systems this is relatively easy, because com- 
mittee leaders whose committees help government resolve issues in the 
Assembly are later incorporated into the central or regional administra- 
tion and this creates an incentive for cooperation between committee 
members and leaders. Unless the Assembly retains control over its com- 
mittees, the committees as units of power and influence quickly gravitate 
to government, which not only controls the necessary resources but, in the 
case of Tanzania, also controls the parliamentary processes. However, 
whatever forces control such committees, it must be acknowledged that 
they have great potential for influencing policy. 
The Tanzanian Parliament cannot help but bestow upon its commit- 
tees its general weaknesses within the national power structure and as a 
sub-unit of the state. While the legal framework has determined the con- 
tent of financial disclosures, the POC has failed to improve the quality of 
this content. First of all, it lacks executive powers to force corporations to 
submit accounts for audit. The POC was formed partly to resolve this 
problem, which was also central to the difficulties of the Tanzania Audit 
Corporation. But the parliamentary resolution that created the POC 
failed to fill the legal vacuum surrounding the duty to submit to inde- 
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pendent audit and failed to impose sanctions for default. What Parlia- 
ment is entitled to do if its summons is refused is unclear. 
The POC's inability to compel enterprise managers to appear or to 
present accounts for audit has since the committee's inception in 1979 
allowed contempt of the committee - non-appearance and non-presen- 
tation of accounts - to continue as a serious problem. In 1980, for 
example, the POC notified the Cashewnut Authority (CATA) that it 
should appear and present accounts (7 July 1980) but neither CATA offi- 
cials nor those of the parent ministry appeared. The POC was of course 
aware of its powerlessness; CATA was repeating the behaviour of the Ki- 
baha Education Centre (23 and 28 January 1980), The Tanzania Coffee 
Authority (18 March 1980), Tanzania Tobacco Authority (8 March 1980) 
and the National Milling Corporation (20 and 24 April 1980). In its 1979- 
80 report (POC 1979-80: 3) it complained that: 
Such a situation deprives the committee of the necessary help it re- 
quires from those ministries. We directed that notice be served on 
principal secretaries in those ministries that repetition of the same 
would not be tolerated in future. 
As can be seen from Table 6.1, the failure or refusal of parastatal and 
ministerial officials to appear before the POC and to present accounts 
was to be tolerated for quite some time, with the same ministries and pub- 
lic enterprise officials refusing to cooperate. 
In 1980, the POC asserted its power to punish culprits, but in the year 
that followed the number of defaulters increased; some defaults bor- 
dered on open defiance. The POC then softened its tone, its castigation 
of the defaulters becoming more plaintive than assertive: 
Apart from the fact that such problems may breed misunderstand- 
ings in the performance of our tasks, they may aggravate the prob- 
lems of the involved enterprises for lack of the necessary help from 
the ministries. (POC 1980-81: 19) 
Thus, while in 1980 the POC was demanding that ministries should 
cooperate to avoid sanctions, by 1981 it was appealing to ministry officials 
to feel a moral obligation to cooperate in the interest of the enterprises in- 
volved. In fact, ministry officials failed to appear in order to cushion the 
enterprises themselves, which were refusing to cooperate. Between 1982 
and 1987, the POC was unable, for internal reasons, to publish its reports, 
and it is possible that the situation later improved. As Senkoro (1988: 22) 
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Table 6.1: Non-Appearance and Non-Presentation of Accounts 
Before the POC,1979-82, Excluding District Corporations 
1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 
No. % No. % No. % 
Total Enterprises 
Covered by POC 81 38 89 
Non-Presentation 25 30.86 10 26.32 29 32.60 
Non-Appearance of Officials 
Government 9 11.11 6 15.79 0 0 
Enterprise 16 19.75 3 7.89 0 0 
Other Escape 
Mechanisms 41 38.29 19 50.0 60 67.4 
Source: POC Reports 1979-82. 
noted, more enterprises have submitted accounts, but the quality of the 
data provided remains very low. 
The Morrisonian model of public enterprises disclaims the link be- 
tween government and the day-to-day operation of public enterprises. 
However, ministries do help enterprises to evade accountability rather 
than joining forces with the POC to uncover and improve poor perfor- 
mance. This suggests that the parent ministries are involved in the man- 
agement of these enterprises and that ministry officials therefore feel mo- 
rally compelled to assist the managers at the screening stage. The POC is 
the focal point of the accountability processes, and the only point at which 
control is completely external to the government bureaucracy. The temp- 
tation that arises where control shifts from one structure to another is to 
struggle for power and principles, and in this case, the struggle is mainly 
between the executive and the legislature. Hence, unless some constitu- 
tional structure subordinates the executive to the legislature, such evas- 
ions of accountability will occur, reflecting inter-institutional struggles for 
power and control. This is not to suggest collusion to hide misdeeds - 
the individual faults of parastatal bodies have not been a motive for min- 
istry-supported evasion - but in political systems dominated by the ex- 
ecutive, some government officials will refuse to bow to institutions which 
are outside the normal hierarchy of government. 
Covert resistance by corporations tends to be less offensive and less 
contemptuous. For example, the POC requires that accounts be audited 
Annual Reports and Financial Disclosure to Parliament 89 
and that queries raised by the auditors have been acted upon by the 
boards of the relevant enterprises. Enterprises which fail to comply with 
this procedure are normally not screened by the POC, so managers may 
appear without properly audited accounts or with audited accounts 
which have not been discussed or acted upon. Such corporations are 
using the POC's procedures to defeat its objectives. Most seem to enjoy 
the tacit support of their ministries, because the latter do not take action 
against them even when the same mistake is repeated several times. Be- 
tween 1979 and 1982, the period for which reports are available, the 
major defaulters using the tactics of non-appearance, appearance with- 
out audited accounts and failure to take action on audit reports, were the 
district development corporations, which were under the Prime Minis- 
ter's office. Fifty-two per cent of the district development corporations 
gave no account of their operations during this period (POC Reports 
1979-82). Since the Prime Minister's office is in charge of all ministries, 
and given the fact that the Prime Minister was the leader of government 
business in the Assembly, it would have been reasonable to expect a bet- 
ter record of compliance. 
Furthermore, some of the corporations breaching procedures were 
professional bodies entrusted with the control and guidance of other en- 
terprises. Accounts brought to the POC by the Tanzania Legal Corpora- 
tion, which offers legal advice on internal and external accountability pro- 
cedures, had not been seen by its own board in 1980. The National Board 
for Accountants and Auditors, which trains accountants and has passed 
several codes of professional ethics, also evaded review in 1980. The POC 
commented (POC 1980:26): 
The main duty of this board in the country is to ensure and en- 
hance efficiency in accounting and auditing standards. We are dis- 
appointed by the performance of the ... board in keeping its 
accounts. 
The list of poor performers included the state banks, the University of 
Dar es Salaam and the Institute of Development Management (the latter 
two provide the best training facilities in the country for accountants and 
auditors). 
Between 1980 and 1982, the number of those refusing to appear de- 
creased, and the proportion of those violating procedures increased. 
Ministries indicated no awareness of the problem, and actually con- 
tributed to Parliament's failure to make enterprises accountable. In 1981, 
the POC wrote protests to individual ministries in an attempt to solicit the 
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help of individual ministries. The ministries did not respond (POC 1980- 
81:26). 
Aside from failing to appear, or appearing with audits which have not 
been sufficiently processed, many corporations which did come forward 
with audited accounts and which had acted on their auditors' reports, 
gave very superficial and/or incoherent answers during their sessions with 
the POC. On average, about 43 per cent of those who appeared followed 
correct procedures but failed to give adequate explanations (POC Re- 
ports, 1980-82). Others committed perjury before the committee by mak- 
ing false entries and giving false financial statements. The POC noted for 
example that: 
On 25 April [1981] for reasons we did not comprehend, SHIHA- 
TA presented a very unsatisfactory and false report and it was 
clear most of the responses to the auditors' report were based on 
mere conjecture. 
The committee increasingly realized its powerlessness in such cases. It 
instituted through its internal procedure, a system of penalty based on the 
actual costs the POC incurred when dealing with cases of contempt or 
other fruitless attempts to meet officials. The fines were limited to a maxi- 
mum of one months' salary of the top executive of the defaulting corpor- 
ation, and were to be paid by the corporations and not the ministries. 
However, the amounts were so negligible that even if the fine were to be 
paid by the individual executive, it was no deterrent. 
The main explanation for corporate and ministerial resistance to the 
POC can be found in theories of power relations. Accountability is a pro- 
cess through which one group or individual submits to the authority of an- 
other. It is a process in which one person or group seeks to subordinate 
the other, and the latter seeks to reduce as much as possible the influence 
and power of the former. Where accountability is legitimized by legisla- 
tion or any set of customary rules or conventions, the struggle is not to re- 
sist but to influence the level of subordination. Where practices, conven- 
tions, customs or laws favour undefined relations of subordination and 
accountability, the struggle is first over the definition of relations and 
their boundaries and then over bargaining processes for mitigation of 
pressures and influence within the defined relations. The Tanzanian pol- 
itical structure elevates the executive and the party above the legislature 
while retaining all the theoretical reverence for democratic and majority 
influence. The latter has led the Assembly to believe it has the right to 
control the activities of government. In trying to strike a healthy balance 
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between democratic processes (through which the government itself 
comes to power) and the dictates of bureaucratic dominance (by which it 
maintains itself in power), the party and government bureaucracies are 
compelled to subscribe to the idea that the Assembly has a legitimate 
control function, but use their power to block any disclosure that may be 
prejudicial to their political credibility. 
The government's use of bureaucratic power to block accountability 
arises from its failure as an entrepreneur and manager. Its supervising 
function and its dependence on the activities and resources of public en- 
terprise compels government to protect public enterprises. The enter- 
prises are politically important within the constituencies of government 
officials and in the country as a whole. Ministers are thus very sensitive 
and partisan when the enterprises are scrutinized outside government 
circles, tending to view negative assessments of performance as attacks 
on ministerial policies and indeed on the whole political system. Thus any 
system of evaluation is seen as geared towards disgracing rather than re- 
warding what they consider to be sacrifices for the public good in the ef- 
fort to bring about development. Even the Presidential Standing Commit- 
tee on Parastatal Organizations (SCOPO) is viewed as an agency planted 
by the President in their midst to curtail ministerial powers and put a 
brake on their developmental efforts. 
Therefore, however well-intentioned the POC and its members may 
be, the ministers tend to view them as an ambitious group of ill-informed 
politicians out to win cheap popularity for themselves by using the 
failures of public enterprises - the causes of which they do not under- 
stand and would not explain even if they did. As for the enterprises, their 
fear and resistance to financial disclosure is deeply rooted in their poor 
financial performance, mismanagement of public assets or, in some cases, 
the use of public institutions as mechanisms for personal or private accu- 
mulation. A survey of auditors' reports for the period 1979-82 shows that 
the level of performance in these areas was so poor that most enterprises 
would have found it difficult to present their accounts before the commit- 
tee without disgracing themselves and embarrassing their parent minis- 
tries. 
As regards the management of assets, the TAC audit reports exam- 
ined by the POC show that between 1979 and 1982 an average of 30 per 
cent of the audited corporations had problems with their records on as- 
sets. Most of these problems reflected a failure to apply proper account- 
ing and materials management techniques. 
Firstly, some corporations failed to keep books and registers of assets 
as required by their statutes. Without such registers, auditors found it dif- 
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ficult to ascertain the existence of assets. In some cases the auditors were 
not convinced that lack of registers was genuine. Examples include the 
records of the Dar es Salaam Transport Company (Usafiri Dar es Sa- 
laam). The company had taken over the assets of a well-established, pri- 
vately-owned company in 1973, but had no register of its buses or spares 
when the auditors came in 1981(POC 1981-82: 4). The Tanganyika Pac- 
kers, taken over in 1969 from private owners, had no register of assets 
(POC 1981-82: 8). The Tanzania Coastal Shipping Lines apparently did 
not know how many ships, boats or engines it owned (POC 1981-82: 10). 
The Tanzania Coastal Hotels Ltd., run by professional managers and ac- 
countants, could not show inventory records for its movable and immov- 
able assets (POC 1981-82: 29). The highly-advanced Tanzania Posts and 
Telecommunications Corporation (see Appendix 8), perhaps the largest 
consumer of foreign loans, could not show registers for its vehicles; and 
the Tanzania Library Services, which had received a donation of buildings 
for its library in Tanga, failed to provide a record of these. 
Secondly, some of the corporations which did provide data presented 
incomplete inventory records; generally this was accompanied by evi- 
dence of mismanagement or the careless handling of assets. In one ship- 
ping enterprise, some assets had been cancelled out of the register said to 
be incomplete (POC 1981-82: 10-11); in another, the unregistered assets 
of a public enterprise were found in the private residence of one of its of- 
ficials (POC 1981-82: 24); and in one of the largest real property enter- 
prises, the register which was provided and declared incomplete omitted 
a number of houses, and about twenty-one bicycles belonging to the en- 
terprise had been deleted from the list without explanation (POC 1980- 
81:4). 
Thirdly, public corporations have failed to develop proper materials 
management systems. In some corporations this seems to have been per- 
mitted for extended periods, allowing overpricing, easy transfer of assets 
to individuals while making auditing and accountability difficult. Some 
corporations were buying and distributing materials without proper rec- 
ords (POC 1979-80: 7). Some had no inventory system or stock verifica- 
tion system (POC 1979-80: 8), sometimes for occasional purchases, such 
as stationery, spare parts and hardware equipment, and sometimes for 
regular inputs such as food, fuel and so on (POC 1979-80:15-16). A build- 
ing and construction company which issued building materials on a daily 
basis but could not show the auditors any inventory system at all was an 
extreme example (POC 1979-80: 66). 
Fourthly, some enterprises failed to produce title deeds for their real 
property, and auditors were unable to ascertain the existence or actual 
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state of buildings recorded on registers of assets. While some corpora- 
tions simply did not appear to understand the importance of such deeds, 
the auditors were of the opinion, especially in the case of district develop- 
ment corporations, that the breach of ethics was at times deliberate. The 
title deeds for the farms of a large agricultural corporation were all mis- 
sing and there was no proof of the actual number of hectares owned 
(POC 1980-81: 8). The National Development Corporation, which is a 
large enterprise, failed to show title deeds for some of its residential 
houses; another corporation could not even provide records indicating 
the geographical location of its properties (POC 1979-80: 53, 68). More 
serious informational lapses included houses listed in early records but 
excluded from later records without the authority of boards of directors, 
which presumably indicate illegal transactions involving such properties 
(POC 1979-80: 4, 28;1980-81: 5, 14, 25;1981-82: 2, 64). 
Poor financial performance on the part of management is shown in 
the way most corporations handled external debts and payments. Corpor- 
ations experiencing what amounted to chronic financial problems were 
inexplicably lax in enforcing the collection of debts. The unclaimed sums 
ranged from Shs. 20,436 (POC 1979-80: 14) to Shs. 20,461,000 (POC 
1979-80: 53). The nature of these debts is even more interesting. Most had 
been unpaid for considerable periods of time, during which the enter- 
prises continued to extend credit facilities to the debtors concerned. 
Some debts represented rent arrears, even though the shortage of hous- 
ing in most towns would imply that very few tenants could risk default on 
their rent. Some corporations possessing no operational capital indicated 
that they were failing to recover debts from clients (POC 1979-80: 41, 56; 
1981-82: 60). Such failures to recover debts even when corporations had 
power to withdraw services and when in fact their accounts were in the 
red, raises doubts about the veracity of the records. Possibly, internal 
debts were being recorded as being external, but it is also possible the 
debts had never existed, or had been recovered but unrecorded in order 
to externalize the causes of poor performance. 
The fact that such external debts were also, if infrequently, being can- 
celled at the discretion of the management further undermines their ap- 
parent probity. In some cases the amounts involved were substantial, and 
in many cases no explanation was given. The POC noted in 1982 in con- 
nection with one engineering enterprise which had cancelled Shs. 
5,264,035 as bad debts (POC 1981-82: 66): 
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What was presented to us in these accounts was mere fabrication 
and we warn very strongly against any future repetition of such a 
thing. 
The POC believed that such cancellations were artificial and that the 
addition or subtraction of unverifiable external debts may have been used 
to balance the books. 
In other cases, there were indications that cancelled debts were in ac- 
tual fact paid even though the accounts showed they had been cancelled 
as uncollectible. A corporation entitled to collect revenues from private 
spare part dealers indicated it had collected only ten per cent of the 
revenues due, but a survey of all dealers indicated that they were obtain- 
ing their goods only on proof of prior payment of these dues (POC 1980- 
81: 31). Other cases, in which debts were cancelled on the grounds that 
the debtors had disappeared, and that efforts to recover debts had failed, 
were not backed by documentary evidence of letters of claim or legal ac- 
tion (POC 1981-82: 9, 41, 51-52). 
In some cases, debts were cancelled ultra vires of the management, 
that is, without the approval of the boards of directors. The amounts 
ranged into the hundreds of thousands and even millions of shillings, and 
in most cases there were reasons to presume that the debts were artificial 
and used to balance the books, or that they related to loans owed by en- 
terprise officials, or had been paid and, either deliberately or inadvertent- 
ly, not recorded (POC 1979-80: 27; 1981-82: 30, 47, 59). External debts 
also may have been used in practice to transfer funds from corporations 
to individuals; and it was common practice in the 1980s for officials to 
negotiate the elimination of a debt in return for a lower, unrecorded pay- 
ment made directly to the officials. The corporations bear the expense of 
such corruption, which is naturally not set down in its accounts. Overall, 
managers' claims that cancelled debts were bona fide unpaid and uncol- 
lectible debts are not particularly credible. 
Funds could also be transferred to individuals through irregularities in 
the payment systems of public enterprises. Irregular payments were fre- 
quent, and some corporations used shortages of staff and other resources 
to excuse the absence of organized systems of payment vouchers. This 
problem was common in the large corporations with subsidiaries, and in 
some cases in enterprises that fund development projects (POC 1980-81: 
4, 36). Some corporations were accused by the TAC of deliberately de- 
stroying payment vouchers before auditors arrived (POC 1981-82: 19). 
Where vouchers were used, auditors at times discovered evidence of 
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forgeries and/or that genuine documents had been destroyed, and that of- 
ficials of the corporations had been involved (POC 1981-82: 21-23). 
They also discovered evidence of the use of fictitious payments to 
transfer funds. Some agricultural corporations made fictitious payments 
to purchase imaginary crops. One crop authority recorded crop pur- 
chases in a district where the particular crop `purchased' was not grown 
(POC 1979-80: 82). Similar payments were for purchases of non-existent 
buildings; for example, one agricultural corporation bought four houses 
on plots which did not exist (POC 1980-81: 9), and in 1979 another crop 
authority recorded an expenditure of Shs. 92,104.50 for 8250 bottles of 
beer supposedly consumed by ten board members at a one-day meeting. 
(POC 1979-80: 83). Clearly such cases represent false accounting to allow 
the transfer of funds. More serious cases of fictitious payments involved 
the export of public funds. One such case involved an agricultural corpor- 
ation, which in 1978 paid family allowance, passage and gratuity to an ex- 
patriate worker who was no longer an employee of the corporation and so 
was not entitled to such financial support (POC 1979-80: 6); another in- 
volved a petroleum corporation which transferred a total of Shs. 
61,157,169 to two fictitious companies, one called ADNOC' alleged to be 
in Abu Dhabi and another called `NIOC' alleged to be in Iran. (POC 
1979-80:32-33). 
Corporation management staff has also in some instances overpaid on 
genuine transactions in order to free funds for personal accumulation, for 
example, contracts involving double payments (POC 1979-80: 82), ex- 
cessive payments for simple services outside the enterprises (1979-80: 
33), or purchases of over-priced, obsolete equipment, in some cases from 
unlicensed dealers (POC 1981-82:37). 
Poor financial management has also been demonstrated in the case of 
recovery of internal debts and staff travel imprests. To some extent the ac- 
cumulation needs of enterprises and those of workers have come into 
conflict because Tanzanian salaries and wages are quite low in relation to 
living costs. Workers of all grades tend to use the various opportunities 
that may be available to them to maximize their income, lawfully or other- 
wise. While for ordinary workers such opportunities are rare, managers 
have various ways to tap the funds of their enterprises. Illegal siphoning 
off of funds represents one field of activity in this conflict; the lack of 
proper controls, staff debts and imprests represent a second field: mana- 
gers use these as lawful ways to borrow, after which they use their powers 
to postpone repayment. The records on internal debts were in general 
very poorly kept. Staff imprests, though appearing as unrecovered in the 
accounts, had no back-up records to indicate which individuals were fail- 
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ing to retire or account for such imprests (POC 1979-80: 5, 9-10) and in 
some accounts staff imprest records mingled with records on external 
debts (POC 1981-82:80). 
The problem of lack of records or inappropriately kept records on in- 
ternal debts was common in key industrial corporations, in large enter- 
prises with strong boards of directors (including those with boards on 
which cabinet members served), in export companies where imprests 
were paid out in foreign currency and in specialized training bodies offer- 
ing financial management courses (POC 1979-80: 79; 1980-81: 47; 1981- 
82: 51, 68, 80). In several instances, unpaid internal debts also included 
imprests to officials in the parent ministries, which may in part explain 
why some ministries failed to pressure corporate officials to recover debts 
(POC 1979-80: 54, 68;1980-81: 11, 60;1981-82: 13, 70). Unrecovered im- 
prests in the period studied grew at an alarming 53 per cent annually 
(POC 1979-80: 14,16; 1981-82: 15). 
It is possible that debts of this nature persisted and grew because top 
enterprise officials could, at their own discretion, cancel at least a per- 
centage of the debts after the lapse of reasonable period, either claiming 
that such debts were irrecoverable (POC 1979-80: 16) or converting them 
into external debts which could subsequently be cancelled on the grounds 
that they had been taken by former employees who could not be traced 
(POC 1979-80: 17; 1980-81: 22, 35; 1981-82: 41). Finally, contrary to 
general rules and regulations, which restrict employee loans to hardships 
(mainly death in the family and similar causes) or to essentials (such as 
eyeglasses and bicycles), many corporations extended their internal lend- 
ing powers to include loans for housing and for transport support such as 
automotive fuel or repairs (POC 1979-80: 30; 1980-81: 35; 1981-82: 41); 
some offered free rent and other types of services for which payment 
should have been required (POC 1979-80: 60; 1980-81: 24; 1981-82: 22, 
40). These were before the 1988 reforms under which such loans were 
allowed. 
With accounts such as these it is only logical that corporations and 
ministries should seek ways to avoid accountability to Parliament. Ac- 
countability in this situation is complicated by the struggle for power and 
influence: the institution (in this case the government) which has the duty 
to assess the behaviour of enterprises, can cooperate only if this will en- 
hance its image. Where performance has been unsatisfactory, and the re- 
porting institution is implicated, accounting will occur only where there is 
no other alternative or the responsible body is in a subordinate position. 
But the Tanzanian government is nowhere near such a position in re- 
lation to the National Assembly. While audits are very revealing, corpor- 
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ations and ministries do not come forward and explain the problems 
identified in audit reports. The POC is left with the record of many such 
problems, but little explanation. This in turn frustrates initiatives to attain 
accountability. 
Other factors which have diminished the possibility of mechanisms to 
help Parliament increase its influence on policy, include the limited 
coverage of public enterprise accounts, the period of time covered by 
various accounts presented to the committee, lack of adequate time for 
debate on POC reports in the Assembly and the profit and loss orienta- 
tion of the reports. As was noted earlier, the annual reports of the POC 
usually cover less than 30 per cent of all enterprises. This is partly be- 
cause the POC spends much of its time on uncooperative corporations 
and partly because its members prefer to meet the relevant officials of 
each enterprise and the appropriate desk officers in the ministries. With 
about four hundred corporations, even if committee members allocated a 
day to each corporation and did nothing else, a year would be insufficient. 
The committee may be required to decentralize some of its functions to 
its secretariat, such as the initial screening of accounts, interviews, and 
the compilation of reports, which might then (preferably on a sectoral 
basis) be submitted to the POC. 
The period covered by the accounts seen by the committee is usually 
not current. Stale accounts which do not relate to ongoing projects or ac- 
tivities usually serve as the basis of committee work. More often than not, 
the officials who were involved in the transactions covered have since left 
the enterprises, ministers have shifted and the actual situation in the cor- 
porations may have changed substantially. This may contribute to the 
lacklustre nature of Assembly debates on POC reports. The likelihood of 
a stimulating discussion on matters relevant to the period dating as far 
back as five years is slight, and in any case the relevance of any individual 
point is easily shunted aside by government, which can simply state that 
things have changed substantially in the meantime. 
Finally, financial disclosure is aimed at informing Parliament as to 
whether public corporations are operating at a reasonable profit. Most 
laws relating to public enterprises have focused on profits and losses. Be- 
cause the majority of the enterprises have negative performance profiles, 
with more losses than profits, the answers to the anticipated questions 
tend to be obvious. 
The multiple causes of poor performance are both exogenous and en- 
dogenous. Official explanations focus on exogenous factors, and no ob- 
jective evaluation can ignore them, but this means that the parameters of 
any debate on profits and losses are inherently limited, and this, com- 
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bined with delays and existing power relations has preempted any 
meaningful debate. The next chapter, which extends performance indica- 
tors beyond the balance sheet, is an attempt to surmount these limita- 
tions. 
7. Beyond the Balance Sheet 
Beyond Financial Statements 
Because public enterprises have very broad social and economic ob- 
jectives, their success or failure cannot be measured by a simple profit 
and loss account. If good performance is equated with minimal costs and 
maximal savings, some corporations would be compelled to avoid certain 
costly but obligatory investments. Even within the framework of financial 
indicators, certain important aspects of costs and savings are not re- 
flected in a traditional financial statement. To fully understand expendi- 
ture patterns, Parliament would need to know the extent to which the 
authorized funds have been spent, how the activities of the enterprise 
have affected its organizational structure and how it has performed its 
statutory obligations. But a focus on these factors implies that the evalu- 
ation process will consider the whole public enterprise system rather than 
particular enterprises. Examining the enterprise system would entail 
evaluating enterprises, their regulatory structures, and their relationships 
with government ministries. However, annual reports present the finan- 
cial picture of each enterprise in isolation. This chapter focuses on the re- 
levance of organizational structures, the management of development 
funds and economic performance generally to performance evaluation 
and accountability. 
Organizational Structures 
The organizational structures of public enterprises are normally 
defined by statutes or subsidiary legislation. Structural changes thus re- 
quire amendments to existing laws. The theory behind this method of cre- 
ating and preserving organizational structures is that the legislative organ 
involved in forming an enterprise is best suited to prescribe structures 
that will accommodate the intended objectives, operations and resources, 
and that structural changes imply altered objectives, operations or re- 
sources. 
In Tanzania's public enterprise system, neither government nor enter- 
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prise boards seem to appreciate the relationship between organizational 
structures and these three factors, nor do they appear to acknowledge the 
legislature's right to change enterprise structures. Instead, executive and 
administrative acts within enterprises have altered their structures with- 
out consulting Parliament and, in some cases, without reporting back to it. 
The clearest example is the decentralization of the National Develop- 
ment Corporation (NDC), which was divided by Presidential Directive 
No. 1 of 1969 into four holding corporations. Initially the NDC had been 
established by statute, and Parliament had not delegated its power to 
determine the corporation's structure. But while the reorganization was 
made in good faith in what was referred to as a rationalization exercise, 
the four new holding corporations, in the area of textiles, tourism, agricul- 
ture and transport were each as large as the NDC. Established without a 
parliamentary review of their viability, they became dependent on Parlia- 
ment for funding. 
Similar changes were made in the state trading system in 1973, when 
the State Trading Corporation (STC) was dissolved at the initiative of 
government. Parliament was called upon to bless the move, although it 
had not been involved in debating the viability of the old structure. The 
STC had been formed from private sector, commercial enterprises which 
had been nationalized in 1967. It had inherited significant debts and re- 
tained some organizational and marketing structures which were suited 
to the former companies but not necessarily appropriate for new objec- 
tives. It immediately acquired a heavy bureaucracy at the top whose func- 
tion was only administration and whose leaders had no prior experience 
of large-scale state trading operations. After only four years of operation, 
the STC had developed operational problems. The government quickly 
commissioned an American consultancy firm to study its problems and, 
acting on the consultancy report, dissolved the STC without consulting 
Parliament. However, local consultations would have produced a com- 
pletely different situtation: improving the performance of the STC re- 
quired relatively few changes. Its successor - the Board of Internal Trade 
- was a larger holding corporation, also with a top-heavy bureaucracy, 
and with five new central companies and twenty-two regional companies. 
The new structure was approved by Parliament in 1973, after several of 
the new elements had already been put into operation. The point is not 
the successes and failures of the new system (although in fact the Board 
of Internal Trade did not solve the state's internal trade problems), but 
the way in which the new structure was created. 
The government introduced similar changes in 1975 when it abolished 
the cooperative system and crop authorities were suddenly shouldered 
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with the purchase of agricultural produce from the farmers. The hard- 
ships that followed have been covered elsewhere (Ellis 1982,1983; Coul- 
son 1979, 1982; Ndulu 1983; Stewart 1986), but clearly the whole change 
was economically and politically unsuitable. After considerable damage, 
the cooperatives were restored in 1982. While it cannot be argued that 
consulting Parliament would have guaranteed a better result, government 
shortcuts and its disregard for popular or parliamentary views did not 
produce appropriate solutions, either. 
Unilateral structural change is not confined to major changes. At en- 
terprise level, there have been cycles of growth and expansion which were 
unforeseen by statutes. Enterprises form subsidiaries, training wings, and 
independent accounting units, all of which increase the demand for de- 
velopment funds. Cycles of growth and expansion seem to have been 
generated by status inflation in the internal labour markets and by the 
desire for political and/or economic control. Status inflation has resulted 
from the growth of the managerial pool and the desire of ministries and 
boards to control enterprise managers. This desire to control meant that 
many intermediate cadre employees were promoted, either as a reward 
for loyalty or as a strategy for enhancing influence, and in order to accom- 
modate the number of staff then located higher up in the enterprises, de- 
partments have had to be formed. Status inflation also has arisen from 
bureaucratic rules linking training and promotion, because as more 
people train, more become qualified to climb. Some corporations modify 
their organizational structure as often as biennially in order to form new 
departments to accommodate status changes. Financial institutions such 
as the state banks and professional institutions such as the universities 
and institutes are good examples of such expansion. 
Political control cycles in enterprise growth are normally generated by 
internal factors. In an attempt to control information flow and the public 
relations function of the enterprise, executives frequently are tempted to 
form specialized departments for these functions, directly under their 
control. Public relations departments mushroomed in the 1980s, and in 
some enterprises have become significant departments, organizing foot- 
ball teams, peoples' militia training, cultural troupes and journalistic 
functions, most of which are neither related nor ancillary to the enterprise 
objectives. Some of these have actually created new avenues of expendi- 
ture, which in ordinary business organizations would easily be regarded 
as ultra vires. Similarly, workers' education departments have emerged, 
oriented more towards ideological control than actual skills, and these 
are large departments with sizeable budgets (Makusi 1982; Mihyo 1986). 
The economic control motives which dominate many expansion pro- 
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grammes have been attained through the formation of extra-statutory 
subsidiary enterprises, independent production units, workshops, train- 
ing institutions, transport units, cartographic and photographic services, 
canteens, social clubs, data processing centres, and so on, all of which in 
essence generate income and perform functions which exceed that regu- 
lar purpose of the enterprises. Furthermore, the proliferation of such sat- 
ellite structures has set into motion other cycles which affect management 
patterns, the investment profile and complicate the meeting of enterprise 
goals. 
Bureaucratic expansion has created a multiplicity of decision-making 
and decision-implementing units. Exchanging information among mana- 
gers has become a complicated process. The profile of investment deci- 
sions has tended to become longer, with many internal bodies involved in 
processing a project or plan. The gestation of an investment plan aver- 
ages three to twelve months (which is a long period in a country with a 
high inflation rate) and by the time it matures the initial conditions have 
often changed substantially. The involvement of holding corporations, 
parent ministries and the treasury in the scrutiny and approval of plans 
has further aggravated the process. Conflict has been common, as each 
blames another for delays. 
Because only the government has the power to review the organiza- 
tional structures of private enterprises, this has become a predominant 
feature of the public enterprise system in Tanzania. While the total num- 
ber of jobs in Tanzania increased from 367,926 to 621,825 between 1969 
and 1982, an increase of over 100 per cent, in the public enterprise sector 
it increased from 64,429 to 164,758, or about 150 per cent, during the 
same period (Statistical Abstract 1984: 51;Analysis ofAccounts of Parasta- 
tal Enterprises 1973-1982: 6). During the same period, total labour costs 
rose by 700 per cent, although the real wages declined by over 20 per cent 
(ICFTU 1988; Maganga 1988), and the predominance of non-market 
mechanisms of regulating the sector may have substantially contributed 
to this. 
Sources of Finance 
Whatever their social and economic objectives, public enterprises 
have a duty to generate wealth if they are involved in the provision of 
goods and services or to use public finances diligently and efficiently if 
they are involved in the provision of non-commercial services and 
utilities. Because they draw much of their funding from public coffers or, 
if from external lenders, with a public guarantee, they are obliged to use 
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these funds strictly for the purposes intended. Finally, enterprises en- 
gaged in the generation of profits are expected to become internally self- 
reliant over time, and for third world countries, national self-reliance can 
only be attained and sustained through the increased self-reliance of pri- 
vate and public enterprises, local authorities, cooperatives and similar so- 
cial and production institutions. 
One indicator of national-level self-reliance is the extent to which 
public enterprises, among others, can become increasingly less depend- 
ent on government funding for their day-to-day investment and other ac- 
tivities. The attainment of independence is determined by such factors as 
initial capital resources, the efficient use of resources, relative autonomy 
and the ability to make the right decisions at the right time, the capacity 
to operate efficiently and competitively on several markets, and the ability 
to strike a favourable balance between production costs and the levels of 
accumulation needed for reinvestment. 
In many countries, public enterprises - in some countries, most pub- 
lic enterprises - fail to attain self-reliance. They may operate in highly 
protected and regulated output markets, with monopoly rights and in 
some cases weak consumer protection encouraging cost inefficiencies 
and stifling innovation. Or, because they have an assured source of capi- 
tal, they are able to borrow below the opportunity cost of capital from 
government or government banks or get grants or government-guaran- 
teed loans. They are generally protected by legislation from the rigorous 
controls of financial market funding. They may enjoy excessive levels of 
government subsidy and cross-subsidy, through which they transfer some 
of their inefficiencies to other sectors. 
Such factors shape the behaviour of public enterprises, and in Tanza- 
nia, the system of public enterprise accountability has not developed 
mechanisms to regulate their sources of finances, nor has it rationalized 
the patterns of accountability. 
Financial data indicates that in the years prior to 1982, public enter- 
prises in Tanzania had failed to achieve internal financial self-reliance 
(see Table 7.1), and the relationship between external and internal sour- 
ces of funding remains unbalanced, with enterprises relying heavily on ex- 
ternal loans and grants. Between 1971 and 1982, records show heavy 
losses and large-scale borrowing from local and foreign sources. During 
this period, they also received large subsidies from the government. The 
most appropriate strategy would have been for the government to compel 
such enterprises to obtain their funds from the regular financial market at 
conditions equivalent to those available to the private sector. This option 
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stead increased loans, grants and subsidies, further undermining the use 
of market mechanisms by public enterprises. Between 1971 and 1982 
public enterprises were subsidized to an annual total of 40 million shill- 
ings in loans and 83 million shillings in grants. The disproportion between 
grants and loans is uneconomic, because while grants were to be repaid, 
they were interest free and exceeded the amount provided through loans. 
Despite these sums, Tanzanian enterprises borrowed an average of 125 
million shillings annually from abroad; and because all foreign loans were 
disbursed through the government, the enterprises were insulated from 
the conditions and pressures of foreign financial markets. 
The lack of control over funding sources was compounded by increas- 
ing government subsidies, which in 1966 stood at Shs 3.5 million and at 
the end of 1986 amounted to Shs 62.4 million (Economic Surveys 1966 - 
1986). The official claim is that most subsidies went to food and agricul- 
ture, but between 1975 and 1985 about 30 per cent of subsidies went into 
services, 10 per cent into commerce and only 5 per cent into agricultural 
operations. Whether or not these figures are precise, it is important to 
note that the `services' which enjoyed the heaviest support were hotels 
and air transport and, even more important, that most of the food sold by 
the food corporations (and especially rice) was obtained through food 
aid, could have been sold at a very reasonable price, and did not need a 
subsidy. 
Annual reports do not disaggregate income sources in such a way as 
to differentiate between locally-obtained funds and loans from abroad. 
Subsidies are rarely accounted for separately, if indeed they are men- 
tioned at all. Few corporations use their accounting system to disclose the 
extent of their indebtedness, and in particular it is unlikely that a corpor- 
ation is likely to chronicle its contribution to the national debt. The source 
of funds for public enterprises is not subjected to parliamentary control. 
In theory, the fact that enterprises secure their funds through government 
should mean that the public, through Parliament, has more control. But 
because Parliament is weak as a control mechanism, in the absence of 
market controls the corporations operate without control. 
The Management of Production Funds 
In 1974, Parliament passed the Production Development Fund Act, 
creating the Production Development Fund. The Fund was created in 
order to enable government to set aside money for investment in public 
enterprise activities that would enhance production and productivity. 
Under the Act, the treasury was empowered to set aside a certain per- 
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centage of national development funds, which it could distribute to vari- 
ous enterprises without seeking parliamentary approval. Essentially, the 
Act sought to create a mechanism for quick decision-making by exempt- 
ing the Treasury from the constraints of parliamentary funding proce- 
dures. Technically, however, the Act excluded Parliament as a contributor 
to public enterprise funding policy. Handing funding procedures over ex- 
clusively to bureaucratic mechanisms widened government's discretion in 
the distribution of development funds to public enterprises. It has also 
undermined the accountability for such funds. 
During the period for which reports are available (1975-82) prob- 
lems surfaced which reflected the weaknesses of the funding system. Fir- 
stly, the records of the way in which the funds have been utilized were not 
properly kept. For example, government accounts fail to indicate how the 
Shs 75 million set aside during the period for the development of tourism 
was spent (Controller and Auditor Generals' Report 1982: 40). Similarly 
the Shs 49.3 million set aside for the development of the cashewnut indus- 
try was not shown in government accounts (Controller andAuditor Gener- 
als'Report 1982: 40). Of the Shs 132 million allocated to industry, only one 
million was recorded in Treasury accounts, and of the Shs 196 million al- 
located to beverages only Shs 23 million was recorded (Controller and 
Auditor Generals' Report 1982: 41). 
Secondly, where disbursed funds are recorded, they are not disaggre- 
gated as loans, grants and subsidies. Records and accounts of recipient 
enterprises also fail to indicate the terms under which the funds were re- 
ceived. Apparently, government was transferring funds to these enter- 
prises for recurrent expenditures rather than for commercial invest- 
ments. Thirdly, the procedures spelt out by the 1974 Act have not been 
strictly followed. In his 1982 report the Controller and Auditor General 
observed that he doubted whether the Treasury was monitoring whether 
recipient organizations used funds for the intended purposes or with the 
intended results (Controller and Auditor Generals' Report 1982: 41). His 
report suggests that funds were not necessarily being disbursed for the in- 
tended purposes. Some amounts were indicated as having been paid to 
private individuals as loans, and in some instances sums had been trans- 
ferred to untargeted corporations without the necessary approval of the 
Minister for Finance. Repayment records did not separate interest from 
principle, and repayments were being recycled back to public enterprises 
without regard to the procedures laid down in the Act (Controller and 
Auditor Generals' Report 1982: 41). 
Such discrepancies in the management of development funds are pre- 
dictable in systems that lack built-in checks and balances on administra- 
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tive discretion. If public bodies can obtain credit and financial support 
outside normal credit markets, they can only use such support efficiently 
if the administrative system has built-in mechanisms for ensuring effi- 
ciency. Where the legal framework excludes parliamentary control of 
such processes, the administrative system will tend either to check itself, 
or to perform poorly as a control mechanism. The inefficiencies arising 
from this laxity spill over naturally into the general performance of the en- 
terprise system. 
The Performance of Public Enterprises 
For the purpose of this chapter, performance is confined to the vol- 
ume of goods and services delivered by public enterprises between 1975 
and 1985. The period is selected because between 1970 and 1975 most 
such enterprises were still preparing themselves for operation, making 
any assessment based solely on output during this period potentially un- 
realistic; and because between 1975 and 1985 economic problems inten- 
sified. 
As the appendices indicate, between 1975 and 1985 the performance 
levels of most public enterprises either stagnated or declined. For 
example, the net increase in sugar production between 1975 and 1983 was 
only 0.6 per cent and between 1983 and 1985 the levels fell 17.8 per cent 
(Appendix 1). The per capita consumption of sugar decreased by 2.8 per 
cent between 1975 and 1985, a drop that would have been much more sig- 
nificant except for the increasing dependence on imported sugar. Key 
corporations engaged in the purchase of agricultural crops for export ex- 
perienced a 70 per cent decline in performance measured in terms of ac- 
tual local purchases and a 62 per cent drop in export earnings (Appendix 
2). Local purchases of key agricultural export crops such as cotton de- 
clined 7.3 per cent annually, and the processing of cotton dropped 7.25 
per cent annually (Appendix 4); tea purchases declined by 0.45 per cent 
annually and coffee purchased from producers fell by 0.6 per cent an- 
nually. On state sisal farms, the amount of land in production dropped 9.8 
per cent; the average drop for tobacco, pyrethrum and cashewnut export 
was 15.5 per cent (Appendix 5). 
Food production and marketing, a major domain of the public sector, 
suffered more than agricultural export production. Rice, beans, millet 
and cassava output all declined by an average of 45 per cent (Appendix 
6). The direct impact of this on producer prices can be seen from Appen- 
dix 6. Performance in the non-agricultural sectors was no better. Mineral 
production fell by 45 per cent (Appendix 7), hotel services experienced a 
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decline of 20 per cent in customers, mileage covered by state bus services 
fell by 20 per cent, the number of unprocessed telephone applications in- 
creased by 1860 per cent for manual telephones and 451 per cent for 
automatic telephones while the number of internal telephone calls de- 
clined by 400 per cent and telegrams by 443 per cent (Appendix 8). The 
number of passengers transported by rail fell by over 30 per cent and 
transport by railway bus decreased by 45 per cent. The number of cattle 
transported by rail fell by 20 per cent (Appendix 9). These are just a few 
examples. Nearly every major public enterprise and almost all corpora- 
tions experienced dramatic declines in performance, as well as hardships 
such as the inability to meet debt obligations, the failure to pay wages and 
high rates of under-used capacity (Wangwe 1983). 
General Causes of Poor Performance 
The broader economic and political causes of performance decline in 
Tanzania between 1967 and 1985 have been discussed by several authors. 
Wangwe, Skarstein and Havenik (1986) have contributed substantially by 
locating the causes of low industrial output, such as the lack of industrial 
and sectoral linkages, under-used capacity, low labour-capital output ra- 
tios, and so on. Studies of transport infrastructure have shown that the 
country's industrialization policy ignored the need for a cost-saving and 
efficient transport network (Kasungu 1983; Mwase 1980; Mihyo 1989). 
Regarding national agricultural policy, marketing margins narrowed 
and the net gains of producers and local buyers of agricultural export 
crops were pushed sharply downwards by the nominal rate of exchange, 
which remained fixed for a long time but appreciated sharply in the late 
1970s and 1980s (Stewart (1986). Stewart also points out (1986: Chapter 
6) that the export taxes leapt from three per cent in the late 1960s to about 
136 per cent for some export crops, and that this lowered the incomes of 
exporting corporations and producers. Stewart explains in more detail 
the problem of producer disincentives in the agricultural marketing sys- 
tem which has been touched upon by many researchers (Ellis 1982, 1983; 
Hyden 1980, Mbilinyi 1982). 
The neglect of agriculture in the general industrialization strategy was 
ironic, because the whole policy of Ujamaa socialism was based on trans- 
forming small peasant producers into a dynamic economic and political 
force, and because Tanzania's stated political philosophy was that while 
others were trying to reach the moon, the Tanzanian government was 
trying to reach the peasants. Yet, no significant investments in infrastruc- 
ture or other necessary factors were made. This was destructive, because 
Beyond the Balance Sheet 109 
Tanzania's Ujamaa socialism emphasized industry without considering 
agricultural production. As a result, as agriculture declined, people 
either moved to the cities or gave up farming in favour of rural semi-em- 
ployment. The income generated by ailing factories in the urban centres 
could not sustain the population. Furthermore, industry began facing 
problems of production and inputs because agriculture which was declin- 
ing could not support the necessary import of inputs such as fuel, foreign 
skills, spare parts and new technology or even repayment of loans which 
urban-based enterprises were incurring at an increased rate. Hence the 
neglect of agriculture and over-emphasis on industry set into motion vi- 
cious circles of dependency, stagnation, inflation and decline in growth in 
all sectors (Schneider-Barthold 1986; Stewart 1986). 
Political factors also contributed to the decline. The deliberate ne- 
glect of and the attempt to suppress the private sector caused much un- 
certainty in investment policy and put the sector on the defensive. As a re- 
sult, the private sector withdrew from major investment areas, depriving 
the public sector of the demand and supply linkages with private produ- 
cers which would have expanded its productive and service potential. The 
long-term effects of this policy are beyond the purview of this book, but 
they include the government's failure to diversify sources of tax revenue 
and its subsequent over-reliance on the taxation of the public sector 
which in effect led to the crippling of that sector. Another long-term ef- 
fect of this policy is that the Tanzanian government, while refusing to pro- 
mote a buoyant private sector in its own boundaries, became dependent 
on the private sectors of other countries, mainly those of Kenya and its 
other traditional trading partners. Tanzania became very dependent on 
the private sectors of other countries, which were naturally strengthened 
by this trade, but which failed to bail out Tanzania when it encountered 
serious financial and credit problems. 
Other political factors include the war with Uganda, which was made 
unavoidable by Uganda's invasion of Tanzania, and Tanzania's contribu- 
tion to the liberation wars in Southern Africa. When one looks at the im- 
mense costs of these wars, one necessarily wonders what uninterrupted 
peace would have produced, although any answer is bound to be specula- 
tive. 
Management Failures and Poor Performance 
Studies of the management of Tanzania's public enterprises have con- 
centrated on decision-making structures (El-Namaki 1985; Bavu 1985; 
Sendaro 1986), workers' involvement in decision-making processes (Ma- 
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polu 1975; Mihyo, Mapolu and Makusi 1982,1986), financial controls and 
patterns of expenditure (Moshi 1984; Rwegasira 1988, 1989) and the 
operational problems of boards of directors (El Namaki 1985; Kalembo 
1982; Mengi 1983). The majority of these studies discuss their respective 
topics in isolation from broader economic, organizational and political 
factors. Yet, to understand the history and plan the future of these enter- 
prises, it is imperative to link all the factors that have had a bearing on the 
context within which their management operates. Most of the problems 
and factors that have shaped the pattern of public enterprise manage- 
ment in Tanzania have been discussed in the previous chapters. In what 
follows, these factors will be clustered into four interlinked and interde- 
pendent categories: (a) economic and social factors, (b) performance-re- 
lated factors, (c) political factors and (d) legal culture. 
Economic Factors 
Public enterprise performance problems are nothing new, nor are 
they exclusive to Tanzania. Nationalizations and public enterprise reor- 
ganizations have been characteristic of many economies in this century. 
Many well-intentioned programmes for establishing the public sector, 
with the noble aim of controlling the `commanding heights' of the econ- 
omy or the `major means of production', have damaged national econ- 
omies, including some of the world's strongest, or become major causes 
of government budget deficits. As Backhaus has pointed out, such pro- 
grammes have in some cases turned commanding heights into sinking 
ships (Backhaus 1989: 308). 
The causes of past and present shocks seem to be similar. In Tanzania, 
for example, overburdening seems to be one cause of public enterprise 
fatigue. Those public enterprises which quickly become clear examples of 
inefficiency are frequently overburdened. Victims of such fatigue include 
the crop marketing boards, transport and cargo handling firms, financial 
institutions, and state industries. Of the 364 public enterprises covered by 
the Tanzania Audit Corporation Report of 1989, 189 ran at a loss. Of 
these, 126 were in industry, agriculture and marketing. 
The marketing, agricultural and transport firms have, statutorily and 
administratively, been saddled with a multiplicity of objectives. They are 
required by law and politically expected to pursue socio-economic goals. 
The combination of economic and social objectives means that they are 
supposed to operate with some degree of profit motive while contributing 
to the `public interest', especially in their allocative and distributive func- 
tion. Issues of income distribution, employment generation, social and 
political stability, regional balance and equity compel them to address al- 
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locative issues, but in doing so they are not expected to sacrifice technical 
or productive efficiency. 
If the measure of the efficiency of such enterprises is its rates of return 
on capital or its economic profit per se, such enterprises can be judged to 
have been inefficient (Zafiris 1986: 347). But if the social basis of this in- 
efficiency is taken into consideration and social policy objectives are ac- 
cepted as part of the measurement criteria, then they become relatively 
more efficient (Vavouras 1988: 332). It is also possible, as has been argued 
by Pestieau, that public enterprise performance can only be fairly evalu- 
ated on the basis of the objectives assigned to the enterprise, and that 
where these objectives are socio-economic, it is arbitrary to single out 
only economic performance (Pestieau 1989: 297). 
As noted earlier, the administration has had an upper hand in forming 
public enterprises, although such powers have been delegated and in 
some instances sub-delegated. More often than not, the day-to-day acti- 
vities of public enterprises have been over-determined by development 
needs as defined by ministries, holding corporations or other control 
agencies, with the diversity and multiplicity of objectives in Tanzania's 
public enterprise systems resulting from the lack of uniform policy on 
how to establish and shape public enterprises. 
At the same time, accountability and management problems are quite 
real. Corporations have spread themselves too thinly in responding to the 
demands and dictates of the development administrators. Creditors, 
most of whom entered into their dealings with public enterprises through 
the state as a credit guarantor, have little influence, or opportunity to re- 
strain the activities of enterprises. Overprotection and monopoly have 
combined to reduce management efficiency, and because the enterprises 
have been assigned social policy objectives or tasks, the tendency has 
been to give monopoly rights to these enterprises in order to reduce com- 
petition. While the creation of official monopolies at times represents a 
hope that lack of competition will allow the successful combination of 
economic and social objectives, such monopoly powers can be abused, or 
in some cases used to control production or to politicize distribution, as 
has been shown in the previous chapters. For example, in Tanzania, pri- 
vate accumulation is regarded as wrong or as likely to lead to a class so- 
ciety. In such a situation, the objective of state enterprise monopoly is not 
necessarily to enable the enterprise to perform well on the economic and 
social fronts, but to protect the power structure desired by the group(s) 
presently in power. This may be done by keeping production out of the 
hands of politically unacceptable groups such as the dlite, the middle 
class, private entrepreneurs and so on. 
112 The Accountability of Public Enterprises in Tanzania 
Monopoly may also be used to control distribution throughout a 
country's production structure. Through confinement policies in the 
1980s, the Tanzanian government allowed public enterprises a monopoly 
over all imported goods and all locally-produced consumer commodities 
such as cooking oil, building materials, agricultural implements, fertili- 
zers, petro-chemical products and educational materials. Even materials 
produced by the private sector, such as wires and nails, glass products, 
tubes and tyres, piping and plastic materials, and so on, could be dis- 
tributed only through state and regional trading companies. Only in 1989 
were measures taken to reduce the number of items confined by law to 
state marketing channels. 
Confinement policies did not necessarily increase allocative effi- 
ciency; they were mainly employed to concentrate the powers of distribu- 
tion within the hands of state agents. Such policies affected management 
by reducing the challenge of competition from the private sector and also 
by making the the private sector dependent upon the public sector for the 
marketing of confined products and procurement of confined inputs. 
Overprotection, through immunities against legal actions, diminished 
liability for negligence or breach of contract, has also affected the beha- 
viour of management towards customers and the public. The right to 
withhold information on grounds of national security also must have 
some impact on the way public enterprises have conducted their busi- 
nesses. Statutory limitations on the compensation that can be paid for 
breach of contract or negligent acts or omissions may also encourage 
careless and negligent behaviour by management. A management team 
aware that its enterprise is unlikely to bear any substantial costs resulting 
from breach of contract or the negligent performance of its obligations is 
likely to operate without fear of loss of employment as a consequence of 
its acts or omissions. 
Management performance may also have been affected by the size of 
the corporations. As was noted in. Chapter Three, most public enterprises 
were formed under the Public Corporations Act of 1%9. The Act did not 
spell out clear procedures to be followed or the criteria to be used. This 
omission encouraged unplanned growth in the number of public corpor- 
ations. Agricultural and livestock boards and agencies were formed 
which specialized only in the development, marketing, export of single 
products, such as cotton, coffee, cashewnuts, meat or hides and skins. 
Each enterprise was independent, but most had functions that over- 
lapped, at least partly, with other enterprises. 
Related to this was the lack of guidelines on the extent to which cor- 
porations could change their organizational structures. As noted in 
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Chapter Three, many corporations expanded by forming subsidiaries or 
specialized units, although their capital structures remained unaltered. 
This increased not only the demand for finances, but also employment 
rosters and the bureaucracy. Even in 1989, when the government re- 
quired some of the largest holding corporations to allow subsidiaries to 
operate as autonomous companies, the spin-off of subsidiaries did not re- 
duce the size of the bureaucracies within the parent corporations. For 
example, at the end of July 1991 the National Development Corporation 
released five major subsidiaries to operate as independent companies. 
This devolution was not followed by any reduction in the number of wor- 
kers at the National Development Corporation. 
Efficiency and accountability are adversely affected by loose and per- 
missive legislation that allows the uncoordinated expansion of large en- 
terprises without restrictions on structural change. They have been fur- 
ther undermined by the multiple roles imposed on some corporations. 
Some functions performed by the so-called independent units, such as ac- 
counting, cleaning, maintenance, cartography, photography, repairing, 
cargo handling, and so forth, can be better performed at a lower cost and 
with less delay by sub-contractors. 
The lack of consumer organizations able to act as watchdogs and pre- 
vent enterprises from violating quality standards, weight requirements 
and prices, has also provided leeway to corporations to produce and 
serve as they found convenient in their circumstances; and although the 
1989 reintroduction of competition and liberalization of trade have in- 
creased consumer choice, consumer consciousness is still low and 
measures to promote it, such as publication of information on standards 
and safety regulations and the formation of consumer protection organiz- 
ations, have not yet occurred. 
Performance-related Constraints 
Performance-related factors fall into two categories, one within the 
relationship between management and public enterprise control agen- 
cies, and the other relating to mechanisms for ensuring optimum perfor- 
mance of obligations and duties by public enterprises. It is now commonly 
accepted that the relationship between management and enterprise is 
that of agent and principal. It includes the duty to make decisions which 
are in the interests of the owners of enterprises (Armstrong 1989: 311). In 
order to do this, there must be a high level of commitment on the part of 
the management to make decisions which maximize benefits for the en- 
terprise. Private sector enterprises rely on the share markets to attain 
such commitment. Managerial efficiency is normally gauged by the extent 
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to which the managers maintain the value of enterprise stock and the 
amount of capital they raise for the company on the share market. Pros- 
pects for insolvency, a fall in value of shares or threats of take-overs by 
other companies are taken as signs of bad performance and jeopardize 
managers' jobs. This provides little guidance in the public sector, where 
capital structures are seldom if ever open for subscription by the public. 
But even if they were, public corporations are not exclusively profit moti- 
vated. 
Managerial commitment, therefore, has to be based on loyalty and 
trust, which can be attained only if managers are given adequate incen- 
tives. As Wright (1985: 94) has observed, enterprises must be prepared to 
pay a high dividend for loyalty from their managers. But, where organiza- 
tions find that adequate incentives to management are too expensive, they 
avoid such costs (Armstrong 1989: 316). They rely instead on mechanisms 
such as patronage, protection or ideology, or they make management in- 
secure by removing tenure, or by encouraging competition within groups 
eligible for appointment. 
Until 1988, Tanzanian public policy was directed away from paying 
high dividends for loyalty and trust to public enterprise managers and 
employees. Tying economic privileges and social status to high trust and 
loyalty positions was taboo. The taboo was based on the ideology of a 
classless society, which wished to raise sacrifice, recognition, heroism and 
political acceptability above salaries, allowances, tax exemptions and bo- 
nuses. Consequently, the public sector attracted managers who were 
ready to pay lip service to organizational goals while at the same time en- 
gaging in corruption, social parasitism (using enterprise facilities and 
time for their own activities) and management by neglect. Management 
by neglect was manifested by the way in which most managers avoided 
tackling difficult issues such as low labour productivity, absenteeism, 
waste of materials, pilferage and low morale generally. Most managers 
sought refuge in collective mechanisms of decision making either through 
joint committees or management committees. This encouraged ineffi- 
ciency, low managerial performance and low productivity. The ideologi- 
cal and social basis of this problem in Tanzania have been examined in de- 
tail by Hedlund and Lundahl (1989); but it is clear that in avoiding higher 
agency and trust costs, the whole economy paid a high premium through 
poor financial, material and human resources management. Some of the 
side effects of this phenomenon, such as the free-ride mentality of wor- 
kers and managers, social parasitism or the willingness to exploit public 
resources for private gain, the culture of accepting the looting or theft of 
the assets of public bodies and problems of dependence on gifts or tips 
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for performance of contractual obligations, will be carried well into the 
next century. 
The performance of corporations could have been better if they were 
less protected (see Chapters TWo and Three) from the consequences of 
their activities. More fundamentally, the activities performed by public 
enterprises need to be contractually guaranteed. As noted earlier, if the 
duties performed are of a general nature and are performed for the 
general public, the absence of a customer relationship has the potential 
for undermining efficiency. Such corporations can quickly become pater- 
nalistic and bureaucratic and can easily treat their services as a privilege. 
One approach to countering this tendency would be the institution of 
nominal charges (either cash or coupons) to nullify the notion of free ser- 
vices which some service corporations interpret as a licence for negligent 
and substandard or reckless service. Once people know that their salaries 
and job security depend on their services, they tend to respect both their 
jobs and their customers. But where they are made to believe that their 
customers should be thankful that they are giving services at all, they 
become complacent and less cautious about the quality of their work. 
Political Factors 
In many countries, public enterprises play a politically sensitive role, 
within which their dependence on public funds makes them quite vulner- 
able. In the Third World generally, and in Africa in particular, the low 
level of development and the potential role these enterprises can play in 
change give them political importance. But, they are politicized by their 
large share of limited public resources. 
Other factors which make them prone to political control or con- 
troversy include the national debt, since public enterprises are major con- 
sumers of foreign loans and the targets of debt servicing strategies. Fur- 
thermore, as was pointed out in Chapters Three and Four, public 
enterprises also share to a large extent in the administrative functions of 
the state, such as licensing, administering development projects, reset- 
tling population, administering towns, providing public utilities, and in 
some cases, collecting taxes and fixing prices. All of these tasks put public 
enterprises in a position where they participate in the political process. 
In Tanzania, this political role is strengthened by the use of public en- 
terprises as instruments of ideological reproduction. As shown in Chap- 
ter Two, they have been burdened with political tasks such as providing 
financial support for the peoples' militia, political education, housing, the 
local costs of the state political party, trade unions and other branches of 
mass organizations, as well as the duty to provide services to top govern- 
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ment and party officials at low rates or on credit or in some cases gratui- 
tously. In addition, public corporations are expected to provide preferen- 
tial treatment to government departments and officials in the allocation 
of resources they produce, distribute or control. 
These factors have combined to make public enterprises more politi- 
cal than commercial or economic. Government hires and evaluates man- 
agers more on the basis of political considerations than on managerial 
competence. They have, in short, created what Stefani (1986: 235) calls a 
`political market'. Within such a market, it may be difficult to approach 
funding, management, performance evaluation or problem solving with 
any degree of objectivity. 
The Legal Culture 
Legal mechanisms can strengthen managerial performance if an en- 
terprise system permits this. Mortgages, debentures, charges, securities 
and other legal instruments can inject discipline into the borrowing and 
spending patterns of enterprises. For example, in Tanzania most public 
enterprise loans have been obtained from or through government as a 
guarantor. Government funding or intermediation in funding activities is 
likely to act as a disincentive for the efficient use of such loans. Public en- 
terprises stand to benefit from participation in finance markets, where 
credit is tied to clear and specified repayment and security conditions. 
Even government funds can be put to better use if they are subject to such 
conditions, for example by being provided indirectly, through commer- 
cial banks. 
Another legal issue which seems to have been dropped from Tanza- 
nia's public enterprise system is the duty to operate on sound economic 
principles which, as we saw earlier, was included in pre-1984 public en- 
terprise legislation but later was allowed to fade away. The duty of enter- 
prises to operate on sound economic principles, together with the duty of 
financial bodies to display information on trends in their operations and 
the duty of state companies to submit annual returns to the Registrar of 
Companies has disappeared. Instead, permissive and ambiguous provi- 
sions in enterprise laws leave so much room for discretion that they 
remove all pretense of objectivity in enterprise or management perfor- 
mance assessment (see Chapters TWo and Three). It may help in the long 
run not only to limit such discretion but also to provide clear statutory 
guidelines for performance assessment. 
Finally, There are inconsistencies in the system of appointing enter- 
prise officials. Lines of accountability and authority, if coherently linked, 
are mutually reinforcing. Ministers can be held responsible for the acti- 
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vities of their subordinates, if they are entitled to appoint and to remove 
them. Similarly, the President may have more influence over ministers 
and enterprises if the power to appoint top executives is exercised only by 
ministers, because this would help to clarify the chain of authority linking 
President, ministers and enterprises. Presidential involvement in the run- 
ning of enterprises - as chancellor or chairperson or through the ap- 
pointment of ministers and principal secretaries to enterprise boards - 
thus undermines the ability of the government to control these enter- 
prises objectively. 
8 Privatization and Reorganization: 
Rationalizing Public Enterprise 
Introduction 
The danger of over-hasty decision-making is inherent to economic 
and political reorganization. For example, the nationalization measures 
of the late 1960s were carried out under the Arusha Declaration, which 
had been prepared by a small circle within the ruling party and an- 
nounced without debate at the party's Annual Conference. The Arusha 
Declaration surprised both the enthusiasts and victims of nationalization. 
The arguments about market failure, the concentration of wealth within a 
few hands and the threats of a class-based economy, which were used to 
justify both the ends and means of nationalization, were raised ex post 
facto, and while the claims were accepted, they were never substantiated. 
Tanzania is hardly alone in this. In many developing countries, rationali- 
zations constituted part of a revolution, especially in those countries pro- 
fessing radical ideology. Such actions were justified after the fact, once 
they had been accepted as inevitable or irreversible. 
In the current reorganization, similar mistakes may be or are being re- 
peated. Certain studies on public enterprises are being used to justify ne- 
gative decisions. Sweeping statements are being made on the inherent 
weaknesses of the public enterprise system. A culture of inefficiency - 
attributed to government businesses and supported by theories of public 
administration or bureaucratic organization - has been assumed to be at 
work in public enterprises. As was pointed out by Lindsay (1976: 1061), 
such attitudes create expectations of inefficiency, inconvenience and 
delay. According to Lindsay, a customer of a government bureau is not 
surprised when a `service is unavailable when demanded or defective 
when delivered or when it is administered by personnel who are rude and 
indifferent'. Such bias, when applied to public enterprises in general, 
blocks the emergence of alternative problem statements, theories, ana- 
lyses or proposals. 
Another presumption commonly held without being established is 
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that public enterprises enjoy a monopoly position. Rees (1984: 23), for 
example, argues from this unestablished base that public enterprises can 
be viewed `broadly as a system of political control of industrial activity'. 
But the primary facts need to be established before the argument can be 
presented. Chapters TWo and Three of this book have attempted to judge 
the validity of this assumption in the case of Tanzania; without such an as- 
sessment the statement would be merely a biased generalization. 
In the same manner, the view that public enterprises play a welfare 
role which can be equated to that of the Good Samaritan is not particu- 
larly useful. Samaritans have no duty to their beneficiaries; all are travel- 
lers and any Samaritan may have provided help in return for previous 
help from an unknown third party. The welfare function of the state arises 
from the social contract which imposes on the state the duty to protect the 
human right to move, live, work, earn and enjoy life with access to health, 
education, shelter and information. Hence it maybe unfair to assume that 
all public enterprises perform a welfare function and second that where 
they perform it, it is a gratuity or a privilege. 
Furthermore, the focus of many research studies, including this one, 
has been on the weaknesses and not the strengths of the public enterprise 
system. Although a few positive enterprise studies have emerged, most 
public enterprises have `lived up to the worst hopes of critics' (Sikorsky 
1986: 480). 
Political bias against both the public and private sectors also exists. Si- 
korsky is right to argue that there are extremists on both sides, as the left 
`keeps on pressing for more public ownership' and the right `sees nothing 
good except private and market forces, ignoring the failures of the first 
and the gaps of the second' (Sikorsky 1986: 478). The fear of privatization 
on the left has its counterpart fear on the right that society is at the cross- 
roads of a fatal choice between free enterprise (and the freedom and ef- 
ficiency it advocates) or a public enterprise system (and the inefficiencies 
and bureaucracy associated with it). Attempting to work wholly within 
such biases creates the danger that public enterprise reforms will take the 
form of what Pestieau has likened to the Stalinist purges or the Inquisition 
in which by way of analogy ̀ the prosecutor does not care to make his char- 
ges specific, or at least to give them foundations, because in his mind the 
defendants are guilty for all instances and purposes' (Pestieau 1989: 294). 
Most of Tanzania's nationalization measures were based on this ap- 
proach. The subsequent need for public enterprise reforms argues 
against its suitability. The next sections examine other possible strategies 
for reorganizing Tanzania's public sector, such as privatization, rationali- 
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zation and deregulation, their potential limitations and chances of suc- 
cess. 
What Privatization Seeks to Achieve 
Many researchers have chosen to confine their understanding of ̀ pri- 
vatization' to the transfer of ownership and control from the public to the 
private sector. In most cases they have limited this to the transfer of legal 
and equitable rights in the assets of public enterprises (Hemming and 
Mansoor, 1988: 31; van de Walle, 1989: 601). Bienen and Waterbury 
(1989: 617) have categorically stated that the mere liquidation of public 
assets, sale of minority shares in existing private enterprises, deregulation 
of private economic activity or the attempt to make the public sector be- 
have like the private sector do not amount to instances of privatization. 
Their interpretation is narrower than that provided by Kay and Thom- 
pson, for whom privatization covers several mechanisms or what they call 
`means of changing the relationship between government and the private 
sector' (Kay and Thompson, 1986: 18). 
Although ongoing political processes have considered most proposals 
for reorganizing public enterprises as forms of privatization, this is not 
necessarily the case. Privatization, strictly speaking, is the juridical trans- 
fer of ownership of assets and liabilities from the public to the private sec- 
tor. Other means of changing the relationship between the government 
and the private sector may include increases in subsidies for export pro- 
motion, research and development or the marketing of new products in 
the private sector. They may even include joint participation in strategic 
research, education and training, or the state may underwrite the lia- 
bilities incurred by private firms when performing state-related contracts 
in the development of strategic products. Such measures do alter the re- 
lationship between government and the private sector, but do not amount 
to privatization. 
The philosophical assumptions of privatization policies are that the 
public sector is inferior to the private one, that competition is the key to 
efficiency, that efficiency cannot be achieved by relying on public enter- 
prises, and that reducing public ownership and increasing private owner- 
ship inevitably entails increases in personal freedom, personal choice and 
democracy (Abromeit,1986: 155). Viewed from such a perspective, pri- 
vatization becomes a strategy, not for improving the relationship between 
the state and the private sector, but for changing it. On 1 November 1983, 
the British Financial Secretary to the Treasurer listed the creation of a 
new generation of stockholders who are owners and workers as one of the 
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goals of privatization, saying this would reduce the division between 
owners and earners (Abromeit, 1986: 156). If this is the case, then privat- 
ization seeks also to change the power structure within production pro- 
cesses, by linking ownership, management and work and by removing the 
basis for confrontation and worker organization which traditionally have 
centred on modalities of distribution and conflict resolution in both the 
public and private sectors. From this perspective, a new, union-free en- 
terprise system based on multiple identities on the part of workers - 
playing the role of workers, supervisors, directors and shareholders - is 
seen as a sustainable way of reducing conflict. That is why Kay and Thom- 
pson (1986: 19) and Heald (1984: 2) have argued that privatization has as 
one of its objectives the taming of unions and the creation of an atmos- 
phere for new non-conflictual industrial relations. 
Privatization can also be categorized according to its fiscal objectives. 
It seeks to provide avenues for relieving the economy of the fiscal burdens 
imposed by excessive public sector borrowing. For example, in Britain, 
which has taken the lead on privatization as an instrument for fiscal re- 
form, it is clear from policy trends in the past decade that the Conserva- 
tive government has had to rely on two instruments of reform - reduced 
public spending or reduced tax. Commenting on the feasibility of this, 
Brittan has asserted that as attempts to reduce the proportion of GDP 
absorbed by public spending and taxation become more difficult, dena- 
tionalization becomes technically easier and politically more acceptable. 
In Britain, therefore, denationalization became an indirect way of reduc- 
ing public spending, which `has been promoted as a success story in the 
crude sense of lists of industries sold off - when there has been a scarcity 
of success in other fields of policy' (Brittan, 1986: 35). 
Given the way privatization featured in the political agenda of the 
Conservatives in Britain, one may agree with Abromeit that before 1979 
the Conservative Party focused only on reducing public spending and tax, 
while privatization hardly featured `in practical politics' (Abromeit, 1986: 
154). The sale of public assets did not feature in the election manifestos 
of the Conservative Party in either 1979 or 1983. It became crucial as a last 
resort strategy for reducing public spending when other strategies failed. 
Brittan may be right when he argues that the impetus for privatization 
came from the government's difficulty in devising criteria for regulating 
the borrowing of nationalized industries. He further argues that the gov- 
ernment realized that if government was to retain ownership and the en- 
terprises were to retain all of their social obligations, the government 
could not refuse them credit. Once they realized that an `arms length re- 
lationship with nationalized industries was impracticable, and that if they 
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really wanted to escape treasury control, the private sector was best for 
them' (Brittan,1986: 35), then privatization became the only rational way 
of reducing public spending. 
But the inefficiency argument ignores the history of public enter- 
prises. Constituted as statutory and in some cases as natural monopolies, 
it is clear they had great potential for inefficiency, which was unlikely to 
be mitigated by the excessive protection afforded. In general, the incen- 
tives provided to public sector managers have not been conducive to in- 
creased commitment, loyalty or trust; the factors shaping private sector 
management responses to organizational goals, for example competitive 
demand, innovation by rival organizations, fluctuations in the value of 
stocks, and so on, were unavailable to public sector managers (Kay and 
Thompson,1986: 18). Compounding this, public sector ownership has al- 
ways been used as a way to produce some level of activity in the least fa- 
voured sectors, in which, according to Richard Pryke (1981: 265) losses 
were already being recorded. 
Despite these disadvantages, studies comparing the private and pub- 
lic sectors have shown that inefficiency is not a public sector monopoly. 
There are good examples of poor performance in similar conditions on 
both sides (Fare, Grosskopf and Logan, 1985). Millward (1982) has 
shown that in many countries the performance of private and public en- 
terprise utilities does not differ significantly. Most of the inefficiencies 
which have characterized the public sector are not inherent, but have 
been carried over from the nature of their activities, their organizational 
structures, their proximity to government agencies or their excessive pro- 
tection from the pressures of competition. Thus their ills may be cured 
without changing their ownership structures. 
But, in many developed countries public sector problems have been 
reduced through privatization. Before discussing the feasibility of this 
strategy in Africa generally or in Tanzania in particular, it is necessary to 
discuss briefly why privatization has met with some success in developed 
countries. 
Privatization in Europe 
Three factors may have been responsible for successful privatization 
programmes in developed countries, and especially in Britain: ideology, 
the abundance of finance markets and careful targeting of enterprises to 
be sold. 
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Ideology 
In Britain and the United States there have been radical shifts in 
popular thinking about development and the role of the state. Concepts 
of social engineering and state welfarism are increasingly being replaced 
by theories of commercialism which put a great deal of faith in market 
forces and little in state intervention. This was pointed out by the British 
Financial Secretary to the Treasurer in 1985 (as quoted by Abromeit 
1986: 159-60). Values are also changing and gravitating towards individ- 
uality and personal choice and freedom or, as Sikorsky has put it, there 
has been a systematic shift away from paternalism and state welfarism (Si- 
korsky,1986: 479). 
This shift in ideology and value systems has provided fertile ground 
for the claim that privatization will lead to popular capitalism. In order to 
facilitate popular participation in stock ownership, during privatization 
the British government set ceilings on the number of shares for which in- 
dividuals or companies could subscribe. Although a few companies man- 
aged to over-subscribe, for a few months there were many small sharehol- 
ders. However, according to Abromeit, the number of smallholders fell 
from 150,000 to fewer than 26,000 in the first few months of the privatiza- 
tion of Cable and Wireless. In British Aerospace, the numbers fell 83 per 
cent within a short period. Abromeit estimates that in British Aerospace 
the number of small shareholders stood at between 0.1 per cent and 4.3 
per cent in 1986 (Abromeit, 1986: 161). But while the official figures pub- 
lished about popular ownership always concentrate on the state of affairs 
at the time of sale and rarely indicate changes in the relative positions of 
smallholders and large-scale holders over time, belief in popular capital- 
ism is very strong in Britain. 
Targeting Public Corporations for Sale 
Identifying enterprises suitable for sale has been crucial to the 
strategies of developed country governments in the implementation of 
privatization programmes. This has been made more complicated by 
public fears, party politics and, at least in Britain, a distinct lack of gov- 
ernmental and ministerial enthusiasm (Abromeit, 1986: 157). Further- 
more, heavy loss-makers earmarked for privatization have not easily 
found buyers - for example, British Airways. Ironically, the British gov- 
ernment began its privatization programme by earmarking profitable and 
dynamic enterprises for sale, namely British Telecom, Associated Ports, 
Amersham International and Cable and Wireless. Furthermore, (see the 
May 1984 comments by the Public Accounts Committee reported in the 
Economist on 30 June 1984: 19, and quoted by Abromeit 1986: 159) 
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shares in these enterprises were sold at very low prices, leading to what 
was regarded as a privatization policy based on cheap sales. Immediately 
after they were sold, the value of their shares rose. As Frank has noted 
(1991: 4) 
Privatizing public enterprises now at bargain basement share 
prices that double next week on the national stock exchange is 
just as fraudulent a practice as nationalizing loss-making enter- 
prises and paying for them above market value or nationalizing 
profitable enterprises with little or no indemnification. 
It can be argued that, although accounts of privatization in Britain 
show that the Treasury gained from the sales (Fraser and Wilson, 1988: 
Ch. 4), the gain resulted more from reduced public sector demand for 
Treasury funding after the sales than on any net gain. Because the aim of 
the British government was to reduce public sector funding, it was pre- 
pared to offer public assets at low or give-away prices and, through tem- 
porary losses, to prevent future losses. 
However, the enterprises which made this programme economically 
and politically supportable in Britain were not the ailing or inefficient 
ones. The government sold off profitable enterprises, which in several 
cases it made even more attractive by writing off fixed interest capital 
debts (Fraser and Wilson, 1988: Ch. 3; Abromeit, 1986: 160) and also by 
renouncing payments due to it from public dividend capital. These were 
all direct subsidies to the privatized industries and as the Economist (3 
March 1984) noted, government continued to fund the privatized enter- 
prises even after their sale. British Aerospace received £250 million from 
the Treasury to build the Airbus A320, after its shares had been sold (Ab- 
romeit,1986: 160). 
Similar support for the private sector exists in the Unites States, where 
at the height of the campaign against the funding of public investments, 
the government invested substantial amounts of money in Chrysler Cor- 
poration of Detroit, the Continental Bank and Trust Company of Chicago 
and the Savings and Loans Banks in Ohio, Maryland, Texas and New 
York City. The interventions were justified as being in the `public inter- 
est', an argument that was rejected in the case of public enterprises 
(Frank, 1991: 3). This also gives insights into the real objective of privatiz- 
ation. The issue is whether governments in developed countries really 
want to roll back the frontiers of the state by withdrawing from the public 
sector or whether they aim only to reduce the government deficit. 
Methods other than direct sale, such as contracting out or transferring 
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public functions to private firms, have been employed in many European 
countries. In France, denationalization has been confined only to profit- 
able organizations and some nationalizations have been undertaken at 
the time when other public enterprises are being privatized (Backhaus, 
1989: 309). A survey of Berlin in the 1980s, for example, shows that privat- 
ization has concentrated on deregulating and contracting out services 
such as blood donor agencies, school meal providers, office cleaners, the 
building of waste disposals, public building programmes and the design 
of public works schemes (Brede and Hoppe, 1986:210-14). In Schleswig- 
Holstein, similar measures have extended to the construction and plan- 
ning of public works, road maintenance, survey and estate registration, 
state forest and coastal management and environmental protection 
(Brede and Hoppe, 1986: 219). In Hamburg, services again feature heav- 
ily in the functions transferred to the private sector: the cleaning of public 
buildings, sewage disposal, university and hospital laundries and work 
programmes and assistance for the unemployed (Brede and Hoppe, 
1986: 220). 
Some regional governments in Germany, for example in Lower Sax- 
ony, have accepted privatization but restricted its pace by adopting a pol- 
icy that prior to privatization, it must be clear that the undertakings of the 
privatized enterprises will be self-supporting, that privatization will not 
jeopardize the interests of public service employees, that access to ser- 
vices will remain open, that the scale and quality of privatized services will 
be permanently assured, and that charges will remain low (Brede and 
Hoppe,1986: 221). The transfer of assets has been confined to transport, 
housing, energy and selected credit institutions. Similar policies and 
reservations have been adopted by the Rhineland government in Ger- 
many. 
Italy is a clear European example of a state too involved in public in- 
vestments to get out without disruption. Although public debate has been 
intense and the will for reforms is unmistakable, practical problems have 
limited the pace of privatization. Political dependence on the public en- 
terprise system by politicians, government bureaucrats, workers and the 
population as a whole is one of the main obstacles. Personnel and em- 
ployment problems, third party liabilities and management resistance are 
other crucial obstacles (Stefani, 1986: 241-7). Most of the practical prob- 
lems of privatization in Italy resemble those likely to limit the pace of pri- 
vatization in Africa. 
As has been noted, most politicians use privatization as a programme 
to mobilize political support, but are also afraid of the consequences of 
losing total control over the sector. Hybridization, or what some refer to 
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as `cold privatization' (Reddy, 1990: 105) seems to be providing compen- 
sation for this fear. Under hybridization, some sections of an enterprise 
may be separated off into independent companies which are then run as 
joint ventures, with state ownership normally between 40 and 49 per cent. 
Hybrids are not very popular, especially in England where they are still 
considered by the private sector as `cold nationalizations' rather than 
`cold privatizations' (Abromeit, 1986: 165). But hybridization somehow 
brings to the fore the fiscal objectives of privatization policies, especially 
in Britain. According to the Economist of 24 November 1984 (p. 16) hy- 
brids show that the major concern of the British government is to control 
the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) and that as long as the 
PSBR is right or manageable, the government does not worry about the 
public sector at all. 
This has led Abromeit to conclude that in Britain `the government 
with all its passion for the private economy, is less bent on creating a new 
(private) economic order, than on taking the pressure off its PSBR' (Ab- 
romeit,1986: 165). Although the 1991 reorganization of the British health 
service indicates a government as committed to building a private econ- 
omy as to controlling expenditure on public investments, its true position 
will be seen when or if privatized enterprises begin to suffer losses. The 
state will probably come to their rescue, because leaving them to perish 
will nullify the economic and political grounds on which they were pri- 
vatized. In any case, this wave of privatizations in Europe is not the first 
and will most likely not be the last. 
Neither past nor present privatizations have reduced the role of gov- 
ernment as an actor in any economy. As Backhaus has pointed out, it is 
not unusual for newly privatized industries to be subjected to new regula- 
tory agencies (Backhaus,1989: 309). The 1991 Citizens Charter in Britain 
and the rise of new consumer and price watch organizations, the new 
trusts and quasi-governmental regulatory agencies for standards and the 
environment, new taxes and their enforcement agencies are a few of the 
many regulatory structures that will increase government control over 
economic life and activities in Britain. 
Privatization and Economic Reforms 
A booming private sector would have numerous advantages for Tan- 
zania's population. With sufficient government support, it could reintro- 
duce competition in the economy, widen public choice and make pro- 
ducts and services cheaper and more accessible. A private sector 
operating at arm's length from the government would be free from politi- 
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cal interference and thereby reduce the numerous political costs that 
have hitherto overburdened taxpayers. However, the creation or expan- 
sion of Tanzania's private sector through the dismantling of the public 
sector has to be assessed in the context of existing conditions and limita- 
tions. The problem of international debt and its impact on reform pro- 
cesses, the issue of privatization as a strategy for modernization, the le- 
gacy of dependence, the lack of entrepreneurial culture and its impact on 
market reforms, the tradition of state intervention or development from 
above and the possibility of resistance to reforms from political, social 
and managerial groups with vested interests in the status quo, all could af- 
fect the viability or the speed of privatization in Tanzania. 
The National Debt and Market Reforms 
Tanzania has embarked on a serious programme of economic reform 
under the structural adjustment programmes initiated and supervised by 
the World Bank and the IMF. As the World Bank report on Sub-Saharan 
Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (1989) has pointed out, the cur- 
rent crisis in Africa is a crisis of governance, arising from an excessively 
large, static, inefficient and centralized state which absorbs a significant 
portion of public expenditure but is incapable of mobilizing and freeing 
the productive forces necessary to enable the economies of Africa to 
meet either their basic and development needs or their national and in- 
ternational obligations. The World Bank correctly states that economic 
reforms must be accompanied by political reforms that can restore legit- 
imacy, democracy, the rule of law, grassroots participation and popular 
empowerment (World Bank, 1989). 
Current problems must also be tackled in terms of their historical 
origins. The centralized and bureaucratic states of many African coun- 
tries, especially in eastern Africa,, emerged from a colonial history which 
encouraged weak infrastructure, a lack of skills, regional imbalances and 
poor social service systems. In the 1960s, these structural deficiencies 
were glaringly obvious and available to justify demands for strong, execu- 
tive states able to intervene domestically and to engage in what was then 
called `social engineering' to bring about social change. International 
donor agencies and governments encouraged the trend, which supported 
their interventionist approaches to development (Harrod, 1986: 212). 
Institution building-oriented donor policies, state formation, national 
building and administrative reforms led the development agendas of the 
1960s and early 1970s (Harrod, 1986: 210). For local bureaucracies, state 
formation and nation building implied a strong state capable of bringing 
about rapid change though executive presidentialism, one-party rule, a 
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weak judiciary, firm control over local authorities, producer coopera- 
tives, chambers of commerce and trade unions. Once these were attained, 
the state began operating as the centre of all activities, further centraliz- 
ing other units of organization - families, communities, schools, fac- 
tories, the military and other important units of governance. (On the de- 
velopment of bureaucratic systems in eastern and southern Africa a more 
detailed account has been given by Asmerom,1989:47-73, and Mutahaba 
1989: Ch. 5). 
International politics shaped this period of state formation and nation 
building in Africa. First and foremost, modernization dominated the 
agenda of every agency of international development, including the 
United Nations agencies. Modernization was equated with western- 
ization (or for those countries aligned to the East, easternization). Afri- 
can countries created huge corporations and large factories with sophis- 
ticated technologies equivalent to those of the West or East. Donors and 
lenders sent technical experts, who immediately introduced modern 
models of management and growth. Management by objectives, organiz- 
ation development, and strategic management models were introduced 
even in the civil service, where the objective was neither marketing nor 
profit, but service. Organizational models for rural development, such as 
the Programme Implementation Model (PIM), based on rural develop- 
ment in industrialized economies, were attempted, for example in Kenya 
(Oyugi,1989: 110-14). 
In Tanzania, models of rural transformation started with an attempt to 
set up rural growth centres based on the Israeli kibbutz model in the early 
1960s. When that model failed, Soviet and Chinese-type collectives were 
created under the villagization programme (from 1969-75). In each in- 
itiative, international donors encouraged the growth of authoritarian and 
bureaucratic states, dealing with and extending aid or credit to or through 
only these states. Independent agencies, non-governmental organiza- 
tions, and grassroots organizations could not, even where they were unre- 
stricted by government, deal directly or successfully with international 
agencies and governments. 
Most public corporations and public bureaucracies were established 
during this era of institution building and modernization. As mentioned 
earlier, some corporations, such as those developing hybrid agricultural 
crops, were formed in response to the availability of aid funds specifically 
tied to the development of such crops. In some cases, corporations were 
formed on the basis of technical advice available as aid. 
The bureaucratic infrastructure established through state formation, 
nation building and modernization thus created a market for interna- 
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tional finance and technology. As shown in Chapter Three, public enter- 
prises became net consumers of foreign exchange and foreign technol- 
ogy. Some of the technology was obsolete, some was static (Coulson, 
1978; Shivji, 1975; Mihyo, 1989), and it was possible to dump such tech- 
nology on Tanzania only because the public sector was huge and because 
the private sector was not permitted to deal directly with international 
donors, finance agencies or technology suppliers. 
However, the current structural adjustment programmes are not 
necessarily aimed at restoring democracy and good governance. Their 
purpose is to enable third world (and primarily African) governments to 
reduce public spending so as to meet their international loan liabilities. 
Issues of governance, empowerment, democracy and free market enter- 
prise are seen as longer-term measures to increase capacity to repay 
loans these government had been encouraged to borrow in the 1960s in 
the interests of modernization, institution building, national stability and 
development. When the initially low interest rates climbed, and African 
and other third world governments began to fall behind in their payments, 
mechanisms through which credit had once been promoted (such as the 
expansion of the state and the creation of huge bureaucratic structures) 
and the huge public sector (which absorbed old and obsolete techno- 
logies through project aid and technical assistance) began to be seen as 
problems. State banks, which had channelled credit to corporations and 
acted as agents for the supply of raw materials and inputs to rural and 
urban producers as part of project aid, are now perceived as a problem, 
because through such schemes, peasants have become heavily indebted 
for fertilizers, insecticides and gunny sacks, most of which came through 
project aid and input support. The same banks had absorbed interna- 
tional loans for crop development projects and supervised such projects 
on behalf of the multilateral agencies and bilateral donors who sponsored 
them. Because they were based on loans, these crop development pro- 
grammes increased the cost of producing primary commodities, making 
any positive change in international primary commodity prices meaning- 
less. In fact, increases in these prices were made even less likely, because 
crop development funding did substantially increase primary commodity 
production, but this in turn pushed down or stagnated the prices of these 
commodities in real terms. 
Thus the current debt crisis grew partly from the modernization pro- 
cesses of the 1960s and the waves of bureaucratization and the expansion 
of the public sector that accompanied these developments, and partly 
from the use of the public sector and the huge state machinery by interna- 
tional finance, international donors and multinational corporations to 
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channel finance, aid and technology imports and inputs into developing 
countries. The principal beneficiaries of these interactions were the pub- 
lic enterprises and their bureaucracies, the state bureaucracies and the 
international suppliers of finance, aid and technology. The obvious vic- 
tims were the target populations, who have paid high political premiums 
to sustain undemocratic institutions and activities. The less obvious victim 
has been the private sector, which suffocated under the weight of these 
bureaucracies and was kept on the defensive through discrimination and, 
on occasion, through unfair competition from state corporations. It is 
both unfair and dishonest to pass the burdens created by the public sector 
in alliance with international agencies - debt, static technologies, over- 
sized corporations, poor management systems, monopoly-oriented mar- 
keting, unproductive systems for organizing work, and objectives with 
little productive content - to the private sector. 
Privatization will be very difficult in the period of structural adjust- 
ment because most public corporations were formed during periods of 
economic prosperity, at a time when currencies were stable. Some en- 
tered areas in which the private sector was less active, and if such areas 
were unattractive to the private sector during better financial times, it is 
very unlikely they will attract it in times of crisis. Specialization may turn 
out to be another logistical problem in Tanzania. Public enterprises were 
encouraged to establish themselves in more difficult and less lucrative 
specialization, such as simple fabrics for school, office, hospital and mili- 
tary uniforms, farm implements, wire products, building materials, and so 
on. These are not the products currently regarded as dynamic by the pri- 
vate sector. Confectionaries, beverages, perfumes, wood products, res- 
taurants, and so forth are less capital intensive, less import dependent, 
cheaper and therefore easier to market and attract less state interference 
and regulation. In the present restructuring, with its stringent conditions 
under import support programmes and credit conditions based on the re- 
quirements for collateral security, the private sector will be operating 
under very difficult conditions which will limit the sizes of firms and oper- 
ations. Most of the mammoth structures of the 1970s - jokingly referred 
to as `white elephants' - will not attract many private investors, local or 
foreign. 
The cost of privatizing existing public enterprises is going to be higher 
in Tanzania and in Africa generally than it has been in developed coun- 
tries. In Britain, the public subsidizes the new owners through windfall 
sales and the waiver of rights to fixed interest on capital debts, or the 
waiver of rights of entitlement to dividends. In some cases, the govern- 
ment has carried out rescue operation by funding privatized enterprises. 
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This has been possible and politically acceptable because the British gov- 
ernment has clearly indicated that it is ready to suffer losses at the time of 
privatization as a way of reducing longer term losses through continued 
public spending. Secondly, the British government has made `competi- 
tion' a factor in its privatization programme. It wants the public to 
measure its success on privatization by the extent to which it has managed 
to introduce competition. Thirdly, and most importantly, the British gov- 
ernment has managed to sell some of its corporations cheaply because it 
was the primary creditor and has had some leeway regarding the disposi- 
tion of these debts and the setting of an appropriate purchase price. 
None of these advantages are available to the Tanzanian government 
or to any other African government. They have no leeway in deciding 
even the appropriateness of the restructuring measures, including privat- 
ization. Windfall sales, if and when allowed, will not help them raise the 
necessary revenues to reduce the government deficit, nor to increase 
debt-servicing capability, which is the primary objective. Most African 
governments will find it difficult to write off public sector debts or divi- 
dends, because the objective of privatization will not be to score points by 
freeing the market but to raise money with which to pay debts. The pri- 
vate sector is unlikely to be attracted to take over a sector haunted by debt 
and experiencing a crisis of confidence from all sides - the masses for 
whom it means debt, shortages and inflation, the state that used it to raise 
loans and attract donor support during the era of modernization and is 
now ready to use it for the same reason with different results, and the in- 
ternational development and trade agencies that encouraged the sector 
to expand as a secure market for credit and technology and are now wor- 
ried that it has grown out of proportion and is becoming an obstacle to 
the repayment of loans and interests it was used to push. 
Privatization and the Bureaucratic Tradition 
Modernization, bolstered in Tanzania by ujamaa socialism, was intro- 
duced from above. Neither the workers and peasants (the proclaimed 
beneficiaries) nor the private entrepreneurs (the professed adversaries) 
were given a chance to debate, enrich or augment its policies. In their im- 
plementation, policies were dictated even to those involved in the running 
of existing and prosperous structures of power, production and distribu- 
tion. Modernization policy was introduced and implemented in a very 
technical and bureaucratic way which undermined most of its social com- 
ponents (Luttrel, 1971; McHenry, 1979). 
This top-down style was a continuation of the colonial tradition. The 
colonial government in Tanzania had also engineered economic reorgan- 
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ization. To create markets it moved the population, reorganized village 
settlements and introduced labour regulations which required people to 
leave their traditional habitat. It introduced trade and commerce by 
burning fishing villages, boats and fishing equipment on Lake Tanganyika. 
It converted certain farming communities into communities of migrant la- 
bourers by cutting them out of agricultural production, and in some in- 
stances distributing boiled seeds in order to engineer crop failures and 
famines and to compel people to migrate in search of work. It used 
famine and hardship relief management to control the distribution pro- 
cess in favour of migration, regional imbalance and perverse economic 
development (Kjekshus, 1977; Koponen, 1988,1989). 
Ujamaa socialism did not depart from the bureaucratic tradition. 
Peasants were moved into collectives with a minimum of consultation. 
Mobilization and politicization were used instead of conviction and con- 
sultation (Cliffe and Saul,1972; Awiti,1975). Cooperatives were created, 
reorganized and further reorganized without the members being con- 
sulted on the forms of cooperation they wanted (Collinson,1970; Migot- 
Adhola, 1969; Saul, 1970a, 1970b). Public corporations were established 
without parliamentary debate, and some of these (for example, the dis- 
trict development corporations) sought to increase opportunities avail- 
able to people at district level to manage economic activities. During the 
period in which these district development corporations were being laun- 
ched, the district development associations which had been initiated and 
autonomously run by the people were outlawed and disbanded. The most 
prominent of these were the Ruvuma Development Association in Ruvu- 
ma and the Balimi Development Association in Kagera region. 
The myth of mass mobilization which surrounded ujamaa policies 
rested on the belief that Tanzania's traditional systems were based on col- 
lectivism and were naturally inclined towards socialism. This myth ob- 
scured the levels of stratification and social differentiation which existed 
in Tanzania prior to its incorporation into the world capitalist system 
through colonization. The myth of mobilization is now being replaced by 
the myth of the market as a strategy for modernization. The new myth is 
based on the assumption that Tanzania's society is ready and eager to 
copy models of growth that have led to sustained growth in the advanced 
countries of the world. Both the myth of mobilization and the myth of 
growth through the market generalize about the eagerness and readiness 
of Tanzania's society for change. Secondly, neither strategy seeks to un- 
derstand and use Tanzania's culture and traditions as a starting point. 
Thirdly, both have taken their own models - whether cooperatives in so- 
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cialism or the creation of modern companies - as unquestionable cor- 
porate forms for organizing production and distribution. 
Large public corporations have ignored the importance of small-scale 
economic and productive units. The large, public enterprises may control 
the economy, but most economic life is organized around informal organ- 
izations, small-scale firms, family partnerships and small-scale, kin-based 
cooperatives. Current strategies, snugly within the bureaucratic ap- 
proach, seem poised to duplicate and transfer economic and social or- 
ganizations from the public to the private sector without considering 
whether their size and the corporate forms defined by company and co- 
operative law are appropriate. 
And while the current restructuring strategies are one product of a 
long policy dialogue between international donors and the Tanzanian 
government, no dialogue has taken place among the producer bodies - 
the chambers of commerce, the cooperative movements, the regional de- 
velopment associations and the so-called informal organizations (the in- 
formal organizations are normally assumed to be unorganized although 
within their own setting they are organized and reachable). If privatiza- 
tion policies are handed down from above, they will eliminate the oppor- 
tunity to contribute to increased participation, grassroots empowerment 
or democracy. Before policies are launched, the government must be cer- 
tain that the proposed structures are appropriate - that they are condu- 
cive to cost-efficient systems of production, service and distribution. It is 
essential that policy-making should not be based on the pathological view 
of development which in the past reduced the impact of modernization 
and mass mobilization as strategies for change. 
The Social Dimensions of Privatization and Reform 
In their comparison of privatization in developed and developing 
countries, Henry Bienen and John Waterbury (1989: 617-32) discuss dif- 
ferences in the social implications of such reforms in the two settings, 
starting from the general premise that the impact of privatization in pub- 
lic sector dominated economies will inevitably be deeper than in private 
sector dominated economies. In countries where the state is the single 
largest employer, the state uses the public sector as a mechanism for so- 
cial stability. For example, in Tanzania, graduates from institutions of 
higher learning have traditionally all found employment in the public sec- 
tor immediately after graduation. The state has also been the dominant 
supplier of health and education services, and the public sector has had 
exclusive control of the banking, insurance and social security systems. 
(Tanzania is a good example, although they cite others. See Bienen and 
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Waterbury 1989: 618). They argue that this degree of dependence on the 
public sector is rare in developed countries. 
Their second argument is that this dependence has created ideologi- 
cal and programmatic constraints on any future attempts to reorganize 
the public sector. These are clearly visible in the functional orientation of 
public corporations in Tanzania. Tanzania has public enterprises formed 
to carry out special ideological or political programmes: employment, 
education, regional equity, access to credit for the poor, rural transforma- 
tion, the low-cost provision of basic needs, and so on. Few corporations 
with such political orientations operate in Europe or North America. The 
fact that the function of enterprises is directed towards such political or 
social agendas is what makes nationalization more popular in developed 
countries than in developed countries. The nationalization of banks, in- 
surance companies, large import and export companies attracted mass 
demonstrations for support in Tanzania partly because it was geared to- 
wards public ownership but primarily because it was calculated to reduce 
foreign ownership. In Europe, nationalization were perceived more as 
acts of economic reorganization, and in general in developing countries 
they are seen as acts of further emancipation. Both nationalization and 
privatization will be more acceptable if they play an emancipatory role. 
If privatization undermines national sovereignty or weakens local con- 
trol, it will provide fertile ground for nationalist agitation and become a 
rallying point for future nationalization. One of the reasons why very few 
political groups openly support divestiture in key enterprises, even in the 
strongest economies of the third world such as India, Malaysia or Nigeria, 
is that the presiding politicians would lose legitimacy if such enterprises 
were to slip back into foreign hands (Reddy, 1990: 104; Puthucheary, 
1990: 120-21). In countries which have easily privatized large portions of 
the public sector, such as Chile and Argentina, most of the commanding 
heights of the economy were in private hands, and privatization began 
long before the current wave of economic restructuring (Boneo and 
Waterhouse, 1990: 104; Glade, 1990: 163-5). In others, such as Turkey, 
where the policy was initially aimed at attracting foreign investments and 
substantial progress was made in that direction, political opposition 
groups have used the courts to reduce the pace of privatization, alleging 
unconstitutionality. Turkish courts have accepted such claims (Kjell- 
strom,1990: 30-2). 
Where economic reforms are not accompanied by political reforms, 
the political and social dimensions of such programmes become more 
complicated. In many countries, nationalizations were carried out as part 
of new political programmes. They were introduced by new governments 
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professing new ideologies: governments promised to use the public sector 
to extend services, control prices, increase employment and eradicate 
poverty, ignorance and disease. The current reforms are in the majority of 
cases being carried out by the same governments that implemented the 
policies now being challenged, which implies that they cannot approach 
these reforms with the same enthusiasm they brought to their initial pro- 
gramme. Even where, as in the case of Tanzania, the regime has declared 
itself to have changed, or to have abandoned old political philosophies, it 
remains trapped between new and old ideologies. It has its proteg6s in 
the management of the public sector and cannot totally abandon the past 
without undermining their own legitimacy. It is difficult for them to play 
roles that vary with each historical phase, without losing face. They were 
midwives to the birth of the public sector; when the sector was ailing they 
nursed it and attempted to keep it alive. Naturally they may find it difficult 
to lead the requiem for what they themselves have fostered. 
If they do lose ground, other social factors are likely to come to the 
fore. Capital markets are thinner in Tanzania than in other African coun- 
tries such as Nigeria, Me d1voire, Egypt, Botswana and Kenya. This is 
further complicated by the fact that the little capital available is concen- 
trated in the hands of a few ethnic groups, which historical circumstances 
have favoured to be well placed in the private sector. People of Asian 
origin and a few business groups from northern and northwestern Tanza- 
nia stand a better chance of benefiting from privatization and similar re- 
forms, because they are well organized at family, regional and ethnic 
level. State monopoly is likely to be converted into ethnic and regional 
monopoly of a private nature. 
This is apart from the problem of nepotism, which has been common 
in many public corporations as some managers preferred to employ wor- 
kers from their own ethnic groups, both as a form of group benefit and as 
a way to make labour control easier. New owners will find it very difficult 
to retain internal labour markets organized on the lines of patronage, 
clientelism and blood or ethnic ties. 
Another factor which is not currently a serious problem but may 
become one in the course of reorganization is religion. Public enterprises 
have mitigated feelings of ethnic and religious inequity. If privatization 
allows political processes to allocate enterprises or shares or to control 
bidding, sensitive groups will watch carefully to ensure that they are not 
being marginalized. If they feel that they have been denied opportunities 
through religious bias, the process will provide a new front for mobiliza- 
tion and opposition. 
Students may also oppose privatization. Current reforms of govern- 
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ment spending have hit students harder than anyone. Beginning in 1991, 
students have had to fmd private sponsors to cover one third of their costs 
for education. They must buy their own books and bedding; they must pay 
their own fares to and from universities and after graduation they have to 
find jobs on their own. These measures have nothing to do with privatiza- 
tion, but are directly linked with structural adjustment. Between May 
1989 and October 1991 the students at the University of Dar es Salaam, 
the Institute of Development Management in Morogoro and the Techni- 
cal College in Dar es Salaam were locked in a struggle against declining 
social services in their institutions (Omari and Mihyo,1991). As the struc- 
tural adjustment programmes continue, they will continue to be the lar- 
gest organized group able and willing to resist reforms that undermine so- 
cial and other advantages provided by existing policies. 
Such social, political and economic factors call for a cautious ap- 
proach to the reorganization of the public sector. While some corpora- 
tions will have to be dissolved, this cannot be proposed without consider- 
ation for its logical repercussions. For example, the dissolution of the 
National Bus Company in August 1991 has raised problems of how to 
handle the former employees of the company. Retrenchment is one of the 
easiest solutions but requires that the government, which is heavily con- 
strained financially, pay severance allowance, repatriation costs, social 
security benefits, and so on. Yet the private sector will not be attracted to 
purchases where a precondition that the workers have to be retained is 
made. Few buyers will be prepared to inherit a work force accustomed to 
years of mismanagement, trained to be inefficient or recruited more for 
the fulfilment of recruitment policies than for their skills. Again, the gov- 
ernment will be obliged to locate ways to meet the cost of unemployment, 
as workers are laid off, increasing the costs of privatization. If schemes 
can be worked out through which donors who benefited from the public 
sector economy in its days of prosperity finance the social costs of reor- 
ganization, this would enable the process to proceed more smoothly. In- 
deed, policy dialogue with donors must continue to address this issue and 
ensure that reforms do not aggravate the debt problem. In the meantime, 
the Tanzanian government is under real pressures to act, and may wish to 
begin experimenting with other strategies for reorganizing the public sec- 
tor. 
Other Strategies for Rationalizing the Public Sector 
In its report to the President of the Republic of Tanzania (Problems of 
Parastatals and Proposals for Structural Reforms) in December 1989, the 
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Tanzania Association of Parastatal Organizations (TAPO) strongly ex- 
pressed its belief that the public sector could be made to perform well. In 
its main recommendations, TAPO called for a change in the cultural 
framework of Tanzania's society and called upon the government to take 
the lead by adopting a culture of productivity in place of the culture of ad- 
ministration (TAPO, 1989:44). Their second major recommendation was 
that Tanzania's society should begin to rely more on material than on 
moral incentives (TAPO, 1989: 45). Their third important recommenda- 
tion was that the government provide more room for market forces to 
operate, in both the public and the private sectors, and that ̀ profitability 
should become the fundamental goal of the commerce and industry sec- 
tor': 
This applies to parastatals and private business enterprises alike. 
Such profitability is rooted in the twin concepts of efficiency and 
effectiveness. (p. 47) 
Their recommendation implies that any sector, whether public or pri- 
vate, that is controlled and kept under surveillance by government is un- 
likely to be effective or efficient. 
TAPO called for the formation of a Parastatal Reforms Commission 
(TAPO, 1989: 47) to review the public sector. They recommended that 
the commission should start by redefining the `commanding heights' of 
the economy, that natural monopolies should be given new structures 
which would enable them to operate without accumulating losses or caus- 
ing hardships; commercially viable parastatals should be subjected to 
`competition on similar premises with the private sector' (TAPO, 1989: 
48) and non-viable parastatals should be allowed to `go into partnership 
with viable parastatals, cooperative organizations, domestic private inves- 
tors or foreign investors' (TAPO, 1989: 48). 
They suggested that the government had too many regulatory bodies 
and could replace these with a Public Enterprise Board staffed with high- 
ly experienced and qualified professional enterprise managers and able 
to appoint boards and management executives, review performance, re- 
define performance objectives, evaluate management systems, capital 
structures and performance and audit reports (TAPO,1989: 49-50). They 
called for the withdrawal of government from the running of the activities 
of parastatals and proposed that the government should restrict its 
powers to licensing, taxing, and providing incentives and support for the 
stability of both the private and public sectors (TAPO,1989: 50-51). 
These recommendations and indeed the whole report, provided a 
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sound basis on which Tanzania's economy can be rationalized. The for- 
mation of a Public Enterprise Review Commission is overdue, and if the 
sector continues to be examined from assumptions that are not based on 
enquiry, the measures taken to restructure the sector will be based on 
conjecture, rumours and the experiences and speculations of political 
and economic fortune-tellers and healers. While an overall identification 
of major problem areas will require a study devoted exclusively to the 
exercise of reform, a modest contribution can be made here regarding the 
criteria to be considered. In addition to the organizational reforms sug- 
gested in Chapter Seven, it may be necessary to newly demarcate the 
frontiers of `the commanding heights', to reduce the influence of govern- 
ment, to change the legal structure governing the powers of control agen- 
cies and to strengthen enterprise boards. These reforms maybe more ef- 
fective if the political structures of the state also change, increasing the 
accountability of the government to the people through Parliament and 
other representative organs. 
Redefining the Commanding Heights 
The Tanzanian government launched a number of public corporations 
in key strategic areas in the 1960s and early 1970s in order to enable the 
government to control what were then `the commanding heights' of the 
economy. Most of these initial corporations were in the areas of trade, 
tourism, banking, insurance, industry, housing, education and health. 
Some of these areas were unattractive to the then small and undercapi- 
talized local private sector, and the government stepped in to prevent 
their being dominated by foreign companies. These public enterprises 
can be clustered into seven basic categories. 
The first includes corporations that were established to provide 
necessary infrastructure. For example, tourist corporations constructed 
hotels, while regional trading and transport companies developed re- 
gional trade and transport infrastructure. These corporations were pion- 
eers in their areas of responsibility, but they have been working in their 
respective areas for more than twenty years, and need to be sup- 
plemented by private initiatives. Their goal was to establish basic infra- 
structure. This having been accomplished, opportunities exist for both 
private and public initiatives. These corporations could be relieved of the 
burden of carrying out their functions on their own, and allowed to oper- 
ate in conjunction with private corporations in ways that will enhance 
their efficiency. 
The second category is that of organizations directed towards achiev- 
ing regional equity, such as trading and transport companies, and crop 
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marketing boards. At the time they were formed, private initiatives were 
limited and cooperative unions were weak. It may be appropriate now to 
decide whether regional equity and balance in growth is best encouraged 
through centralized bodies or whether the new development associations, 
the regional chambers of commerce and the new district-based producer 
unions, all of which were ineffective earlier but are mushrooming now, 
provide a more sound basis for sustainable regional development. If this 
is the case, regional equity-oriented boards could, by way of devolution, 
surrender their functions to these regional bodies. 
The third category includes corporations created to promote import 
substitution. A variety of these produce textiles, leather, machine tools, 
beverages and paper products. Most operated with difficulty; their costs 
were very high and their products were in some cases more expensive 
than imports. Some could easily be redirected towards import and export 
activities. Because trade liberalization threatens their very existence, 
there maybe no justification in tying them to import substitution-oriented 
production. Where they retain the ability to produce competitive pro- 
ducts, they could be strengthened. But where they operate unfavourably, 
they could be allowed to act as the main importers of their specialized 
commodities. 
Human resource development organizations were formed for the spe- 
cific purpose of developing high-level skills. They include universities, 
specialized institutes and management development boards. They were 
formed independently, and in some instances perform overlapping func- 
tions. Engineering, water resources and land development institutes carry 
out functions that could easily be incorporated into the activities of the 
University of Dar es Salaam. Management and human resources in- 
stitutes also carry out functions which could be transferred to the Univer- 
sity of Dar es Salaam. Although institutes are likely to resist incorporation 
into university structures, their independent existence requires duplicate 
training facilities and costs. The independent bodies for management de- 
velopment in accountancy, auditing, materials management, and quantity 
surveying could also be grouped, since most of their training facilities 
could be provided through a single organization. 
An additional group of training institutions aims at rural skill forma- 
tion. Most are known as `folk development colleges'. At the time they 
were formed, non-governmental groups, development association, re- 
gional cooperatives and mass organizations (for example, the parents' 
union and the workers' union) were not allowed to establish training fa- 
cilities, but beginning in 1988 many privately-oriented training institutions 
were formed by non-governmental bodies. Folk development colleges, 
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which are more oriented towards political training than skill formation, 
are becoming less and less relevant in rural development, and could easily 
be phased out. 
Political projects and enterprises also exist within Tanzania's public 
enterprise system. One outstanding political project is the Capital Devel- 
opment Authority, which has as its main objective the establishment of a 
new capital. The Capital Development Authority has managed to estab- 
lish substantial infrastructure for government offices in the intended new 
capital, Dodoma. However, at the end of July 1991 it was estimated that if 
all the government ministries were to move to the new capital, the govern- 
ment would have to spend four billion shillings to move its workers, ex- 
cluding any costs for temporary housing, new equipment, or even the cost 
of building enough houses to cater for staff. The move, in short, would re- 
quire massive amounts of money. The government is trying to recover 
from financial crisis, and such a programme would leave the treasury 
without resources for other development programmes. It would be more 
realistic to suspend the project indefinitely. 
Public bodies such as ideological institutes, wings for training the peo- 
ples' militia, and party and worker union branches whose main function is 
to promote the vested interests of groups in power, and whose costs are 
met by public corporations and special marketing bodies operating with- 
in political organs (for example, the Elders' Trade Organizations and 
consumer groups) could also be abandoned. Similarly, state organiza- 
tions such as those formed to control wages, prices, labour markets, ex- 
ports, imports, foreign contracts, construction contracts, tenders for gov- 
ernment or other corporations, management contracts and censorship do 
not have a role in the current era of deregulated markets, trade liberaliza- 
tion and increased autonomy of production and distribution activities. 
Finally, some enterprises could be disbanded because they have com- 
pletely failed to meet their objectives. The best example would be the Bi- 
cycle Company; another is the glass factory, which established all the nec- 
essary infrastructure but failed to operate. A few brick factories in 
Arusha and Dar es Salaam fall in this category. The majority of district 
development corporations have also failed to live up to their expecta- 
tions, and now specialize in running bars and social halls. An objective 
survey will reveal a number of corporations whose fundamental objec- 
tives have completely disappeared and which therefore could be dis- 
banded. 
Further Organizational Changes 
In addition to the changes suggested in Chapter Seven, legal changes 
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would be required to allow some autonomy to the corporations which 
would remain in operation. Primarily, this would entail the government's 
withdrawal from direct control of both the public and private sectors. For 
public corporations, a single parent ministry to coordinate the needs and 
activities of public enterprises may play a more useful and supportive role 
than is possible in the present system, under which each corporation has 
one or more parent ministry. Concentrating the activities of all enter- 
prises in one ministry may reduce multiple lines of communication, 
multiple command posts and the delays in decision-making which are 
caused by multiple and overlapping channels. 
Holding corporations seem to have negatively affected the operations 
of corporations. Apart from the fact that they are non-productive and de- 
pend on the resources generated by subsidiaries, holding corporations 
tend to be top-heavy and bureaucratic. They have a role in slowing deci- 
sion making, information exchange, evaluation, feedback and the dis- 
tribution of products and services. If autonomy is accepted as necessary 
for increasing efficiency, holding corporations may have to be dissolved 
or, where retained, made very small. 
Boards of directors have been weakened by appointments from 
multiple authorities. Boards that include Ministers and Principal Secre- 
taries have tended to act as mini-cabinets. Boards operating under the 
control of corporation executives have been reduced to the level of man- 
agement committees. The absence of material incentives for board mem- 
bers may also have contributed to making boards ineffective, in that ab- 
senteeism, lateness and lack of commitment seem to characterize many 
boards (as noted by Kalembo 1982, and Mengi 1983). The predominance 
of politicians, soldiers and people without managerial expertise has 
tended to reduce the ability of boards to guide the management of para- 
statals. If professional experience was made a prerequisite for member- 
ship, perhaps boards would be stronger. Members' commitment might be 
improved if they were appointed on the basis of contracts spelling out 
their duties and providing adequate compensation. 
Furthermore, corporations would benefit from the challenge of oper- 
ating within the same general financial and market constraints as the pri- 
vate sector. As mentioned in Chapter Seven, mortgages, charges, bonds, 
debentures and other instruments could help to reshape the investments 
and operations of public enterprises. Additional steps may be needed to 
rationalize the capital structures of public enterprises, to adjust them to 
their assets, liabilities and stocks in trade. Capitalization through grants 
could be restricted and more reliance put on subscription and shares. 
Provisions for the conditions under which capital can be increased, re- 
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duced, consolidated, subdivided and converted into stocks for use as se- 
curity within the public lending system or for loans from other public en- 
terprises of a financial nature, could help corporations manage their capi- 
tal on sound economic bases. As the principal shareholder of such 
corporations, the Registrar of the Reasury must play a more active role in 
monitoring the relationship between their liquid and illiquid assets, their 
capital and its rates of return, their securities, charges and debentures 
and their general performance. The Registrar of the Treasury has not 
done so to date because the Registrar is part of the Treasury and the cor- 
porations are under the control of various ministries. It may be more 
strategic to collect the corporations under one ministry and to transfer 
the powers of the Registrar of the Treasury to that ministry. 
All of these measures could help to strengthen the public sector pro- 
viding two broad measures are taken first. The corporations must be 
allowed to decide how to perform their functions without fear. They could 
be allowed unrestricted contractual powers, including the power to con- 
tract and subcontract other corporations and private sector companies to 
carry out some of their functions. Such contracting could be carried out 
more easily by corporations than by the government, because the govern- 
ment's tendering procedures are highly centralized and payment proce- 
dures are lengthy, bureaucratic and channelled through the central bank 
rather than commercial banks. Contracting through the government also 
has all the limitations of dealing with sovereign states, and in Tanzania it 
is still very difficult to bring the legal action against the government for 
breach of contract. Private companies would find it simpler and more se- 
cure to deal with corporations. If all parastatals are operating from one 
ministry or enterprise board, that ministry might coordinate major con- 
tracting arrangements by its corporations and rationalize its policies for 
such functions. However, autonomy would be essential. 
Economic or organizational reforms are insufficient without political re- 
forms. A new structure of governance at national level is a necessary con- 
dition for successful economic reforms. As the recent histories of the So- 
viet Union and of South Africa indicate, political reforms without 
economic reforms cannot bring about a new national order. Similarly, 
changes in the structure of production and distribution require changes 
in the power structures in order to work. Power and production attract 
each other and together they tend to shape distribution. If economic re- 
forms aim at decentralization and deregulation, politics and power must 
also decentralize and devolve. Power must be transferred from the centre 
to the Parliament, to local authorities and to producer organizations 
(such as cooperative unions, chambers of commerce, development asso- 
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ciations and non-governmental voluntary organizations). These need to 
be empowered to act independently and to promote production, trade 
and distribution channels of their own (subject, of course, to the usual 
duties and taxes). 
Governmental and quasi-governmental agencies established to regu- 
late the policies, accounts, human resource development and planning 
activities of local authorities, cooperatives, development associations and 
commercial organizations have to be stripped of their roles and powers. 
This is necessary to allow these bodies to operate without undue inter- 
ference and to rely on experts and agents whom they can seek out on 
technical rather than on paternalistic and political lines and inde- 
pendently contract to advise them. Government bodies specializing in the 
control of peoples' freedom of speech, movement, association and 
choice, should, in the interest of human rights, be disbanded. These in- 
clude bodies for censorship and the several squads whose purpose is the 
surveillance of peoples' movements and economic activities. Such bodies 
represent a colonial legacy which was unjustified during colonial times 
and cannot be justified now. These sorts of political reform need not wait 
for political pluralism. They are essential to any sustainable move away 
from monocratic political structures and towards accountability and plu- 
ralistic political and power structures. The quality of reform is dependent 
on the quality of the changes in power relations between basic producer 
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